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

The four geographical areas sampled

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THE VOTER DECIDES

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With the assistance of

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Preface

In the fall of 1948, the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan carried out a small-scale study of the presidential election of that year. Although restricted in scope, this project was reported in some detail in the hope that it might serve as a "pilot study to the definitive investigation" of voting behavior in subsequent elections.

In March, 1952, the Carnegie Corporation of New York made available to the Survey Research Center, through the Committee on Political Behavior of the Social Science Research Council, a research grant to make possible a nation-wide study of voting behavior in the 1952 presidential election. The present report is the first major publication of the results of this study.

Our list of acknowledgments of assistance given during the course of this study is a long one. Our most obvious obligation is to the Carnegie Corporation whose support made the study possible. We express herewith our appreciation of their willingness to invest a substantial grant in our research proposal. The Corporation is not, of course, in any way responsible for this publication, and is not to be understood as approving by virtue of its grant any of the statements made therein.

This project is the outgrowth of a series of meetings of the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Political Behavior. While this committee has not taken direct responsibility for any specific research project, it has given considerable attention to the present study, both in its planning phase and during the preparation of this report. The committee cannot of course be held accountable for what appears in these pages, but the authors wish to acknowledge its very valuable support and counsel. The members of the Committee on Political Behavior are David B. Truman (chairman), Conrad M. Arensberg, Alfred de Grazia, Oliver Garceau, V. O. Key, Avery Leiserson, and M. Brewster Smith. Professor Key was chairman of the committee during the development of this study.

Special reference should be made to Dr. Pendleton Herring, President of the Social Science Research Council. As an ex officio member of the Committee on Political Behavior and as a political scientist, Dr. Herring participated in a number of discussions of this project and has followed its development with continuing interest.

We have also had the assistance of a group of our colleagues at the University of Michigan who have served as an Advisory Committee to the project. This local committee has met at frequent intervals to

discuss various problems which arose during the conduct of the study, and we are grateful for its interest and advice. The members of this group are Professors Arthur W. Bromage, Amos H. Hawley, Daniel Katz, Theodore M. Newcomb, and James K. Pollock.

A number of our other associates at the University of Michigan have also taken an interest in the study and have contributed in one way or another to it. For various kinds of assistance we wish to thank George M. Belknap, James C. Davies, Samuel J. Eldersveld, Ronald Freedman, Morris Janowitz, and Dwaine Marvick.

It will be apparent to the reader that the present study has drawn on the previous thinking and research of numerous other students of voting behavior. We are particularly indebted to Professor Paul F. Lazarsfeld, whose pioneering work in this field has served as a model for much of what has followed.

Our most immediate debt, of course, is to our colleagues in the Survey Research Center. Rensis Likert played an important role both in the early planning of the study and in its later development. Stephen B. Withey also contributed advice and assistance. Charles F. Cannell, as head of the Center's Field Staff, was responsible for all field operations. Leslie Kish, head of the Sampling Staff of the Center, supervised the design and selection of the sample. Jane Benjamin directed the coding of the interviews. Joan Abramson and David F. Miller served as research assistants at different stages of the study. Unnamed, but greatly appreciated, are the hundred or more Center interviewers who gathered the data on which this report is based.

The breadth and complexity of the data which were assembled in this project pose serious problems of presentation. It will become apparent to the reader that the full range of analysis which could be undertaken with the data at hand is very broad indeed and vastly beyond the limits of any single volume. Considerations of time and space have imposed limitations on the scope and detail of the data which could be discussed in this report. In some cases tables have been included with only brief comment, primarily for the purpose of indicating the possibilities of subsequent analysis. As a consequence, the reader will encounter many intriguing aspects of the data which appear to have been disregarded in the discussion and will think of numerous cross-tabulations which might have been presented, but are not. It is hoped that additional analyses carried forward independently of this publication will answer some of the questions which are not adequately treated here.

Ann Arbor, Michigan
February 21, 1954

Angus Campbell
Gerald Gurin
Warren E. Miller

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Foreword

The survey that this book reports will be regarded by students of politics as a highly significant step in the development of the art and substance of their trade. Yet since it depends on methods of observation not ordinarily at the command of political analysts, be they academic or journalistic, a few words may be in order by way of introduction from a political scientist habituated to the older modes of study.

In this volume we have the most impressive analysis yet made of a national election by the survey method. It should arouse great interest among students of politics, since it demonstrates strikingly how the survey technique supplements our older methods of observation. It brings new problems within reach, and it permits more assured handling of some of the old problems. The traditional means by which we have sought to understand politics have built a respectable body of lore about the nature of the political process. Yet those methods do not always produce satisfactory results. Ivory-tower excogitation, a practice by no means limited to academic precincts, yields persuasive insights, as well as comprehensive descriptions pleasing in their grand architecture but often suspect. Individual field inquiry, in which a good deal of shoe leather is worn out in quest of communicative participants in the political process, permits description with a tone of verisimilitude. Some types of political phenomena, of course, stand out like a red barn when the sun shines on the winter snow and can be identified by the most cursory observation. Even so, only the most doubtful judgments may be made about such dimensions as the frequency, the extent, the magnitude of what one sees. Furthermore, some sorts of political phenomena, especially some features of mass behavior, are simply not perceptible by the older ways of observation.

The invention of the sample survey created a powerful new instrument for the observation of the political process. The most obvious applications are in the study of electoral behavior, but in the long run extensions will doubtless be made to many other matters such as those the political philosophers speculate about when they consider "the nature of the state." A great advance of the sampling method consists in the capacity it gives to make inferences about total populations from the characteristics of relatively few cases. Questions of frequency of occurrence, of magnitude, of incidence, become much more manageable.

Other features of the sample survey also fix its qualities as a tool of analysis. By its nature the survey permits the ready pooling of observations made by many men. The analytical techniques adaptable to the data make possible the identification of phenomena and the isolation of relationships otherwise perceptible chiefly by surmise, if indeed at all. The form of survey data facilitates internal checks on the correctness of interpretations as well as corroboration, refutation, or supplementation by other investigators.

The use of the sample survey in the analysis of voting behavior is, of course, no longer new. Yet this application of the method by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan to the 1952 campaign must be ranked as especially notable both for its finished technique and for its contribution to our substantive knowledge of electoral behavior. The highly developed techniques—of sampling, of data collection, of analysis—underlying this volume represent a cumulation of the tricks contrived by many investigators. They owe something to the polling organizations which both popularized opinion sampling and made us wary of it. They build also on techniques developed by other scholars who have used the survey method. Most of all, they rest on the long experience of the authors and their associates of the Survey Research Center in the conduct of national sample surveys on a wide variety of topics. In consequence, from the standpoint of technique, the study here reported bears to Mr. Gallup's 1936 election poll somewhat as the new Cadillac does to the first Model T.

On the substantive side, a differentiating feature of this survey is that its planning involved an effort to harness the skills and curiosities of several disciplines. By an accident of the academic division of labor, social psychologists early acquired an understanding of the mysteries of sampling. They quickly applied the technique to political studies. These forays produced results of genuine significance; yet social psychologists at times, or so it seemed to political scientists, were as aliens moving on strange terrain and failed to examine questions that students of politics would have given priority. By a variety of means —consultation, staffing, and immersion in the literature of politics— the Survey Research Center staff has sought to feed into the survey apparatus the kinds of problems that concern political scientists as well as those that preoccupy social psychologists. In consequence, the inquiry has its roots quite as much in political science as in social psychology.

What does the survey machinery produce when it is set to work in the observation of a presidential campaign and election? An adequate appreciation of the breadth and variety of the findings can be had only from a reading of the entire report, yet the major elements may be

quickly indicated. The materials of Part One, in the main, describe the behaviors and attitudes of the voters in the election of 1952. What was the process by which people made up their minds in 1952? What was the extent and nature of public interest and participation in the campaign? How did groups of people—occupational categories, income levels, unionists, metropolitan dwellers, and so forth—vote? How did people perceive parties and candidates? On all such matters Part One presents the facts. An incidental, but significant, overtone is the emphasis on the peculiarities of the behavior of voters in 1952 and on the theme that elections are likely to differ vastly from time to time—a proposition whose neglect has, on occasion, brought political prognosticators to grief.

Students of politics at least will probably regard Part Two as the major contribution of the study. While that part deals, as does the first, with the election of 1952, it develops a new framework for the analysis of electoral decision. That system of analysis aids in explaining the election of 1952 but it also contributes toward a better understanding of electoral behavior in general. In brief, a scheme or theory is devised for ordering the data on motivation of voters in terms of party identification, candidate orientation, and issue orientation. The authors establish the independence of each of these variables and indicate some of their interrelations in the 1952 polling. By the identification and measurement of these variables, a means has been found to explain to a considerable degree variations in participation and variations in the direction of the vote. The analytical scheme takes into account the baffling complexity of voting behavior, yet its concepts and categories may turn out to be of a sufficiently high level of generality to fit a wide range of voting situations. If so, this scheme will differ markedly from simpler voting behavior theories which so often seem to hold good for only one election.

While the report and the appended special studies touch an astonishing number of aspects of the election of 1952, some readers will doubtless find no mention of points of particular interest to them. Some of these omissions will be cured by subsequent publications based on the survey data. Others resulted from the choice of topics on which to center attention, a process of selection somewhat affected by the nature of the survey method. The survey apparatus, unlike a camera, does not record an image of the entire scene toward which it is aimed, but only of those parts that have been singled out in advance. These choices of centers of attention have to be made a good while before the unfolding of the campaign. Such a schedule creates an opportunity for second-guessing about matters that should have been inquired into, questions that might as well have been omitted. Further, some questions are beyond reach by a national survey. No findings are reported, for

example, on the Irish of Boston, the farmers of Iowa, or the Democrats of Birmingham. Segments of the population so small escape detection in a national sample. On some questions of interest to the political scientist, no material will be found simply because such matters cannot be analyzed by a sample survey. Useful though it may be, this method leaves many questions to be dealt with by older modes of political analysis.

The experienced research worker will be impressed by the high degree of technical virtuosity evident throughout, both in the collection of data and in its analysis. While people are astonishingly responsive to the importunities of interviewers, the conduct of a study of this sort amounts to considerably more than asking people questions about what they feel, believe, know, or do, and recording the answers. One aspect of the art consists, paradoxically enough, in the putting of questions that will yield information about people of which they may not be fully aware themselves. What people tell about themselves does not automatically exude from the stacks of completed interview schedules. Another phase of the art consists in the extraction of the more or less hidden meaning from the data. Examination of the interview schedule (Appendix E) in relation to the text of the report will make apparent the order of ingenuity requisite for the transformation of the raw data into meaningful interpretation. While much of the analysis rests on conventional methods, some of the techniques will be appraised as most elegant by the connoisseurs of these matters.

Some readers may still view skeptically inferences about the nation's electorate based on interviews with a couple of thousand persons. While skepticism is never unseemly, the more appropriate posture may be one of awe that inferences with so narrow a margin of error may be derived from so small a sample. The statistically sophisticated will take the analysis in stride. For the benefit of others, it ought to be said that an ineradicable chance for error inheres in even the most perfect sampling procedure. Yet the probability that particular characteristics of the sample mirror characteristics of the total electorate may be calculated by relatively simple statistical methods. These probabilities for the various estimates of this study are set out in Appendix F.

One quality of the analysis that will evoke praise in some circles and perhaps impatience in others is the pervading restraint of statement. At point after point the scholar of speculative bent will observe that the authors have stonily ignored opportunities to soar out through the boundless blue in imaginative explication of the possible immediate or future significance of particular bits of data. On the whole, there prevails in the exposition a dead-pan insistence on the limitation of inferences strictly to the data. In explanation of this manner of the

authors, it can only be said that habituation to explicit methods of analysis tends to dampen intellectual boisterousness. When they rely on the sorts of procedures used here, investigators are subjected to the disciplining etiquette of the scientific tradition, sanctioned by the painful but humbling knowledge that no matter how reasonable one may seem he can turn out to be magnificently wrong—and be found out.

While these remarks have been addressed primarily to the professional student of political behavior, they should not becloud the fact that this book has something for everyone with a concern about American politics. What sorts of Southerners voted for Eisenhower? Were the egg-head college graduates largely in the Stevenson camp? Did the women really turn the trick for the Republicans? Did the election mark a widespread popular acceptance of Republican conservatism in domestic policy? What happened to the farmers between 1948 and 1952? On these and many other questions the general reader, so beloved of publishers and booksellers, will find treatments of great interest. At points the presentation requires, as befits a difficult and complex subject, the closest attention. Yet the technical terminology has been kept to the minimum consistent with the necessity for precision of statement.

Professional politicians, or their brain trusters, will find it worth while, and perhaps disturbing, to ponder many of the findings. What did the Republicans have in 1952 other than General Eisenhower? Under what conditions will the Democrats who voted Republican in 1952 return to their party? Are current national policies well calculated to make permanent the 1952 accretions to Republican strength? Can the Southern swing to the Republican party be made lasting? On what terms? What appeals are most likely to move the voter in 1954? In 1956? The answers to such questions are not neatly set out in the pages that follow, but suggestive materials are there for those whose vocations compel them to fret about such matters.

V. O. Key, Jr.

Cambridge, Massachusetts
January 11, 1954

I

Introduction

The American presidential election is a massive and complex social phenomenon. Every four years the campaigns to elect a president draw millions of Americans into action in support of their candidates and tens of millions into the voting booths on Election Day.

Certainly no single research project can encompass the entire range of political events that make up a presidential election. There must be selection of the area of data to be investigated and of the method of analysis to be applied to it. Many different kinds of studies have been carried out, all having the general objective of providing a better understanding of what goes on during the elections. There have been studies of the registrations, the primaries, the nominating conventions, the campaigns, the media, the pressure groups, the party workers, the candidates, and, of course, the voters. They have drawn their information from historical and legal documents, public records, election statistics, special informants, and cross-section samples. They have provided a very substantial literature regarding the presidential elections.

In the present study we shall be concerned not with legislators, politicians, wardheelers, office-seekers nor any of the other special kinds of people that have particular political importance, but with the general public. That is to say, we are interested in the citizenry, the nearly one hundred million people of legal age who by reason of their citizenship are entitled to vote. Our broad interest is in the political life of these people, their participation as individuals in the total political process. Our specific interest, in the project to be reported here, is in their political behavior during the 1952 presidential campaign and election.

Most analyses of public participation in elections have depended on the election statistics which become available after the votes are counted. These are usually reported on a precinct or county basis, and they have made possible a variety of useful studies of factors related to the vote. Aggregate data, such as election statistics, do not permit analysis on an individual basis, however, and this means that many problems of great interest cannot be explored through this source of data.

The methodology of the sample survey makes it possible to reach and obtain information from great masses of people on an individual basis. Thus we are able to learn about perceptions, attitudes, interests, and behaviors, because our data come from personal interviews with individual citizens. We are able to describe the characteristics of the total population, because these individual respondents are carefully selected to represent the total, of which they are a very small sample.

The present report is based entirely on data gathered through the sample survey method. This procedure was employed because it is the only research method which could provide the kinds of data required by the objectives of the study.

The Objectives

Our study was designed with six major objectives in view. They were as follows:

1. To identify the voters and nonvoters, Republicans and Democrats, within four major geographical areas, in regard to:
   a) socio-economic characteristics,
   b) attitudes and opinions on political issues,
   c) perceptions of the parties and the candidates;
2. To compare these groups with the corresponding groups in the 1948 presidential election;
3. To trace the resolution of the vote with particular attention to the undecided and changing voters;
4. To study the impact of the activities of the major parties on the population;
5. To analyze the nature and correlates of political party identification;
6. To analyze the nature and correlates of political participation.

It was clear from the beginning that it would not be possible to pursue all these objectives with equal emphasis. The objective of greatest theoretical interest to the group of political scientists, social psychologists, and others who planned the study was that dealing with participation. This was given high priority. On the other hand, it was evident that the study could not undertake a full investigation of the activities of the political parties during the election period. This objective was least adequately dealt with. Although certain minor objectives were added during the course of planning, the six major objectives set the basic pattern for the study. They determined the design of the sample, the content of the questionnaires, and the ultimate analysis of the data. The reader will find all these objectives represented in the present report.

The Methods

The procedures used in the study reported here followed the design employed by the Survey Research Center in its study of the 1948 election.[1] A nationwide sample, selected by methods of probability sampling to represent all citizens of voting age living in private residences, was interviewed by representatives of the Center during the seven weeks preceding the election of November, 1952. These same people were interviewed again during the six weeks following the election. These two interviews, the first approximately an hour in length, and the second about a half-hour, were collated for each respondent and they provide the data for the study. A detailed description of the sampling procedures and reproductions of the interview questionnaires are given in the Appendix.

The Two Samples

Since all the data of this study derive from either the pre-election or the postelection sample, it is advisable to state the characteristics of these samples in explicit detail at the outset. The pre-election sample consisted of 2,021 people. This total is subdivided in some phases of the analysis into four geographical areas: the Northeast, the Midwest, the South, and the Far West (see Frontispiece). These areas were sampled at an equal sampling rate (somewhat less than one in 50,000) except in the Far West, where the sampling rate was doubled in order to build up the sample of that relatively thinly populated area. The number of cases by areas was: Northeast, 448; Midwest, 618; South, 509; and Far West, 446. In all presentations in this study in which the West is treated separately from the rest of the country, the full Western sample (446 cases) is used. In all presentations in which the West is combined with other areas of the country to show national totals, half of the Western sample is omitted so that this area will be represented in its proper proportion.

The postelection sample consisted of 1,714 people. Of these, 1,614 had been interviewed in the pre-election survey. The discrepancy between the 2,021 interviewed before the election and the 1,614 who were reinterviewed after the election resulted from two facts: (*a*) The

[1] Memoranda describing the methods of study design, interviewing, coding, sampling, and analysis employed by the Survey Research Center are available on request. For a general statement of survey research methods, the reader is referred to the relevant chapters in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (Eds.), *Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: Dryden Press, 1953). The Survey Research Center study of the 1948 election, referred to in this and subsequent chapters, is reported in Angus Campbell and R. L. Kahn, *The People Elect a President* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1952).

extra loading of the Western sample in the pre-election survey (222 cases) was dropped in the postelection survey. (*b*) It proved impossible for reasons of change of address, illness, or refusal, to reinterview 185 people from the pre-election sample who ideally should have been included in the postelection sample. However, 100 people who for one reason or another were missed in the pre-election sample were interviewed in the postelection survey. These, when combined with the 1,614 reinterviewed people, made up the total postelection sample of 1,714 cases. In order to avoid confusion, most of the tables which will be presented are based on the sample of 1,614 people who were interviewed both before and after the election.[2]

Throughout this report, the number of cases on which percentages are based is given. This permits the reader to estimate the reliability of the information which is presented. Reference to the Appendix statement regarding sampling errors should prove helpful in this connection.

Turnout and Party Choice

The major dependent variable in the present study was, of course, the vote itself. Since so much of the analysis which will be presented here will be devoted to the explanation of why people did or did not vote, and why they voted as they did if they did vote, it is appropriate in these introductory paragraphs to examine the record of the survey in its measurement of the two basic voting variables, turnout and party preference.

Of the 1,614 people interviewed in October and again in the postelection survey, 74 per cent said they had voted. According to the election statistics, 61.6 million people are reported to have voted for president. It is very difficult to estimate how much discrepancy exists between these two figures. If turnout is computed by dividing the total number of people officially counted as voting by the total number of people of voting age (approximately 98.5 million), the result would be near 63 per cent, and the discrepancy would appear sizable. However, it must be noted that the survey was not designed to represent the entire adult population. It excluded the following categories of people: (*a*) non-citizens; (*b*) the institutional population, living in prisons, hospitals, homes for the aged, etc.; (*c*) the "floating" population, people with no fixed addresses, traveling salesmen, people in transit to new addresses, hoboes, etc.; (*d*) military personnel living in

[2] The characteristics of the 185 respondents who were lost from the October sample and the 100 who were gained in the November sample were very similar to those of the 1,614 respondents who were interviewed in both surveys. Consequently, their inclusion or exclusion from the total sample does not have any significant effect on the data presented.

military installations or outside the country; and (*e*) mental incompetents living in private homes.

It is not known how many people of voting age fell into these five categories at the time of the survey. The total was certainly not less than five million and might well have run as high as ten million. It is apparent that a very small proportion of these people vote, either because of legal disfranchisement, physical or mental incapacity, or failure to meet residence requirements. It is also evident that the universe the survey represents contains virtually all of the voting population, and that within this universe the turnout must have been substantially higher than 63 per cent.

It would not be unreasonable, of course, to expect in a survey of voting that occasional individuals would say they had voted although in fact they had not. Several researchers who have checked the precinct records of their respondents have found this type of over-reporting.[3] It is safe to assume that some respondents in the present study gave themselves credit for a vote they did not actually cast. It seems clear, however, that this was a very small proportion of the total sample.

In the postelection survey, each respondent who said he had voted was asked how he had voted for president and congressman and, if there were contests in his state, for senator and governor. Their reports are compared in Table 1.1 to the proportions of the total vote recorded in the election statistics as going to the two parties.

TABLE 1.1

Division of the 1952 Two-Party Vote as Recorded in Election Statistics and in the Postelection Survey

Office	Election Statistics		Postelection Survey	
	Republican	Democratic	Republican	Democratic
President	55.5%	44.5	58%	42
Congressman	49.8%	50.2	51%	49
Senator	54.3%	45.7	55%	45
Governor	46.8%	53.2	47%	53

None of the survey results shown in Table 1.1 digresses from the election statistics by a margin larger than that which might be attributed to sampling error alone. However, the largest discrepancy is found in the case of the presidential vote, and it seems likely that this

[3] A check of this kind would have been highly desirable in the present study. Because of the anonymity of the respondents, however, it was not possible.

two or three percentage-point over-report of the Eisenhower vote is not the result of sampling deviation, but of errors of report. If this is indeed an expression of a "band-wagon" effect following the Eisenhower victory, it is perhaps most noteworthy that the effect is so small.

One additional reference to election statistics should be brought to the reader's attention at this point. In the text which follows, a number of comparisons are made between the 1952 presidential vote and the vote for Truman and Dewey in 1948. In some cases—in Chapter V, for example—the record of the 1948 vote is taken from the Survey Research Center's study of that election carried out in November, 1948. In other cases, use is made of the 1952 respondents' report of their 1948 vote, as they remembered it when interviewed in the present study.

When we examine the distribution of the 1948 vote as reported by our respondents in 1952, we find a larger Truman vote than was actually cast. According to the election statistics of that year, Truman received 50 per cent of the votes cast for president, Dewey received 45 per cent, and 5 per cent went to the minor candidates, mainly Wallace and Thurmond. However, in reporting their 1948 votes, our 1952 respondents gave Truman 57 per cent, Dewey 41 per cent, and 2 per cent to the minor candidates. An inspection of Table 1.2 will disclose two factors which seem to be mainly responsible for this distortion: (*a*) It is apparent that the minor party vote was under-

TABLE 1.2

1948 Presidential Vote by Regions as Reported in Election Statistics and in the 1952 Pre-Election Survey

"In 1948, you remember that Truman ran against Dewey. [If voted] Which one did you vote for?"	Northeast		Midwest		South		Far West	
	Election Statistics	1952 Survey	Election Statistics	1952 Survey	Election Statistics	1952 Survey	Election Statistics	1952 Survey
Truman	47%	52%	50%	54%	53%	77%	50%	52%
Dewey	48	46	48	46	32	19	46	46
Other	5	2	2	*	15	4	4	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* In all the tables in this report, the asterisk is used to denote an entry of less than one-half of one per cent. The dash is used to denote an entry of zero per cent.

reported in all four areas by our 1952 respondents, and the Truman vote was correspondingly over-reported. This probably resulted in large part from the wording of the question (see Table 1.2), which concentrated their answers on Truman and Dewey. If we assume that the missing minor party voters reported themselves as having voted

for Truman (a very likely probability), we shall find that the data for the three regions outside the South conform closely to expectation. (*b*) In the South an additional factor was apparently present, an unwillingness to admit having voted for Dewey. This is the only region of the four in which the Dewey vote was not reported with reasonable accuracy, and the understatement there no doubt reflects the special political character of that region.

These discrepancies between the survey data and the criterion data drawn from election statistics must be regarded as defects of the survey. In the case of the 1952 data, these defects would appear to be minor. It is highly improbable that they could exert any significant influence on the analysis which is presented in this report. The error in the recall of the 1948 vote is more serious, but the reader should keep in mind that the error is largely a confusion of Democratic and third party votes rather than a confusion of Democratic and Republican votes. This fact makes these data more useful than they might otherwise have been.[4]

The Organization of the Report

The presentation of data in this report is organized in two major parts, followed by a short concluding chapter. Part One, entitled "The Character of the 1952 Election," is composed of four chapters devoted to a description of the voters: their previous voting record and the development of their 1952 decision to vote, their interest and participation in the campaign, their perception of the parties and candidates, and finally their demographic characteristics. Whenever possible, comparable data from our 1948 survey are also presented so that contrasts and similarities between the two elections may be seen.

Part One is intended to accomplish two objectives. In the first place, it is our expectation that the kind of "social accounting" it presents will have interest in itself for students and practitioners of politics. The project was conducted on a national basis in order to give the data national significance, and it was patterned after our 1948 study in order to make a comparison of the two elections possible.

The second purpose of the presentation in Part One is to provide a background for the analysis carried out in Part Two. The argument of the latter is based on a conception of the individual citizen acted upon by forces having relevance for him in the realm of political behavior. We are concerned with individual motivation. We approach this problem not at the level of external factors such as campaign appeals,

[4] It may be noted that all of the data presented in this report are reproduced exactly as they came from the two surveys. No attempt has been made to "improve" the data by introducing adjustments or other "corrections."

personal conversations, or other isolated aspects of the total stimulating situation leading up to Election Day, but rather at the level of the intervening variables of attitudes, perceptions, and group loyalties which mediate between the external environmental facts and the individual response. We have attempted to identify the major components that make up the total matrix of forces influencing the individual vote. It is hypothesized that these factors interact dynamically to determine the individual's behavior in the area of politics, stimulating his participation when they reinforce each other, inhibiting it when they are in conflict.

The reader will observe that while Part One deals specifically with the 1952 election and its relation to the election of 1948, Part Two uses the data of the 1952 election to demonstrate relationships which we believe to have more general significance. It is assumed that the three motivational factors which are considered in Part Two have relevance to all presidential elections, and that the type of analysis undertaken in Part Two might equally well be applied to the circumstances of any such election.

Part One

THE CHARACTER OF THE 1952 ELECTION

II

Conflict and Resolution in 1948 and 1952

The year 1952 was one of reversal of trends in American politics. Most dramatic was the overthrow of a Democratic regime which had held power in Washington for 20 years. Almost as impressive was the great increase in turnout of voters, with over 61.5 million people going to the polls, as compared with about 48.5 in 1948. The losing candidate for the presidency polled more votes—almost two and a quarter million more—than had the winner in 1948.

What gave rise to this great increase in the vote, and why did the vote go so heavily to the Republicans? These are the two questions with which this book is mainly concerned. In this opening chapter we propose to examine some of the characteristics of the vote as we observed it in our 1948 survey and again in 1952. We shall need this descriptive comparison of the two elections to provide a setting for our later analysis of factors which influenced the 1952 vote.

The Course of the Decision

It will be recalled that the pre-election polls of 1948 indicated a Republican victory, and that with few exceptions political forecasters seconded the predictions of the poll-takers. The Democratic victory in 1948 was an "upset," an upset resulting from crucial developments in the minds of the voters during the final weeks of the campaign.[1] It was the memory of that bitter experience that gave the pollsters pause in 1952, even though their data showed Eisenhower leading by a clear margin. Ironically, had they simply projected their pre-election percentages to a prediction of the election, as they had done disastrously in 1948, they would have come very close to the actual vote. For 1952, in contrast to 1948, was a year in which intentions reached in October were carried firmly into action in November.

What was the course of development of these voting decisions? In order to provide the fullest possible answer to this question, we would have had to design our study so as to interview our respondents

[1] For a full discussion of the factors affecting the 1948 predictions, see *The Pre-Election Polls of 1948* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1949).

repeatedly over the period covered by the conventions and the campaign. We could thus have recorded each individual decision, or shift in decision, that took place during this period. Although our study was not based on this extended "panel" design, we did interview our respondents twice, once just before the election and once just after. These two sets of interviews make it possible for us to compare October intentions with November actions.

Comparing October, 1952, to October, 1948, we find a marked difference in the amount of uncertainty still remaining in the last month of the two campaigns. In 1948, the number of voters who were still undecided in October—19 per cent of the adult population, according to our survey at that time—was so great as to make prediction hazardous. The conventional assumption that these people would

TABLE 2.1

Relation of October Voting Intentions to Voting Behavior in 1948 and 1952 Presidential Elections

Vote for Presidential Candidate	Intentions in October Regarding Vote for President							
	Will Vote Republican		Will Vote Democratic		Don't Know		Won't Vote	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Voted Republican	71%	89%	5%	7%	19%	47%	5%	7%
Voted Democratic	14	4	66	79	40	38	10	4
Voted for minor party or vote not ascertained	2	*	4	1	10	2	1	1
Did not vote	13	7	25	13	31	13	84	88
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	170	648	163	517	102	103	119	330

split their votes in the same proportions as the rest of the voters was one of the factors that led the poll-takers into error. By contrast, as of October, 1952, only 6 per cent of our national sample said they had not yet decided whom to vote for. In 1948 those undecideds who voted—and a majority of them did so—supported Truman two to one (Table 2.1); in 1952 the undecideds did split their votes like the rest of the voters, but their number was so small that, even if they had not, they would not have overturned the election.

The greater decisiveness in the late stages of the 1952 campaign, suggested by the low ratio of undecided voters in the pre-election survey, is also expressed in findings from the postelection study. In

1948 large numbers of people who in October apparently intended to vote did not vote at all (Table 2.1). In 1952 the percentages of such instances were reduced by half. Similarly, late shifts from one candidate to another, so damaging to the rejected candidate, played a significant role in the 1948 vote, when an appreciable number of people who planned in October to vote for Dewey changed candidates by Election Day. In 1952, late shifts from one candidate to the other were far fewer and balanced out to the advantage of neither candidate.

The effects of these differences between 1948 and 1952 are summarized in Table 2.2. There we see that although 32 per cent of the

TABLE 2.2

VOTING INTENTIONS (OCTOBER) AND VOTING BEHAVIOR, 1948 AND 1952 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (IN PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SAMPLE)

Voting Behavior Compared to Intention	1948			
	Truman		Dewey	
	Intended to Vote for Him 28%	Voted for Him 32%	Intended to Vote for Him 29%	Voted for Him 27%
Voted as intended	19%	19%	21%	21%
Lost to candidate because:				
Did not vote	7		4	
Voted for opponent	1		4	
Voted other	1		—	
Gained by candidate because:				
Had intended to vote for opponent		4		1
Had been undecided†		9		5
	1952			
	Eisenhower		Stevenson	
	Intended to Vote for Him 40%	Voted for Him 43%	Intended to Vote for Him 32%	Voted for Him 31%
Voted as intended	35%	35%	26%	26%
Lost to candidate because:				
Did not vote	3		4	
Voted for opponent	2		2	
Gained by candidate because:				
Had intended to vote for opponent		2		2
Had been undecided†		5		3
Not ascertained	*	1	*	*

† Including a few who had not expected to vote.

sample reported voting for the winner in 1948, only 19 per cent said in October that they were going to vote for him and then did so. The large remaining share of his vote came partly from people who had intended to vote for his opponent and partly from people who had been undecided. In 1952, on the other hand, 43 per cent of the sample reported voting for the winner, of whom fully 35 per cent had told us in October that they intended to vote for him. If we base our figures on only those who voted, we may say that in 1948 only two-thirds of the voters acted in accordance with intentions stated a few weeks before the election, whereas in 1952 four-fifths did so. This does not necessarily mean that these relatively firm October intentions in 1952 were reached without conflict and uncertainty in the minds of the voters. On the contrary, we shall see later in this chapter that there was a great deal of indecision during the 1952 campaign, just as there had been in 1948.

What was the course of events that lay behind this crystallization of voting intentions in October? Was there a growing wave of Eisenhower support which reached its crest on Election Day? Did the two parties begin the campaign on an equal footing, or were the Democrats fighting a losing battle from the very start?

The October-November change is not the only information our study offers regarding the course of the decision. In the postelection survey, each respondent who reported that he had voted in the election just past was asked "How long before the election did you decide that you were going to vote the way you did?" Of course we would not expect people to be able to answer such a question with complete accuracy; but the answers do enable us to divide those who felt they had known from the beginning how they would vote from those who by reason of conflict or procrastination had not come to a decision until later. Since we should not expect that errors in recall would differ systematically for those who voted one way and those who voted the other, a comparison of the responses of the two party groups should tell us whether they differed on this rough measure of the time at which their decisions crystallized.

By the use of this recall question, we are able to estimate how the division of sentiment regarding the two candidates stood at successive points during the pre- and postconvention period. If we consider only the people who eventually voted for one or the other of the two major candidates, and look at their choices at the time they made their decisions, we find that General Eisenhower led Governor Stevenson from the very beginning. Of those voters who said they had their minds made up—

1. Before the conventions, 52 per cent voted for Eisenhower.
2. At the time of the conventions, 60 per cent voted for Eisenhower.

3. During the campaign, 58 per cent voted for Eisenhower.
4. By the last two weeks of the campaign, 58 per cent voted for Eisenhower.

These percentages are cumulative and give an approximation of what a survey would have shown at each of these points during the election period. It is of interest that there was a slight Republican majority among those who had decided how they were going to vote even before the nominations were held. This majority increased when the nominees were known and held very stable through to Election Day.

An interesting contrast appears when we look at the same data from the 1948 election. Precisely the same question was asked voters in our postelection survey of that year. Of the 1948 voters for the two major candidates who said they had their minds made up—

1. Before the conventions, 49 per cent voted for Dewey.
2. At the time of the conventions, 52 per cent voted for Dewey.
3. During the campaign, 51 per cent voted for Dewey.
4. By the last two weeks of the campaign, 47 per cent voted for Dewey.

Although the fact that the 1948 data are based on a relatively small sample suggests caution in their interpretation, it appears that at the time of the nominations Dewey held a slight lead over Truman which he maintained through most of the campaign; but the decisions made during the final period of the campaign erased this advantage and elected Mr. Truman.

Thus we see that the 1948 and 1952 presidential elections afford a number of contrasts of interest to students of political behavior: first, the much greater public involvement in the 1952 election as expressed in the difference in turnout; second, the early and persistent division of voting intentions in 1952 in favor of the eventual winner; and third, the greater late-campaign stability of the individual voters' convictions regarding their chosen candidates. Related to these contrasts, of course, is the fact that after electing the Democratic party's candidate in five consecutive elections, in 1952 the voters decisively elected the candidate of the Republican party.

The Components of the Vote

Where did the flood of Eisenhower voters come from? Did the great increase in the Republican vote come from the ranks of young voters participating in a presidential election for the first time? Did the activated voters, those who had sat out the 1948 election, come into the electorate as a pro-Eisenhower bloc? Did the 1948 Republicans

and Democrats stand by their 1952 candidates, or were there serious defections?

Table 2.3 shows us the basic components of the 1952 vote. There we see that both parties drew to the polls people who had not voted in 1948. The support of these voters was divided between the two

TABLE 2.3

RELATION OF 1948 TO 1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

1952 Voting Behavior	1948 Voting Behavior				
	Voted for Dewey	Voted for Truman	Neglected to Vote	Not of Voting Age	Total Sample†
Voted for Eisenhower	90%	28%	20%	33%	43%
Voted for Stevenson	4	61	17	25	31
Voted otherwise, or vote not ascertained	*	1	1	—	*
Did not vote	6	10	62	42	26
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	429	592	467	96	1,614

† Included here but not represented in the preceding four columns are people who reported voting for Thurmond or Wallace in 1948 and some whose 1948 voting behavior was not ascertained.

candidates in about the same proportions as that of voters as a whole. The same holds true for the first-time voters—those who reached voting age after 1948. Both these groups that accounted for the increase in turnout gave Eisenhower a majority, but no larger a majority than the rest of the voters gave him. In other words, while they contributed to the Eisenhower victory, they did not contribute disproportionately. Much more striking is the record of the people who had supported the Democratic candidate in 1948. Roughly one-quarter of Truman's 1948 supporters voted for Eisenhower. Although this figure is probably slightly inflated because of the over-report of the Truman vote (see page 6), there can be no doubt that there were serious defections in the Democratic ranks. Shifts in the opposite direction—from Dewey to Stevenson—were negligible in percentage.

The relative influence of all these groups on the final vote may be seen more clearly if we present them as fractions of the total vote of each candidate, as is done on the opposite page in Figure 2.1. We must be sure to keep in mind in examining these data that every vote for a candidate counts equally, whether it comes from a new voter, a defector,

or a party regular. It is clear that both candidates in 1952 received the largest portion of their support from their loyal partisans who had followed the party banner in 1948. This is the solid core which both parties depend on when they go into an election. In 1952 this core was a much larger proportion of the Democratic total vote than it was of

Of those who voted for Eisenhower:	Of those who voted for Stevenson:	
56%	3%	had voted for Dewey
24	74	had voted for Truman
1	1	had voted for minor candidates, or vote was not ascertained
13	16	had neglected to vote in 1948
5	5	were too young to vote in 1948
1	1	were people whose 1948 vote was not ascertained

FIG. 2.1

the Republican, although in actual numbers of voters the two party followings did not differ greatly in this respect. Each party added to its core vote a sizable number of newly activated voters and a somewhat smaller number of young voters. Each drew a small number of people who had voted for minor parties in 1948. The coup de grace was administered to the hopes of the Democratic party, however, by the addition to the Republican total of a substantial number of erstwhile Democrats. Had these 1948 Democrats stayed with Stevenson in 1952, General Eisenhower would not have gone to the White House.

Indecision and Conflict

The evidence seems to be clear that the campaign of 1948 was a much closer contest than was that of 1952. While in 1948 the issue was in doubt until the very end, the Eisenhower victory was strongly foreshadowed from the very beginning. This does not mean, of course, that the 1952 decision was clear-cut and easy for every individual voter. Procrastination and conflict were reported by many 1952 voters just as they had been in 1948, and in both years this indecision was most common among Democrats who were trying to decide whether or not to bolt their party.

One indication of indecisiveness on the part of the voter is delay in reaching his final choice of candidates. Although earlier studies[2] have attributed late decisions largely to indifference, there is considerable

[2] Lazarsfeld, P., Berelson, B., and Gaudet, H., *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).

evidence in the present study that delay in voting decision is for many people a much more dynamic process than simple lack of interest would imply. We find data regarding time of voting decision in Table 2.4. Two kinds of comparison are possible in this table, time of decision in 1948 and 1952, and time of decision of Republican and Democratic voters.

TABLE 2.4

RELATION OF VOTE FOR PRESIDENT TO TIME OF VOTING DECISION, 1948 AND 1952

"How long before the election did you decide you were going to vote the way you did?"	1948			1952		
	Dewey Voters	Truman Voters	All Voters	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters	All Voters
Before the conventions	42%	36%	37%	27%	35%	31%
At the time of conventions	34	22	28	40	27	34
During the campaign	13	14	14	18	24	20
Within two weeks of election	3	14	9	10	7	9
On Election Day	2	3	3	1	4	2
Do not remember	2	1	1	1	—	1
Not ascertained	4	10	8	3	3	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	178	212	421	687	494	1,195

It will at once be remarked, if we begin by considering the two elections, that there was no great difference between 1948 and 1952 in the proportions of voters who located their point of decision at various stages of the campaign. In both years, two-thirds of the voters said they had decided how to vote by or before the end of the conventions, and the proportion who said they had waited until the last two weeks is also the same for the two elections. This similarity must be viewed with some caution. In 1948, of those people who were still undecided in October one-third did not vote (Table 2.1); of the much smaller percentage who were undecided in October, 1952, only one-eighth did not vote. Thus, the findings based on the recall question, which was asked only of people who had voted, understate the total extent of indecision in 1948 through eliminating the relatively large group who evidently did not resolve their indecision in time and ended by not voting at all. Had this group finally voted, they would have increased the proportion of late deciders in the 1948 electorate appreciably.

Considering only voters, however, there is no difference in the two years in their reported time of decision.

When we divide the voters into their two parties in each year, as in the remaining columns of Table 2.4, we see a marked difference between 1948 and 1952. In 1948 early deciders constituted only 58 per cent of Truman's vote, but 76 per cent of Dewey's; in 1952, by contrast, both candidates received two-thirds of their respective votes from early deciders. Again, in 1948 the proportion of Truman voters who felt they had not made up their minds until two weeks or less before Election Day was three times as great as that of Dewey voters; in 1952 there was no such difference between the supporters of the two candidates. As we have seen earlier, the 1952 election was one in which decisions reached during the campaign months maintained rather than changed the choice that was crystallizing before the campaign began.

Do our data give us any explanation for the difference between the two years in the time of decision of the Republican and Democratic voters? An analysis of the previous voting records of these people provides a key. We know from our 1948 study that the waverers who made up their minds late in that campaign were largely former Roosevelt supporters who for one reason or another were flirting with the idea of voting for Dewey. Their conflict over factors associated with the two candidates apparently delayed their final decision until the latter phases of the campaign. In 1952 the situation was somewhat more complex, but the influence of conflict, especially among former Democrats, was again demonstrated in the time of decision.

To carry out this analysis we shall divide the voters into five groups: those who voted for Truman in '48 and Stevenson in '52; those who voted for Dewey and for Eisenhower; those who voted for Truman and for Eisenhower; those who did not vote in '48—whether because they were too young or for other reasons—and voted for Stevenson in '52; and the 1948 nonvoters who voted for Eisenhower in '52. (We shall omit the group who switched from Dewey to Stevenson, a group which was so small that too few cases appeared in the sample to be studied.) To facilitate discussion, we shall call these groups regular Democrats, regular Republicans, switchers, new Democrats, and new Republicans, respectively, although these names are based solely on votes for president and are therefore not applicable to the general political behavior of some of the people so classified.

In Table 2.5 we see the time of voting decision as recalled after the election by the people within each of the five groups. There we see that the regulars were earliest in deciding how they would vote. Whether Democratic or Republican, nearly four in ten of the regulars knew even before the conventions that they would vote for the candidate of the

party they had supported four years before. Among the switchers, only one in seven had decided before the conventions to vote Republican. The new Democratic voters were between the switchers and the regulars in proportion of preconvention deciders; but new Republicans were no more likely to have chosen their man before the nominations than were the switchers.

TABLE 2.5

RELATION OF 1948–1952 PRESIDENTIAL VOTING PATTERN TO TIME OF VOTING DECISION IN 1952

TIME OF DECISION	1948 AND 1952 VOTE FOR PRESIDENT†				
	Dewey, Eisenhower	No Vote, Eisenhower‡	Truman, Eisenhower	No Vote, Stevenson‡	Truman, Stevenson
Before the conventions	37%	16%	14%	29%	37%
At the time of conventions	44	41	32	29	27
During campaign	12	23	29	25	23
Within two weeks of election	4	13	20	7	6
On Election Day	*	1	2	7	3
Do not remember	*	1	1	—	—
Not ascertained	3	5	2	3	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	385	125	165	104	362

† Voters who switched from Dewey to Stevenson were uncommon; therefore too few appeared in the sample to be treated here.
‡ Voters who came of age after 1948, as well as others who did not vote in 1948, are included.

By the time of the conventions, when the candidates were known but before the campaigns were under way, 81 per cent of the regular Republicans, 64 per cent of the regular Democrats, but only 46 per cent of the switchers, had their minds made up. The new voters were between the regulars and the switchers. Very late deciders—those who decided within two weeks of the election—were more frequent among the switchers than in any other group.

The crucial fact here is that wavering Democrats were responsible for most of the late decisions in both 1948 and 1952. In 1948 former Roosevelt voters who had been considering Dewey either returned to Truman in the late stages of the campaign or did not vote at all. Relatively few of them finally decided for Dewey and cast their vote

for him. In 1952 many former Democrats were again tempted to cross party lines, and this time the temptation was apparently stronger: a large number of them made their decision for Eisenhower, late in the campaign in many cases, and supported him on Election Day. In both years, people who had voted Republican in the previous presidential election were notably infrequent among the late deciders.

It will also be noted that on the average the regular Democrats tended to arrive at their decision later than the regular Republicans. This fact suggests that the forces that drew so many former Democratic voters to Eisenhower in 1952 also affected some who stayed with the Democrats in 1952, creating a certain amount of indecision and conflict, although not ultimately capturing their votes. Conversely, the absence of forces that might have turned usual Republican voters toward the Democrats in 1952 is evidenced not only by the fact that such switches were few, but by the very early crystallization of the regular Republican vote. The tendency of regular Republicans to reach their decision earlier on the average than regular Democrats offset the amount of vacillation among the Truman-Eisenhower switchers, with the result that, as we have seen, the average time of decision of Eisenhower voters as a whole was very similar to that of the Stevenson voters.

One other comparison in Table 2.5 is of interest. Although new Democrats were a little later in reaching their decision than regular Democrats, they were much closer to the regular Democrats than new Republicans were to regular Republicans. Although by itself this particular datum will not bear much interpretation, it will become significant in connection with comparisons to be made later of the two groups of new voters.

When we look at the October intentions of our five groups, as shown in Table 2.6, we get much the same impressions as those resulting from the recall question. Again we see that the final decision had been reached at that time by a greater proportion of the regular Democrats and Republicans than any of the other groups, and that the switchers included the largest proportion of people whose vote was not yet stabilized.

A second question which was intended to reveal the relative decisiveness with which the voting decision was made was, "Did you ever think during the campaign that you might vote for [opposite candidate]?" The answers to this question show us differences of the expected kind among the voting groups (Table 2.7). Such a question may have different meanings for different people, and probably not all who answered affirmatively had considered the possibility with equal earnestness. Nevertheless, we can accept the finding that those who voted for Stevenson were more likely to have thought about voting for

TABLE 2.6

RELATION OF 1948–1952 PRESIDENTIAL VOTING PATTERN TO VOTING INTENTION IN OCTOBER, 1952

VOTING INTENTION IN OCTOBER, 1952	1948 AND 1952 VOTE FOR PRESIDENT				
	Dewey, Eisenhower	No Vote, Eisenhower	Truman, Eisenhower	No Vote, Stevenson	Truman, Stevenson
Will vote for Eisenhower	95%	75%	67%	9%	3%
Will vote for Stevenson	1	6	12	79	86
Do not know; undecided	3	6	16	8	7
Will not vote	1	11	3	2	3
Not ascertained	—	2	2	2	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	385	125	165	104	362

Eisenhower than vice versa, and that among the Eisenhower voters the switchers were the most likely to have considered voting for Stevenson.

Table 2.7 also presents a comparison of the 1948 and 1952 survey data on consideration of the opposing candidate. The findings are similar to the 1948–1952 comparison on time of decision observed in Table 2.4. They are affected by the same large drop-out of uncertain people in 1948 that was noted in connection with Table 2.4. Had these people voted they would doubtless have increased the proportion of the 1948 electorate who oscillated between the two candidates. As it was, however, the proportions of voters who considered the opposing candidate were very similar in the two years.

One further evidence of conflict expressed in the 1952 vote, the splitting of ballots, needs to be reviewed in this chapter. The freedom to vote for different parties in executive and legislative offices is one of the peculiarities of the American political system, and it is a freedom which is widely exercised. The total phenomenon of ballot-splitting deserves more detailed examination than we can give it here; our interest at this point is in its significance as an indication of divided motivations in the mind of the voter.

One-third of the voters cast split ballots in 1952 (compared with a little over one-quarter in 1948). Outside the South, Eisenhower supporters were a little more likely than Stevenson supporters to split their ballots—the proportion was about one-third in both cases

TABLE 2.7

RELATION OF 1948–1952 PRESIDENTIAL VOTING PATTERN TO CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO VOTING FOR THE OPPOSING CANDIDATE IN 1952

"DID YOU EVER THINK DURING THE [1952] CAMPAIGN THAT YOU MIGHT VOTE FOR [THE OTHER CANDIDATE]?"	1948 AND 1952 VOTE FOR PRESIDENT					ALL VOTERS	
	Dewey, Eisenhower	No Vote, Eisenhower	Truman, Eisenhower	No Vote, Stevenson	Truman, Stevenson	1948	1952
Yes	12%	22%	31%	36%	21%	19%	22%
No	88	78	67	64	78	73	78
Other	—	—	1	—	1	3	*
Not ascertained	—	—	1	—	*	5	*
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	385	125	165	104	362	421	1,195

(Table 2.8). Ticket-splitters outside the South usually voted the entire national ticket of one party, shifting only when they came to state or local candidates. In the South, most voters chose one of two voting patterns: either they voted a straight Democratic ticket, or they voted for Eisenhower while splitting their tickets. A quarter of

TABLE 2.8

RELATION OF VOTE FOR PRESIDENT TO SPLITTING OF BALLOT, 1952 ELECTION; IN THE SOUTH, ELSEWHERE, AND IN THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE

Allocation of Votes for All Candidates in 1952†	The South		All Other Regions		Entire Country		
	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters	Total
Voted straight ticket	26%	93%	65%	69%	59%	75%	66%
Split away from their presidential votes:							
At national level only	8	3	2	4	3	4	3
At state or local level only	13	3	24	19	23	15	19
At both levels	53	1	9	8	15	6	12
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	104	111	583	383	687	494	1,181

† The questions were: "Whom did you vote for for president?" "How about the election for United States senator? Did you vote for a candidate for senator? Whom did you vote for?" "How about the vote for congressman? Did you vote for a candidate for Congress? Whom did you vote for?" "How about the vote for governor here in [your state]? Did you vote for one of the candidates for governor? Whom did you vote for?" "How about the elections for other state and local offices? Did you vote a straight ticket or did you vote for candidates from different parties? [If voted a straight ticket] Which party did you vote for?"

Those who voted a straight ticket except in the case of senator or congressman are categorized as splitting "at the national level only." Those who voted for the presidential and congressional candidates of one party, but for some or all of the state and local candidates of the other party, are shown as splitting "at state or local level only." Those who voted for the presidential candidate of one party, but for one or more candidates of the other party at both the national and local levels, are shown as "splitting at both levels."

the Southern Eisenhower supporters voted a straight ticket; over 90 per cent of the Southern Stevenson supporters voted a straight ticket.

Table 2.9 summarizes the performances of the groups we have classified according to their 1948 and 1952 votes for president. Regular Democrats were the least likely of all voters to split their tickets, but new Democrats and regular Republicans were only a little more likely to do so. The commonest voting pattern of ballot-splitters in these

three groups was to vote for the presidential and congressional candidates of one party, shifting to the other party only for state or local candidates.

Consistent with their other indications of vacillation and conflict, the Truman-Eisenhower switchers were most likely to have split their ballots. Only one-third of this ambivalent group embraced the entire

TABLE 2.9

RELATION OF 1948–1952 PRESIDENTIAL VOTING PATTERN TO SPLITTING OF BALLOT, 1952 ELECTION

ALLOCATION OF VOTES FOR ALL CANDIDATES IN 1952†	1948 AND 1952 VOTE FOR PRESIDENT				
	Dewey, Eisenhower	No Vote, Eisenhower	Truman, Eisenhower	No Vote, Stevenson	Truman, Stevenson
Voted straight ticket	70%	59%	36%	70%	77%
Split away from their presidential votes:					
At national level only	3	2	4	4	4
At state or local level only	20	22	28	17	14
At both levels	7	17	32	9	5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	385	125	165	104	362

† For the questions used and an explanation of the categories, see Table 2.8.

Republican ticket when they crossed party lines to vote for Eisenhower. An equal number supported Democrats at both the national and local levels.

The behavior of the new Republicans also attracts our attention in Table 2.9. Four in ten split their tickets (compared with three in ten new Democrats), and like the switchers many voted for Democratic candidates for Congress as well as for local office. This fact, together with the finding (Table 2.5) that relatively few new Republicans reached their presidential voting decision until Eisenhower's candidacy was expected or known, suggests that on the average the new Republicans may be less firmly attached to the Republican party, even on the national level, than new Democrats are to the Democratic party, and that psychologically many of them were more like switchers in 1952—"Democrats for Eisenhower"—than like Republicans.

Finally, the reader will note that Table 2.9 documents very clearly the manner in which General Eisenhower ran ahead of the Republican ticket. All of the three groups of Eisenhower voters gave a significant fraction of their vote to Democratic candidates for the House and Senate. This was least true of the Republican regulars, but since they were the largest of the three groups their defections from the party ticket were not insignificant. There were also Stevenson voters who supported Republicans at the congressional level, but their proportions were not large, and they were obviously outnumbered by Eisenhower voters supporting Democrats.

Summary

We have now reviewed an array of data regarding the development of the 1952 presidential vote. We have compared the election of 1952 with that of 1948 and have found a complicated pattern of contrasts and similarities.

On the one hand, it is clear that the 1952 campaign was from the beginning a more one-sided contest than was true in 1948. It seems also true that there was less uncertainty in the minds of the 1952 voters as the election approached, less last-minute switching from one candidate to the other, and less failure to carry through on voting intentions. In these respects, the 1952 voters appear to have been more highly motivated, more decisive, and more unequivocal in their voting decisions than were their 1948 counterparts.

However, when we examine the character of these individual decisions we find at least as many people who showed evidence of conflict in reaching their decision to vote in 1952 as we found in 1948. There were just as many who reported putting off their decision until late in the campaign, there were an equal number who gave serious consideration to the candidate they finally voted against, and there were even more who split their ballots between the two parties.

To resolve this apparent contradiction, we must anticipate our later argument regarding the motivation of the voter. The burden of that argument (to be developed in Chapter XII) holds that the total motivation to vote was higher in 1952 than it had been in 1948. Moreover, it maintains that the increase in forces on the voters in 1952 was largely favorable to the Republican candidate and was sufficient to tip the total balance of forces in his direction.

In contrast to 1952, 1948 was a year in which voters generally were not highly motivated, and in which the balance of partisan forces on the voters was much more even. Consequently, many people were uncertain both as to whether they would vote and how they would vote. Among those who did vote, indecision and conflict were found largely

among Democrats attracted for one reason or another to the Republican candidate. A sizable number of Democrats considered voting Republican at some time during the 1948 campaign, only to change their minds at the last minute and return to the Democratic fold. In 1948 the factors favoring the Republican candidate were strong enough to create much indecision among many Democrats but not strong enough to hold their votes.

The 1952 election also created considerable conflict in the minds of the voters, and this conflict was again concentrated largely among Democrats attracted to the Republican candidate. In 1952, however, the increase and greater inbalance of motivating forces resulted in a situation in which, in spite of conflict, more people made a definite decision to vote, more people stayed with the decision once made, and more people carried the decision into an actual vote. For one reason or another, Democrats were attracted to the Republican camp in both 1948 and 1952, but in 1952 this attraction was strong enough to prevent a repetition of the last minute uncertainty and change which took place in the previous election.

III

Public Interest and Participation in the Campaign

The effectiveness of political motivation may be measured by the degree to which it brings about political action. The most crucial demonstration of the strength of the forces motivating the public comes on Election Day, and in 1952 the high turnout of voters provided a convincing record of the level of public concern with that election.

Of course, voting is not the only way that the public can participate in a presidential election. The campaigns offer countless opportunities for the interested citizen to express his impulse to support his candidate or party. In 1952 there were organized "Volunteers" and "Independents" and "Citizens" for Eisenhower and Stevenson all over the country. Crowds turned out to greet the presidential candidates' campaign trains. Candidates for state and local office spoke at countless luncheons and dinners and rallies. Television and radio brought the sights and sounds of campaign activities into millions of homes time and again. One had the impression of tremendous activity. How many citizens took part in it?

A number of questions in both the pre- and postelection surveys in 1952 were designed to obtain some estimate of the extent of participation in the campaign. These covered several kinds of participation, ranging from actual canvassing in behalf of a party or candidate, through informal attempts to influence the votes of friends and neighbors, and on down to the passive participation of the stay-at-home radio-listener, television-viewer, and newspaper- or magazine-reader. An attempt was made also to measure the extent of psychological involvement in the outcome of the presidential election—to discover how many citizens felt they "cared" who won.

Participation

Three questions dealt with direct participation in organized campaign efforts: (*a*) "Did you give any money, or buy tickets, or anything, to help the campaign for one of the parties or candidates?" (*b*) "Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, dinners, or things like that?"

(*c*) "Did you do any other work for one of the parties or candidates?"[1]

The answers are tabulated in Table 3.1. Of the total sample, 4 per cent reported that they had contributed financially in some way to a party or candidate, 7 per cent attended campaign meetings of some kind, and 3 per cent did some sort of party work. As we would expect, people who participated in one of these ways were often the ones who participated in the other ways. Altogether, a little over 11 per cent of all adults—one person in nine—took part in these organized party efforts. To political enthusiasts these figures may appear discouragingly small, for their size can be evaluated only against the yardstick of one's expectations. But it must be remembered that each of the figures, even the smallest, represents several million people scattered over thousands of communities.

In percentage of active partisans, Stevenson and Eisenhower supporters did not differ appreciably but, as there were more Eisenhower supporters, the active Eisenhower partisans exceeded Stevenson workers greatly in actual number. The questions were not restricted to activity on behalf of the presidential candidates only, but it is safe to assume that most people who engaged in some activity did so in support of the party of their presidential choice.

Many more people were informally involved in the campaigning than took part in organized party work. About a quarter of the sample, including even people who did not themselves vote, reported that in talking to others they had attempted to gain converts for their side. Here Eisenhower voters appear to have exceeded Stevenson people, not only in actual number, but even in percentage.

From the information on voting behavior and the responses to these four questions—the three about organized party work and the one about informal, individual "campaigning"—we may construct a crude but serviceable scale of political activity by means of which people may be sorted into three categories: (*a*) those who voted and also participated in the campaign; (*b*) those who voted but took no other active part; (*c*) those who did not vote. Some nonvoters were more involved politically than others and did talk politics in a partisan manner, or even in a few cases contributed money and effort to party work; but as the act of voting is, except in uncommon circumstances, the *sine qua non* of political participation for the ordinary citizen, these people are grouped in our scale with other nonvoters. The results of this classification, hereafter referred to as the *index of political participation,* appear in Table 3.2. This index is frequently used in succeeding chapter,

[1] A fourth question, "Do you belong to any political club or organizations," produced too few affirmative responses to support statistical analysis—approximately 2 per cent of the total sample.

particularly in Part Two, as a device for measuring the relation between political attitudes, or other characteristics, and involvement in politics.

Vicarious participation in campaign activities is available to practically every American through the mass media of communication. The

TABLE 3.1

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR AND CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE TO PARTICIPATION IN CAMPAIGN

NATURE OF PARTICIPATION	VOTED FOR:		DID NOT VOTE, BUT PREFERRED: †		TOTAL SAMPLE‡
	Eisenhower	Stevenson	Eisenhower	Stevenson	
Organized party activities					
"Did you give any money or buy tickets or anything to help the campaign for one of the parties or candidates?"					
Yes	6%	4%	1%	2%	4%
"Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, dinners, or things like that?"					
Yes	9%	8%	1%	2%	7%
"Did you do any other work for one of the parties or candidates?"					
Yes	5%	3%	2%	*	3%
Answered yes to one or more of the above	15%	11%	3%	4%	11%
Informal participation					
"Did you talk to any people to try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates?"					
Yes	36%	28%	15%	12%	27%
Number of cases	687	494	175	202	1,614

† Those who reported not voting were asked, "Who would you have voted for if you had voted?"
‡ Included here is a small number of cases of people who voted or would have voted for minor-party candidates or whose votes or preferences were not ascertained.

TABLE 3.2

THE INDEX OF PARTICIPATION†

DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION	VOTED FOR OR PREFERRED: ‡		TOTAL SAMPLE
	Eisenhower	Stevenson	
High (voted, and engaged in other political activity)	32%	23%	27%
Medium (voted, but did not engage in other activity)	48	48	47
Low (did not vote)§	20	29	26
Total	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	862	696	1,614

† For the kinds of participation on which the index is based see Table 3.1.
‡ Included here are nonvoters who specified the candidate they "would have voted for" if they had voted.
§ About 4 per cent did not vote but participated in other ways, chiefly by "talking to people." They are included in the "low" category.

people in the survey were asked whether they had read about the campaign in newspapers, listened to any campaign speeches on the radio, watched any campaign programs on television, or read about the campaign in magazines. Almost 95 per cent said the campaign had reached them through at least one of these media (Table 3.3), 81 per cent said it had reached them through at least two, and one out of every six adults had been reached by all four media. Asked whether they "read [listened, watched] quite a lot or not very much," 65 per cent replied that they had followed the campaign "quite a lot" in at least one of the four media.

There was no great difference between Eisenhower and Stevenson voters in the percentages who followed the campaign (Table 3.4), but there was some tendency for Eisenhower voters to utilize a greater variety of news sources. Almost one-fourth of Eisenhower's voters reported getting information from all four sources, whereas only about one-sixth of Stevenson's did so. The Eisenhower voters also reported much more magazine reading and somewhat more newspaper reading.[2] These differences may be less an evidence of the political influence of the media than of the socio-economic differences—in level of education and of income—of Republicans and Democrats.

The mass media are, of course, the chief avenues by which the parties

[2] The survey data on mass media in the campaign are much more extensively treated by the present authors in "Television and the Election," *Scientific American*, May, 1953, **188**, No. 5.

TABLE 3.3

RELATION OF NUMBER OF MASS MEDIA IN WHICH CAMPAIGN WAS FOLLOWED TO VOTING BEHAVIOR

VOTING BEHAVIOR	NUMBER OF MEDIA USED†					TOTAL SAMPLE
	None	One	Two	Three	Four	
Voted for Eisenhower	13%	27%	39%	50%	58%	43%
Voted for Stevenson	17	24	32	34	30	31
Did not vote	70	49	29	16	12	26
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	92	218	481	551	272	1,614
Proportion of total sample	6%	13%	30%	34%	17%	100%

† The four media represented are newspapers, radio, television, and magazines. The following questions were asked: "We're mainly interested in this interview in finding out whether people paid much attention to the election campaign this year. Take newspapers, for instance. Did you read about the campaign in any newspaper?" "How about radio? Did you listen to any speeches or discussions about the campaign on the radio?" "Did you watch any programs about the campaign on television?" "How about magazines? Did you read about the campaign in any magazines?" After each of these questions respondents who answered affirmatively were asked, "Would you say you read [listened, watched] quite a lot or not very much?" but the percentages here include all who made any use of the media, whether "quite a lot" or "not very much."

TABLE 3.4

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR TO NUMBER OF MASS MEDIA IN WHICH CAMPAIGN WAS FOLLOWED

NUMBER OF MEDIA†	VOTED FOR:		DID NOT VOTE	TOTAL SAMPLE
	Eisenhower	Stevenson		
None	2%	3%	15%	6%
One	8	11	25	13
Two	27	32	32	30
Three	40	38	21	34
Four	23	16	7	17
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	687	494	419	1,614

† The four media represented are newspapers, radio, television, and magazines. For the questions on which the data are based, see the footnote to Table 3.3.

seek to reach the electorate, but personal canvassing is still employed by both parties. In response to the question, "Did anybody from either one of the parties call you up or come around and talk to you during the campaign," 12 per cent reported that they had been thus solicited. Inasmuch as our inquiry into these postcampaign recollections of such calls was very limited, the data obtained were not very substantial. In general, they pointed to a tendency among workers of both parties to neglect previous nonvoters, and also to concentrate a large part of their efforts on the particular kinds of voters who would be expected to support the party they represented.

Sense of Involvement in the Outcome

Interest and psychological involvement in politics may exist without producing any of the particular outward manifestations examined above. It is possible to be much concerned about the outcome of an election without interjecting one's political beliefs into social conversation and without going to rallies. Conversely, although one must assume that, as a rule, voting is an evidence of interest and nonvoting an evidence of lack of interest, in individual cases the rule may not apply. As a part of the study, three direct questions were asked in the pre-election interviews concerning three somewhat different aspects of interest in the 1952 election.

Responses to the first of these, ". . . would you say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political campaigns so far this year," are summarized in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Over one-third said they were very much interested, one-third said they were somewhat interested, and a little more than one-quarter were not interested. Eisenhower voters tended to be more interested than Stevenson voters, but this difference did not appear among the nonvoting supporters of the two candidates. We would expect degree of interest to be associated with inclination to vote, and we see in Table 3.6 that there is such a relationship: interested people were much more likely to vote than uninterested people. But it may be noted, as the first indication of a phenomenon we shall observe repeatedly, that interested Democrats were somewhat less likely to vote than interested Republicans. (It may be noted, too, that one out of five voters, for either candidate, said in October that they were not even "somewhat" interested in following the campaign.)

The statement that one was interested in following the campaign undoubtedly could have different meanings to different people. It might, for example, refer to what is sometimes called spectator interest. In that case, the election would be on a par with other competitive spectacles, and interest would not necessarily be accompanied by a

TABLE 3.5

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR AND PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE TO INTEREST IN FOLLOWING THE CAMPAIGN

"WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU HAVE BEEN VERY MUCH INTERESTED, SOMEWHAT INTERESTED, OR NOT MUCH INTERESTED IN FOLLOWING THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN SO FAR THIS YEAR?"†	PREFERRED EISENHOWER			PREFERRED STEVENSON			TOTAL SAMPLE
	Voters	Nonvoters	Total	Voters	Nonvoters	Total	
Very much interested	49%	19%	44%	39%	18%	33%	37%
Somewhat interested	32	31	32	37	36	37	34
Not much interested	18	48	23	23	43	29	28
Not ascertained	1	2	1	1	3	1	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	687	175	862	494	202	696	1,614

† This question was asked in the pre-election interview in October. The classification by vote or—in the case of nonvoters—preference is based, as in the preceding tables, on data obtained in the postelection survey.

TABLE 3.6

RELATION OF PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE AND INTEREST IN THE CAMPAIGN TO VOTING BEHAVIOR

Voting Behavior	Preferred Eisenhower			Preferred Stevenson		
	Interested in Following Campaign:†					
	Very Much	Some-what	Not Much	Very Much	Some-what	Not Much
Voted	91%	80%	59%	84%	72%	57%
Did not vote	9	20	41	16	28	43
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	367	277	205	228	257	202

† The question on which these groupings are based is shown in Table 3.5.

sense of concern about the outcome. Hence another question, ". . . would you say that you personally care a good deal which party wins the presidential election this fall, or that you don't care very much which party wins?" About one-tenth said they cared not at all, and another fifth cared little (Table 3.7). Eisenhower voters were the most likely to care very much, while supporters of Eisenhower who did not vote were most likely to care very little. Here again we observe that the degree of interest is much more closely related to voting among Republicans than among Democrats. Over one-quarter of the Stevenson followers who cared a good deal did not vote (Table 3.8).

The third question directed at measuring concern was, "Do you think it will make a good deal of difference to the country whether the Democrats or the Republicans win the elections this November, or that it won't make much difference which side wins?" About one in every three adults felt it would make no difference at all (Table 3.9). Two out of five thought it would make "some" difference. Only one in five said it would make a "good deal" of difference. Those who voted for one presidential candidate did not differ in this respect from those who voted for the other. Nonvoting Eisenhower supporters were again very low in their expression of concern over the election. Among Eisenhower followers, those who thought the outcome of the election would make a good deal of difference to the country were more likely to vote than those who thought it would not (Table 3.10). Among Stevenson followers, this was not true. Almost one-third of the Stevenson people who thought the outcome was important did not vote.

Failure to vote may spring from any of several causes. The technical cause, inability to meet residence requirements for eligibility to vote,

TABLE 3.7

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR AND PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE TO DEGREE OF CONCERN ABOUT OUTCOME OF ELECTION

"WOULD YOU SAY YOU PERSONALLY CARE A GOOD DEAL WHICH PARTY WINS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION THIS FALL, OR THAT YOU DON'T CARE VERY MUCH WHICH PARTY WINS?"	PREFERRED EISENHOWER			PREFERRED STEVENSON			TOTAL SAMPLE
	Voters	Nonvoters	Total	Voters	Nonvoters	Total	
Care very much	36%	17%	32%	26%	24%	25%	28%
Care somewhat	38	28	36	44	40	43	38
It depends	*	1	1	1	1	1	1
Don't care very much	18	33	21	19	18	19	20
Don't care at all	6	19	8	8	13	9	10
Don't know or not ascertained	2	2	2	2	4	3	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	687	175	862	494	202	696	1,614

TABLE 3.8

RELATION OF PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE AND CONCERN ABOUT OUTCOME OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION TO VOTING BEHAVIOR

Voting Behavior	Preferred Eisenhower				Preferred Stevenson			
	Concerned about Outcome of Election:†							
	Very Much	Somewhat	Not Much	Not at All	Very Much	Somewhat	Not Much	Not at All
Voted	90%	84%	68%	53%	72%	73%	72%	61%
Did not vote	10	16	32	47	28	27	28	39
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	274	311	183	72	176	298	131	67

† The question on which these groupings are based is shown in Table 3.7.

was evidently not much of a factor in 1952. Only 12 per cent of the people who reported that they had not voted said they were disfranchised because of inability to meet such requirements; in terms of the total population, this means 3 out of every 100 adults living in private households (whereas 26 out of every 100 were nonvoters). In any case, we would not expect this factor to involve Democrats appreciably more than Republicans. In some places Negroes, who were very strongly pro-Democratic even in 1952, are debarred from voting by local customs and institutions, a fact that influences the Democratic showing somewhat, although their proportion in the total population is small.

Aside from the effect of residence requirements, there are obviously a variety of other obstacles that may prevent even a highly interested person from voting. Sickness, absence from home, conflicting obligations, and other personal considerations undoubtedly take their toll of the potential electorate. Earlier research has indicated, however, that the major reason for failure to vote is apathy—lack of motivation.[3]

[3] See, for example, Harold F. Gosnell, *Non-Voting: Causes and Methods of Control* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924); James K. Pollock, *Voting Behavior: A Case Study* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1939); and G. M. Connelly and H. H. Field, "The Non-Voter—Who He Is, What He Thinks," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer, 1944, **8**, 175–87. For theoretical discussions of political indifference or apathy, see David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "Criteria for Political Apathy," in A. W. Gouldner (ed.), *Studies in Leadership* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 505–59; and Morris Rosenberg, "The Meaning of Politics in Mass Society," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring, 1951, **15**, 5–15.

TABLE 3.9

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR AND PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE TO PERCEPTION OF IMPORTANCE OF ELECTION TO THE COUNTRY

"DO YOU THINK IT WOULD MAKE A GOOD DEAL OF DIFFERENCE TO THE COUNTRY WHETHER THE DEMOCRATS OR REPUBLICANS WIN THE ELECTIONS . . . OR THAT IT WON'T MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE WHICH SIDE WINS?"	PREFERRED EISENHOWER			PREFERRED STEVENSON			TOTAL SAMPLE
	Voters	Nonvoters	Total	Voters	Nonvoters	Total	
A good deal of difference	22%	11%	20%	22%	24%	23%	21%
Some difference, minor differences	43	33	41	42	35	40	40
It depends	1	1	1	1	—	1	1
No difference	30	44	33	30	29	30	32
Don't know or not ascertained	4	11	5	5	12	6	6
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	687	175	862	494	202	696	1,614

TABLE 3.10

RELATION OF PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE AND PERCEPTION OF IMPORTANCE OF ELECTION TO THE COUNTRY TO VOTING BEHAVIOR

Voting Behavior	Preferred Eisenhower			Preferred Stevenson		
	Importance of Outcome to the Country:†					
	Much	Some	None	Much	Some	None
Voted	89%	83%	75%	69%	75%	73%
Did not vote	11	17	25	31	25	27
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	170	325	322	157	257	236

† The question on which these groupings are based is shown in Table 3.9.

The tables we have presented in this chapter have demonstrated that a sizable minority of the public had virtually no interest or concern with the 1952 election, and that, at least among the potential Eisenhower supporters, fewer of these apathetic people did vote than did those who were involved in the election. The fact that a good many of the apparently disinterested people actually voted, however, implies that they were activated by other factors than personal concern with the outcome of the election.

Summary

The assumption of a responsive and participating electorate is one of the basic propositions underlying the democratic concept of government. We have seen in this chapter the extent to which the public actually took part in the 1952 election.

If we regard passive attention to radio or television speeches or newspaper articles as participation in the campaign, then it can be said that virtually the entire public took part in the 1952 election. If we think of voting as the *sine qua non* of participation, the figure was still quite high—three out of four of the people our sample represented, although many of these voters seemed to have very little interest in how the election came out. If we consider only the more individual, less institutionalized, forms of activity, we find that the proportion of political "actives" dropped off to a very small minority of the total population.

Despite the appearance of feverish public interest which characterized the 1952 campaign, it seems evident that the bulk of the political activity that went on during that period was concentrated in a fraction

of perhaps one-tenth of the public. They were the meeting-goers, money-givers, party-workers. Most people took the campaign much more casually, and approximately one person in three did not seem interested enough to care which party won.

If we think of these differences in extent of participation as reflecting differences in strength of motivation, we would conclude that the population divides into contrasting groups of strongly and weakly motivated people, with the bulk of the public falling between these extremes. We shall examine the characteristics of political motivation more fully in Part Two of this report.

IV

The Popular Image of the Parties and the Candidates

A prominent subject of debate in the 1952 election postmortems was the question of who won the election—the victorious party, or its candidate? This question was not peculiar to 1952, but it seemed particularly relevant to that election because of the dramatic change of control of the national government and the fact that the winning candidate was not a political figure but a popular military hero never before associated with a political party. Such a question is an obvious oversimplification, and our research does not undertake to answer it in this form. Voting behavior is a complex involving many factors, some of them doubtless varying in relative weight from time to time, but all to be taken into account in any serious attempt to understand why people vote as they do.

Voting behavior does not take place in a vacuum. At any given time at which we choose to observe it, we are confronted first with the particular features of the political environment that happen to be most prominent at that time. In 1952 these were such as to focus our attention strongly on the people's reactions to the candidates as well as the parties. Hence, in this chapter we shall attempt to delineate the people's perceptions of Eisenhower and Stevenson as revealed in response to direct questions and also in spontaneous comments throughout the interviews. We shall deal in the same way with perceptions of the two parties. We shall present data bearing on several aspects of the popular perceptions of the parties and candidates: their relative popularity, the specific positive and negative characteristics most prominent in the public mind, and the differences between these perceptions and comparable perceptions in 1948.

It should be stressed that this chapter does not attempt a motivational analysis of the 1952 vote. The images people had of the parties and candidates undoubtedly bore some relation to their motives for voting as they did, but the reader is cautioned not to interpret this relationship too directly.

Perceptions of the Parties

Most of the data on the respondents' perceptions of the parties were gathered in four questions asked in the pre-election interview. Each respondent, regardless of his own political inclinations, was asked the following questions:

> I'd like to ask you what you think are the good and bad points about the two parties. Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic party? (What is that?)
>
> Is there anything in particular that you don't like about the Democratic party? (What is that?)
>
> Is there anything in particular that you like about the Republican party? (What is that?)
>
> Is there anything in particular that you don't like about the Republican party? (What is that?)

In addition to the responses to these specific questions, favorable and unfavorable references to the parties in response to other questions in the pre-election interview were also recorded. Many respondents made such comments in answering the question about whether they thought it would make a difference to the country who won the election, in giving the main reasons for their vote intentions, and so on. From a tabulation of all these responses, it is possible to construct descriptions of the two parties as they existed in the minds of the people at the time of the pre-election interviews.

Let us first compare the two parties with respect to the number of people who made any kind of favorable comments about them (Table 4.1). In order to distinguish between attitudes toward the parties themselves and attitudes toward their candidates as personalities, we exclude from this tally people whose only favorable remark about a party was that they liked its presidential candidate. Those who made any other kind of approving reference are counted. As shown in Table 4.1, a larger proportion of the total sample, voters and nonvoters, made such references to the Democratic party (65 per cent) than to the Republican party (48 per cent). This difference seems to be more in accord with the usual party identification of the population (which we shall see in Chapter VII is more often Democratic than Republican) than it is with the 1952 vote. Considering voters alone, we see that most (78 per cent) of the people who voted for Eisenhower had something good to say about the Republican party, but even more (91 per cent) of Stevenson's voters said something favorable about the Democratic party. More striking than this difference, however, is the difference that occurred in the positive perceptions of the parties one

TABLE 4.1

FREQUENCY OF FAVORABLE REFERENCES TO THE PARTIES†

	References to Republican Party			References to Democratic Party		
	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters	Total Sample	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters	Total Sample
Made one or more favorable references	78%	21%	48%	50%	91%	65%
Made no favorable reference	22	79	52	50	9	35
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	687	494	1,614	687	494	1,614

† The direct questions and other sources on which these data are based are shown in the text. Not counted here as making favorable comments are people whose only favorable reference to a party was that they liked its presidential candidate.

voted against. Whereas only one-fifth of the Stevenson voters commented favorably on the Republican party, one-half of Eisenhower's voters commented favorably on the Democratic party. While some such finding might have been expected on the grounds that many Eisenhower supporters had previously voted Democratic, the party defectors did not contribute all the difference in these proportions.

The greater popularity of the Democratic party apparent in these positive reactions is partly offset by the fact that unfavorable remarks about the Democratic party were also more common (Table 4.2),

TABLE 4.2

FREQUENCY OF UNFAVORABLE REFERENCES TO THE PARTIES†

	References to Republican Party			References to Democratic Party		
	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters	Total Sample	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters	Total Sample
Made one or more unfavorable references	36%	77%	51%	83%	43%	58%
Made no unfavorable reference	64	23	49	17	57	42
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	687	494	1,614	687	494	1,614

† The direct questions and other sources on which these data are based are shown in the text. Not counted here as making unfavorable comments are people whose only unfavorable reference to a party was that they disliked its presidential candidate.

although not much more. In other words, the Democratic party elicited more feeling, both of approval and of disapproval, than the Republican party, but with a net of greater apparent popularity.

From this rough estimate of the relative popularity of the two parties, we can proceed to a consideration of the nature of their appeal and lack of appeal, and thence to a reconstruction of the popular images of the parties.

The specific statements made by the respondents regarding the parties were coded out of the interviews in much greater detail than can be presented here. However, the individual items have been combined into a series of broad categories (as in Table 4.3 and succeeding tables) designed to conform to the objectives of the basic study design. A few brief quotations from the interviews will illustrate the content of these categories:

PARTY LEADERS: "I like some of their men that have held office." "President Roosevelt helped us." "I just like the man who is running." "General Eisenhower—that's enough right there."

PARTY IDENTIFICATION: "It's just that I was raised up to be a Democrat." "It's just that I'm fully Democratic." "Just the habit of being a Republican." "I like everything about the Republican party." "The Democrats as a whole stand together better than the Republicans regardless of the issues. We stand by our party."

DOMESTIC POLICIES AND ISSUES: "The Democrats propose some pretty good reforms. Their stand on things like aid to education is good, for example." "They helped me by getting this social security through." "Seems like we have more prosperity when the Democrats are in office." "I think they will straighten out our corrupt government." "They favor the principle of most production creates most profit." "They'll try to keep taxes and prices more on a lower level." "They're more conservative."

FOREIGN POLICY: "I like the way they deal with other countries." "They were good to Europe with the Marshall Plan." "They don't want to foot all the bills for foreign countries." "I think they will get us out of this cold war." "I don't like to bring Korea into this, but the Republicans are the only ones who said that that situation could be brought to an end."

ASSOCIATION WITH CERTAIN GROUPS: "They stand for the working class people." "They pay us farmers more for the stuff we raise." "They are for the people in place of business." "They favor the small businessman more than the Democrats."

"TIME FOR A CHANGE": "One thing is that they're the party out of office. A new broom sweeps clean. When a person's on a job too long, he gets stagnant and decadent." "Time for a change. One party in power too long tends toward corruption. Gets too securely lodged."

Using these six rubrics, Table 4.3 presents a summary of the favorable comments made regarding the two parties. A number of interesting differences may be seen. First of all, comments favorable to both parties dealt more with domestic affairs than with any of the other

TABLE 4.3

FAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

Favorable References	Mentioned in Connection with:	
	Republican Party	Democratic Party
Party leaders	13%	7%
Party identification; traditional party allegiance	8	11
Domestic policies and issues	33	43
Foreign policy; ability to handle Korean War	13	3
Association with certain groups (working people, farmers, etc.)	2	32
"Time for a change"	13	—
Made no favorable reference	49	35
Total	**	**
Number of cases	1,614	1,614

** Columns total more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason for liking the Democratic or Republican Party.

categories. This emphasis is especially marked in references to the Democratic party, particularly if one considers the "association with groups" category as a response referring to domestic policy. The most striking difference in the images of the two parties lies in this group-association category. One out of three people spoke favorably of the Democratic party as the party of the "common people," the party that had helped the working man, the farmer, etc. Only a handful of people spoke favorably of the Republicans in these terms.

The other remarks on domestic policies, though numerous for both Democratic and Republican parties, also show differing perceptions of the two parties. The three main domestic issues mentioned in favor of the Republican party were those involving "corruption," economy, and taxation. Of the sample, 8 per cent remarked that the Republicans might provide a "more honest" government than that of the Democrats, might "clean up the corruption" in Washington; 9 per cent said that the Republicans were more "economy-minded," that they would "spend less money" and "balance the budget"; 8 per cent mentioned that the Republicans might "lower taxes."

The favorable perceptions of the Democratic party in the domestic sphere, on the other hand, were dominated by one major issue. Although some spoke favorably of Democratic social welfare policies, particularly the social security program, the one domestic issue in favor of the Democrats that stood out most clearly was that of economic prosperity. Fully 26 per cent of the sample population spoke favorably of the Democrats as the party that has meant "prosperity" and "good times," "higher wages" and "more jobs." In contrast to this, only 6 per cent spoke favorably of the Republican party in terms of broad economic conditions, most of these hoping that the Republicans might be able to do something about "inflation" and the "high cost of living."[1]

Looking again at Table 4.3, the difference between the party perceptions in terms of foreign affairs provides an interesting contrast to the domestic area. Whereas domestic issues were more prominently mentioned in favor of the Democratic party, foreign affairs were almost exclusively an area favorable to the Republicans. Only a minority of the population mentioned foreign affairs as reasons for favoring the parties, but most of those who did favored the Republicans.

These perceptions of foreign and domestic policies, taken together with the sizable mention of the "time for a change" argument, reflect very well the major arguments and "issues" defined by the two parties during the campaign. Corruption, economy, taxation, Korea, and "time for a change" were all points that Republican speakers stressed during the months preceding the election. The Democrats, on the other hand, strove to build up the image of their party as the party of "the people" and the party that had brought prosperity and good times, the two points which, as we have noted, were most heavily accented by our respondents in talking about the favorable points of the Democratic party.

Differences between the reactions to the parties in terms of party identification and party leaders, though less striking than the differences in terms of issues, are also of some interest. Most of the positive references to Republican party figures were to their presidential candidate; 8 per cent of the total sample mentioned Eisenhower

[1] Further evidence of this tendency to identify the Democratic party with economic well-being was obtained in response to a question designed specifically to measure the respondents' perception of the election in terms of their economic interest. The following question was asked in the pre-election interviews: "Do you think it will make any difference in how you and your family get along financially whether the Democrats or Republicans win? (How is that?)" About half of the respondents said that the election outcome *would* make a difference in their economic situation, and of these twice as many felt they would be better off if the Democrats won than felt their condition would improve under the Republicans.

as a reason for liking the Republican party. In connection with the Democrats, on the other hand, only 1 per cent of the sample mentioned Stevenson as a reason for liking the Democratic party. The majority of the favorable references to Democratic party figures were to Roosevelt.

Responses to the parties in the category labeled "party identification" consist mainly of spontaneous references to the respondents' own traditional party allegiance. At one point in the pre-election interview, people were asked directly with what party they identified themselves (Chapter VII); their answers to that question are not included here. Not many people mentioned their personal party identification in their spontaneous comments regarding the parties, but those who did were a little more likely to mention it in connection with the Democratic party than with the Republican.

Turning now to a consideration of the unfavorable perceptions of the parties, the findings, in general, complement those observed in connection with the positive party responses. Factors mentioned in favor of one party tended also to be mentioned in criticism of the other party. Thus, as shown in Table 4.4, the favorable perception of the Democrats as the party of "the people" is paralleled by some tendency to criticize

TABLE 4.4

UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

UNFAVORABLE REFERENCES	MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH:	
	Republican Party	Democratic Party
Party leaders	7%	11%
Party identification†	8	7
Domestic policies and issues	31	43
Foreign policy; Korean War	4	15
Association with special interest groups (mostly "upper classes," "rich people")	11	1
One party in power too long; "time for a change"	—	9
Made no unfavorable reference	48	42
Total	**	**
Number of cases	1,614	1,614

** Columns total more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason for disliking the Democratic or Republican party.

† Unfavorable references in this category consist of responses which involved rejection of the party as a whole or certain factions of the party, rather than the rejection of specific policies or people. (For example: "I just seem to have a natural dislike for Republicans." "I'm just a Republican and I don't see no good in the Democratic party." "I don't like anything about them—they're crooks and not honest.")

the Republicans as the party of the rich and privileged. Foreign policy and the handling of the Korean War, which appeared as predominantly pro-Republican arguments, also emerge as predominantly anti-Democratic arguments. "Time for a change" is an argument mentioned prominently both in support of the Republican party and in criticism of the Democrats.

This parallelism breaks down to some extent when the domestic issue category is considered. The tendency for more people to favor the Democrats because of their domestic policies is not paralleled by a tendency for more people to criticize the Republicans in this area. On the contrary, somewhat more people criticized the Democrats on the basis of domestic policies and actions, as Table 4.4 demonstrates. However, in the specific content within this broad category, the findings on the unfavorable party perceptions are completely consistent with the favorable ones. Regarding domestic affairs, the three major anti-Democratic comments, like the pro-Republican ones, had to do with "corruption," economy, and taxes: 15 per cent of the sample criticized the Democratic party on the "corruption" issue; 12 per cent criticized it for "too much government spending," the "high national debt," etc.; 12 per cent voiced disapproval of the Democrats by criticizing "high taxes." The big anti-Republican domestic argument, like the main pro-Democratic support in this area, dealt with economic depression: 21 per cent of the sample identified the Republicans in some way with depressed economic conditions, sometimes referring to their past experience in the depression of the early thirties, sometimes expressing a fear about what a Republican victory might mean for their future economic well-being.

The specific content of the unfavorable perceptions of the party leaders also is of interest. Only a small proportion of these comments referred to either Stevenson or Eisenhower. This fact is consistent with the results we shall note in our later consideration of the popular images of the candidates, which indicate very little public rejection of either presidential candidate. The largest number of disapproving comments directed at any political figure were about President Truman, who was referred to critically by 7 per cent of the population.

As we have already seen (Tables 4.1 and 4.2), favorable and unfavorable perceptions of the parties are highly related to the respondents' voting behavior, with Stevenson voters tending to accent the positive aspects of the Democratic party and the negative aspects of the Republican party, and Eisenhower voters tending to stress the positive aspects of the Republican party and the negative aspects of the Democrats. There is not much relative difference between the Eisenhower and Stevenson voters, however, in the particular aspects of the parties that they responded to. That is, there is no particular

tendency for Stevenson and Eisenhower voters to stress different characteristics when talking about their own or the opposite party. Thus Eisenhower voters, in comparison with Stevenson voters, are much more favorable to the Republican party and much more critical of the Democratic party in all major categories of response (Tables 4.5 and 4.8). Stevenson voters, in turn, are more favorable to the Democratic party and more critical of the Republicans in all the major areas coded (Tables 4.6 and 4.7).

TABLE 4.5

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR TO FAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS OF REPUBLICAN PARTY

Favorable References to Republican Party	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters
Party leaders (mostly Eisenhower)	20%	8%
Party identification; traditional party allegiance	14	2
Domestic policies and issues	57	11
Foreign policy; ability to handle Korean War	23	4
Association with certain groups (working people, farmers, etc.)	3	*
"Time for a change"	25	4
Made no favorable reference	19	76
Total	**	**
Number of cases	687	494

** Columns total more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason for liking the Republican party.

TABLE 4.6

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR TO FAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Favorable References to Democratic Party	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters
Party leaders (mostly Roosevelt)	6%	11%
Party identification; traditional party allegiance	5	18
Domestic policies and issues	31	63
Foreign policy; ability to handle Korean War	2	6
Association with certain groups (working people, farmers, etc.)	19	55
Made no favorable reference	50	9
Total	**	**

** Columns total more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason for liking the Democratic party.

TABLE 4.7

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR TO UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS OF REPUBLICAN PARTY

Unfavorable References to Republican Party	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters
Party leaders	7%	9%
Party identification	5	14
Domestic policies and issues	15	52
Foreign policy; Korean War	3	8
Association with special interest groups (mostly "upper classes," "rich people")	4	23
Made no unfavorable reference	63	21
Total	**	***

** Column does not total 100 per cent because a number of the responses were not appropriate for any major category and therefore are not included in the table.
*** Column totals more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason for disliking the Republican party.

TABLE 4.8

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR TO UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Unfavorable References to Democratic Party	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters
Party leaders (mostly Truman)	18%	5%
Party identification	11	3
Domestic policies and issues	65	29
Foreign policy; Korean War	26	12
Association with special interest groups (mostly "upper classes," "rich people")	1	*
One party in power too long; "time for a change"	17	3
Made no unfavorable reference	17	57
Total	**	**

** Columns total more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason for disliking the Democratic party.

Although the general relationships between voting behavior and party perceptions shown in Tables 4.5 to 4.8 do not add much to the previous discussion, some of the specific figures may be noted. As has already been observed, a large proportion of people who voted for Eisenhower had some favorable perception of the Democratic party. It is evident in Table 4.6 that this favorable perception is heavily concentrated in the area of domestic affairs. Almost one-third of the Eisenhower voters had something approving to say about Democratic

domestic policy and activity, and one-fifth talked favorably of the Democrats as a party that helped the working people, farmers, or other subgroupings of the population. We have also observed that many Stevenson voters criticized the Democratic party, criticisms which are also heavily concentrated in the domestic area (Table 4.8). Also, the observation that foreign issues constituted an area almost exclusively favorable to the Republican party is underscored by the fact that even the Stevenson voters more often criticized the Democrats in this area than approved them: 12 per cent of the Stevenson voters criticized the Democratic handling of foreign affairs (particularly the Korean War), as opposed to only 6 per cent who had something good to say about the Democrats in this area (Tables 4.6 and 4.8).

Although not presented in the tables, it may also be of interest to note how often the main specific domestic issues were mentioned by the party protagonists. Democratic "corruption," "government spending," and "high taxes" were specifically mentioned in criticism of the Democratic party by 24, 21, and 18 per cent, respectively, of the Eisenhower voters. Almost as large proportions of Eisenhower voters mentioned these issues when commenting favorably on the changes they felt the Republicans might make if elected. The importance of the "prosperity" theme for the Democrats, on the other hand, is indicated by the fact that 41 per cent of the Stevenson voters praised the Democrats and 36 per cent criticized the Republicans on this issue.

These strong relationships between party perceptions and voting choice should be interpreted with caution, particularly with reference to imputations of causality. We cannot assume from the fact that a person stressed a particular item in talking about the parties that this factor had any necessary influence on his vote. The fact that many Republican voters mentioned "corruption" does not mean that these people voted for Eisenhower "because of" the corruption issue. We have already noted that the main points mentioned by people in describing the parties were all arguments that had been heavily stressed in newspapers, radio, and television in the months before the election. These arguments were thus among the slogans that were readily available to people as rationalizations for their voting choices. A conservative evaluation of the importance of these various issues should be based on the *relative* extent to which different issues stressed by the two parties were accepted by the electorate, rather than on the absolute number that accepted any one of them. Although it may be impossible to interpret the importance of the fact that many people mentioned an argument that party orators and editorial supporters were stressing day after day, the fact that such an item was mentioned by relatively few people may be taken more safely as a sign of the relative unimportance of an issue.

The importance of the presumably big campaign issues that received considerable mention from the electorate should be evaluated, then, by a consideration of and comparison with the presumably big campaign issues that received very little response in the interviews. The most interesting fact, in this connection, is that only 3 per cent of the population mentioned the argument that the Democratic administration had been "soft to communism" and was "infiltrated with Communists," in spite of the fact that this argument was very prominent among the campaign stimuli to which the voters were subjected. It would appear from this that the "communism-in-government" issue was a relatively unimportant one, less meaningful to the electorate than the issues of "corruption," "government spending," etc. Similarly, the almost complete lack of criticism of the Republicans in terms of foreign affairs, in spite of the fact that Republican "isolationism" was one of the Democratic campaign arguments, suggests that this was not particularly important in influencing a vote for Stevenson, certainly much less important than the identification of the Republican party with depressed economic conditions.

Perceptions of the Candidates

One of the most striking aspects of the 1952 election was the apparently great personal attraction of the winning candidate. The crowds that thronged to see him, the buttons and the chants proclaiming "I like Ike," seemed to evidence a dramatic appeal rarely encountered in American presidential candidates. What was the image of Eisenhower to which the American people were responding? Did they see him as a strong leader, a warm and kindly father figure, the person capable of ending the international crisis?

Although the 1952 election will probably be remembered as the "Eisenhower Election," the Democrats also presented an unusual candidate. His refusal to campaign for nomination, his intellectualism, his willingness to take positions unpopular with his audiences, do not conform to the usual stereotype of the American politician. What impact did Stevenson have on the American public? Did he help or hurt the Democratic cause?

Because of the unusual qualities of both major candidates, the 1952 election affords a particularly favorable opportunity to study attraction to a candidate as a force influencing voting behavior. Chapter IX of this volume will deal with the general concept of "candidate orientation" and will attempt to develop this aspect of total political orientation as one of the factors important to the analysis of motivations underlying voting. In the present section of this chapter we shall be concerned with the public's perceptions of the candidates, of

their policy positions, their party representativeness or nonrepresentativeness, their experience, and "personalities." From these data should emerge the images of the candidates as they were seen by the public during the campaign.

The data on the respondents' perceptions of the candidates were gathered in a manner similar to that used for perceptions of the parties. Each respondent was asked specifically what he liked and what he disliked about Eisenhower and Stevenson. Responses to these questions, together with favorable and unfavorable references to the candidates that appeared in response to other questions in the pre-election interview, were assembled and categorized.

TABLE 4.9

FREQUENCY OF FAVORABLE REFERENCES TO THE CANDIDATES†

	References to Eisenhower			References to Stevenson		
	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters	Total Sample	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters	Total Sample
Made one or more favorable references	89%	53%	68%	38%	70%	47%
Made no favorable reference	11	47	32	62	30	53
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	687	494	1,614	687	494	1,614

† Not counted here as making favorable comments are people whose only favorable reference to a candidate was that he was a Democrat or Republican.

Following the same procedure used in the preceding section, a rough measure of the relative popularity of the two candidates may be obtained by comparing the numbers of people who made any kind of approving references to them during the course of the pre-election interview. As seen in Table 4.9, a much larger proportion of the sample made such references to Eisenhower than to Stevenson (68 against 47 per cent). (These include approving references to any aspect of the candidate—his experience, position on issues, campaign, personal qualities, etc.—except the statement that he was liked because he was a Democrat or Republican.) That this difference is not just a function of the larger number of Republican voters is indicated by the fact that it remains when the vote is controlled. Of the Eisenhower voters, 89 per cent made favorable references to Eisenhower, whereas only 70 per cent of the Stevenson voters mentioned their candidate favorably. Of the Stevenson voters, 53 per cent mentioned something favorable

about Eisenhower, whereas Stevenson was thus spoken of by only 38 per cent of the Eisenhower voters (Table 4.9).

As in the case of the party perceptions, this apparent evidence of Eisenhower's greater popularity is offset somewhat by the fact that unfavorable references to Eisenhower were also more common (Table 4.10). However, this difference in the negative references to the two candidates is not as great as the difference in favor of Eisenhower in the proportions of people who made favorable comments.

TABLE 4.10

FREQUENCY OF UNFAVORABLE REFERENCES TO THE CANDIDATES†

	References to Eisenhower			References to Stevenson		
	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters	Total Sample	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters	Total Sample
Made one or more unfavorable references	33%	67%	45%	57%	19%	35%
Made no unfavorable reference	67	33	55	43	81	65
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	687	494	1,614	687	494	1,614

† Not counted here as making unfavorable comments are people whose only unfavorable reference to a candidate was that he was a Democrat or Republican.

Evidence of Eisenhower's greater popularity may also be inferred from the responses to another question in the pre-election interview. An attempt was made to have the respondents evaluate the candidates without consideration of their party connections. Although it is no doubt difficult for most people to make such a psychological separation, still it is significant that Stevenson voters were more likely to express the opinion that, of the two, Eisenhower would make a better president than were Eisenhower voters to give this opinion regarding Stevenson (Table 4.11).

A further measure of the relative appeal of the two candidates may be derived from an examination of the respondents' evaluations of the two parties. As we noted in the discussion of the perceptions of the parties, special tabulation was made of those people who mentioned the presidential candidates as reasons for liking the parties. These responses give some indication of the salience of the attitudes toward the candidates. According to this measure, Eisenhower was a more positive figure for Republican voters than Stevenson was for the Democratic voters. Of the Eisenhower voters, 13 per cent said that

they liked the Republican party because of its presidential candidate, whereas only 3 per cent of the Democratic voters said that they liked the Democratic party because of Stevenson.

These various findings, then, support the general impressions one gained during the course of the campaign about the relative appeal of the two candidates. It should be noted, however, that the data do not indicate an overwhelming preference for Eisenhower, nor do they necessarily imply that there was any striking rejection of Stevenson by

TABLE 4.11

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR TO CANDIDATE PREFERENCE

"Now adding up the good points and the bad points about the two candidates, and forgetting for a minute the parties they belong to, which one do you think would make the best president?"	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters
Eisenhower	82%	16%
Stevenson	9	72
No preference	8	11
Not ascertained	1	1
Total	100%	100%
Number of cases	687	494

the American electorate. As we observed above, more people made unfavorable comments about Eisenhower than about Stevenson. It seems rather to have been the lack of knowledge about Stevenson that worked to his disadvantage, with Eisenhower's greater popularity being partly a function of being better known.

Granting that Eisenhower was a more widely popular candidate than Stevenson, what was the nature of his greater appeal? And what was the popular image that finally evolved of the less well-known Stevenson?

Just as in the case of the parties, a great variety of comments were made by the respondents regarding the candidates. It was necessary to combine these items into a manageable number of categories. In devising this outline of major categories, three main objectives were kept in view: (*a*) An attempt was made to distinguish references to the personal characteristics and abilities of the two men, references to their support of certain policies and group interests, and references to their party representativeness. (*b*) In order to test hypotheses about factors related to different types of orientations to leadership figures, certain distinctions were made within the broader category of "personal" responses. Separate note was made of responses to the candidates in

functional terms (that is, having to do with their experience and competencies, their ability to do the job), responses to the candidates as strong, decisive leadership figures, and comments which suggested a personal attraction to the candidates (for example, comments on the candidates' "likeableness" or "warmth," which are referred to as "personal attractiveness" in the tables that follow).[2] (*c*) Within all of these main categories, an attempt was made to tally separately the specific content categories that had particular relevance to one or the other man—for example, Eisenhower's military background or Stevenson's intellectualism.

When the positive perceptions of Stevenson and Eisenhower are compared (Table 4.12), some interesting differences emerge. One notes first of all, as has already been discussed, that many more people made comments about Eisenhower than about Stevenson. Therefore, to choose the items that were especially favorable to Eisenhower one must look for a very heavy preponderance of pro-Eisenhower references. On the other hand, even a small tendency for more people to mention something favorable to Stevenson than to Eisenhower is noteworthy.

Two attributes of the Eisenhower image stand out in comparison to that of Stevenson. Eisenhower was more often seen as a man with the qualities of leadership, and in particular he was seen as a man able to do something about the foreign situation. One out of seven respondents spoke favorably of Eisenhower as a person of leadership ability, strength, and decisiveness as contrasted to only a handful who spoke of Stevenson in those terms.[3] More than one out of five spoke favorably about Eisenhower's ability to handle the foreign situation (many of them specifically referring to the Korean War), whereas very few spoke of Stevenson in this connection.

The marked accent given to the foreign situation in the positive perceptions of Eisenhower is particularly striking when compared with the emphasis given this area in the reactions to the parties. We have

[2] These distinctions are similar to some that have been made in studies of "authoritarian" reactions to leadership figures. See, for example, Sanford, F. H., "The Follower's Role in Leadership Phenomena," in Swanson, Newcomb and Hartley, *Readings in Social Psychology* (New York: Dryden Press, 1951), 328–39.

[3] The tendency to perceive Eisenhower in "leadership" terms needs to be interpreted with caution. Although we were primarily interested, in this category, in coding out responses to the "charismatic" leader, the "man on horseback," very few of the responses were of that nature. Most of the responses had a strong functional flavor, being rather matter-of-fact references to the fact that Eisenhower had certain demonstrated leadership abilities. In general, the interviews evidenced very little reaction to Eisenhower as a strong authoritarian figure, much less, certainly, than was evidenced in many of the newspaper comments and editorials during the campaign. An analysis of the study data in terms of the charismatic response to Eisenhower is being carried out by Dr. James C. Davies.

already noted that foreign policy, to the extent that it was a party issue, was almost exclusively a pro-Republican issue; but a comparison of Tables 4.3 and 4.12 suggests that foreign policy was much more a pro-

TABLE 4.12

FAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS OF EISENHOWER AND STEVENSON

FAVORABLE REFERENCES	MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH:	
	Eisenhower	Stevenson
Experience and abilities:		
Good man; qualified; capable	17%	11%
Governmental or political experience	1	11
Military experience	11	—
Successful record	14	8
Other references to experience or ability	6	4
Leadership	14	2
Personal attractiveness	15	7
Other personal qualities:		
Integrity; principle; honesty	15	6
Intelligence; education; understanding	7	9
Other personal references	14	7
Issues and policies:		
Domestic policies	9	7
Foreign policy; ability to handle foreign situation, Korean War	22	2
General references to policies and issues	2	4
Association with certain groups (working people, farmers, etc.)	3	7
Party representativeness:		
He's a Republican (Democrat)	5	15
Other party references	1	1
Good campaign; good speaker	2	8
"Time for a change"; he'll bring a change	4	—
Made no favorable reference	31	46
Total	**	**
Number of cases	1,614	1,614

** Columns total more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason for liking Eisenhower or Stevenson.

Eisenhower than a pro-Republican party issue. Whereas many more people responded favorably to Eisenhower in terms of the foreign situation than in terms of what he might do on the domestic scene, the reverse was true of the favorable perceptions of the Republican party: many more people mentioned favoring the Republican party because of the domestic situation (clean up corruption, lower taxes, etc.) than

because of its ability to do something about the foreign situation and the Korean War (Table 4.3). The favorable perception of Eisenhower in this area, then, was not just a symptom of dissatisfaction with the Korean War, nor a mere echo of the public's reaction to the Republican party. Eisenhower, because of his background and experience, seems to have been perceived as a person peculiarly able to cope with the nation's international problems.

In the face of the greater Eisenhower appeal, there were very few ways in which Stevenson was viewed more favorably than Eisenhower. One asset was his governmental and civil experience, although this was counterbalanced by Eisenhower's military experience. There was also a slight tendency for more people to speak favorably of Stevenson's intelligence and his speeches and campaign. On the whole, however, Stevenson's main advantage over Eisenhower does not appear to have been anything that Stevenson himself brought to the campaign. Rather it lay in his party representativeness. Among the respondents, 15 per cent said they liked Stevenson because he was a Democrat, whereas only 5 per cent spoke of liking Eisenhower because he was a Republican. In part, this difference probably reflects the respondents' inability to think of other reasons for favoring Stevenson. Half of the people who said they liked Stevenson because he was a Democrat gave no other reason for liking him.

Although we have emphasized the differences between the public perceptions of Eisenhower and Stevenson, they were also similar in some ways. In spite of the fact that the number of references to Eisenhower was much larger, many of the same qualities were attributed to both candidates—their capabilities, their commendable records of past service, their attractive, "likeable" personalities, and their positive domestic policies.

When we consider the images of the candidates in relation to the respondents' voting behavior, the similarities are even more striking and overshadow the differences. Comparison of the Democratic and Republican voters' perceptions of Eisenhower is presented in Table 4.13, and the comparison with respect to Stevenson appears in Table 4.14. Although many more Democrats than Republicans gave pro-Stevenson responses, and many more Republicans made favorable references to Eisenhower, Stevenson and Eisenhower voters did not differ greatly in the particular aspects of the candidates that they responded to.

There is little relation between the respondents' presidential vote and the particular characteristics of the candidates that they mention, but a few of the specific findings in Tables 4.13 and 4.14 deserve notice. For example, in Table 4.13 it is interesting that there is only one category in which a larger proportion of Stevenson than Eisenhower

voters commented favorably on Eisenhower, and that was his past record. There was some tendency for Stevenson voters to speak favorably of Eisenhower's past record rather than of his present capacities and competencies for the job of president. Looking at

TABLE 4.13

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR TO FAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS OF EISENHOWER

Favorable References to Eisenhower	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters
Experience and abilities:		
Good man; qualified; capable	22%	13%
Governmental or political experience	1	*
Military experience	15	6
Successful record	15	17
Other references to experience or ability	10	2
Leadership	25	6
Personal attractiveness	21	13
Other personal qualities:		
Integrity; principle; honesty	23	10
Intelligence; education; understanding	10	5
Other personal references	25	5
Issues and policies:		
Domestic policies	16	3
Foreign policies; ability to handle foreign situation, Korean War	35	10
General references to policies and issues	4	1
Association with certain groups (working people, farmers, etc.)	4	1
Party representativeness:		
He's a Republican	8	*
Other party references	2	*
Good campaign; good speaker	3	1
"Time for a change"; he'll bring a change	8	*
Made no favorable reference	9	47
Total	**	**
Number of cases	687	494

** Columns total more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason for liking Eisenhower.

Table 4.14, the figures on the responses to Stevenson's campaign are also noteworthy. Stevenson's campaign approach, which aroused considerable interest and speculation in the months preceding the election, was reacted to favorably by as large a proportion of Eisenhower as of Stevenson voters. To the extent that this made a positive impression on the voters, the effect seems to have been a bipartisan

one. Finally, examination of both Tables 4.13 and 4.14 underscores the observation already noted that being a Democrat was apparently a much stronger basis for support of Stevenson than being a Republican was for Eisenhower. Whereas 29 per cent of the Stevenson voters mentioned the fact that their candidate was a Democrat as a reason for

TABLE 4.14

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR TO FAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS OF STEVENSON

Favorable References to Stevenson	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters
Experience and abilities:		
Good man; qualified; capable	8%	18%
Governmental or political experience	7	20
Successful record	7	13
Other references to experience or ability	2	6
Leadership	1	4
Personal attractiveness	6	10
Other personal qualities:		
Integrity; principle; honesty	5	11
Intelligence; education; understanding	9	12
Other personal references	6	13
Issues and policies:		
Domestic policies	2	12
Foreign policy; ability to handle foreign situation, Korean War	*	4
General references to policies and issues	1	9
Association with certain groups (working people, farmers, etc.)	2	14
Party representativeness:		
He's a Democrat	3	29
Other party references	*	2
Good campaign; good speaker	9	9
Made no favorable reference	60	19
Total	**	**
Number of cases	687	494

** Columns total more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason for liking Stevenson.

approving of him, only 8 per cent of the Eisenhower voters mentioned his being a Republican as a reason for supporting him.

The unfavorable reactions to Eisenhower and Stevenson were much less extensive than were the favorable reactions, as is evident in Table 4.15, but certain aspects of these perceptions deserve mention. There appears to have been very little personal rejection of the candidates. The most frequent objection to Eisenhower was that he was a military

man and had no governmental or political experience. The objection to Stevenson mentioned most often was his supposed connection with Truman, the feeling that he was "Truman's man." It would appear that there was not much "voting against a candidate" in the 1952 election, not much rejection of the personalities.

TABLE 4.15

UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS OF EISENHOWER AND STEVENSON

UNFAVORABLE REFERENCES	MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH:	
	Eisenhower	Stevenson
Experience and abilities:		
Military man	25%	—%
Lack of governmental or political experience	10	1
Other references to experience or ability	4	5
Lack of leadership	1	2
Personal unattractiveness	1	3
Stevenson's divorce	—	5
Other personal factors or qualities	5	9
Issues and policies:		
Domestic policies	4	4
Foreign policies; likelihood of getting us into war	5	2
General references to policies and issues	2	2
Association with special interest groups (mostly "upper classes," "rich people")	2	1
Party representativeness:		
He's a Republican (Democrat)	8	6
Connection with Taft, "Old Guard"	3	—
Connection with Truman	—	11
Other party references	3	4
Bad campaign; poor speaker	1	3
Made no unfavorable reference	50	61
Total	**	**
Number of cases	1,614	1,614

** Columns total more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason for disliking Eisenhower or Stevenson.

The comparisons of the unfavorable reactions of the Stevenson and Eisenhower voters do not add greatly to the picture. As indicated in Tables 4.16 and 4.17, there is a high relationship between voting behavior and the number of unfavorable references to the candidates, with Eisenhower voters giving many more anti-Stevenson responses, and Stevenson voters making many more unfavorable references to

Eisenhower, but there was no particular tendency for the two groups of voters to stress different aspects of the candidates in their negative perceptions of them.

Before concluding this section, some further comment might be made on one of the items that appears in the unfavorable references to

TABLE 4.16

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR TO UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS OF EISENHOWER

Unfavorable References to Eisenhower	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters
Experience and abilities:		
Military man	17%	41%
Lack of governmental or political experience	8	18
Other references to experience or ability	2	8
Lack of leadership	1	2
Personal unattractiveness	—	1
Other personal factors or qualities	3	10
Issues and policies:		
Domestic policies	2	7
Foreign policies; likelihood of getting us into war	3	8
General references to policies and issues	1	4
Association with special interest groups (mostly "upper classes," "rich people")	1	4
Party representativeness:		
He's a Republican	1	14
Connection with Taft, "Old Guard"	2	7
Other party references	2	4
Bad campaign; poor speaker	1	1
Made no unfavorable reference	66	23
Total	**	**
Number of cases	687	494

** Columns total more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason for disliking Eisenhower.

Eisenhower: his lack of governmental or political experience. In an election that was determined to a considerable extent by Democrats who deserted their candidate and voted Republican, we would expect that Eisenhower's lack of political background and consequent ambiguity with relation to the party system may have been an asset as well as a liability. Democrats with some antipathy to the Republican party may have been able to vote for Eisenhower in 1952 because they did not see him as clearly identified with the Republican party.

Although Eisenhower's nonpolitical background was rarely mentioned directly as a reason for favoring him, there is some evidence from one further question in the pre-election interview that it may have been a positive aspect of Eisenhower's appeal. In an attempt to

TABLE 4.17

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR TO UNFAVORABLE PERCEPTIONS OF STEVENSON

Unfavorable References to Stevenson	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters
Experience and abilities	9%	2%
Lack of leadership	3	1
Personal unattractiveness	5	1
Divorce	7	4
Other personal factors or qualities	16	3
Issues and policies:		
Domestic policies	6	4
Foreign policies; likelihood of getting us into war	3	*
General references to policies and issues	4	1
Association with special interest groups	2	1
Party representativeness:		
He's a Democrat	12	*
Connection with Truman	20	3
Other party references	8	1
Bad campaign; poor speaker	7	1
Made no unfavorable reference	35	80
Total	**	**
Number of cases	687	494

** Columns total more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason for disliking Stevenson.

measure the extent to which Eisenhower was differentiated from the Republican party, the following question was asked:

> Some people say that Eisenhower is not a real Republican. What do you think about this? Is he the kind of man that *you* think of as being a real Republican? (Why do you say that?)

Responses to this question indicate that a large number of people looked upon Eisenhower as different from their image of the Republican party. If this ambiguity of Eisenhower was a significant factor in enabling former Democrats to switch their votes, one would expect this perception of him to be particularly marked among those people who voted Democratic in 1948 and Republican in 1952. In Table 4.18 these people are contrasted with the regular Democrats and Republicans

in their perceptions of Eisenhower as a "real Republican." There we see that the Democratic-Republican switchers did tend to see Eisenhower as less clearly Republican than did the regular Republicans. But contrary to what we might expect, there was no difference between the switchers and the regular Democrats in this perception.

TABLE 4.18

RELATION OF 1948–1952 VOTING PATTERN TO PERCEPTION OF EISENHOWER AS A REPUBLICAN

PERCEPTION OF EISENHOWER†	1948 AND 1952 VOTE FOR PRESIDENT		
	Dewey, Eisenhower	Truman, Eisenhower	Truman, Stevenson
Eisenhower is a "real" Republican	50%	32%	33%
Eisenhower is not a "real" Republican	31	44	41
Don't know; it depends	15	21	24
Not ascertained	4	3	2
Total	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	385	165	362

† The question used is shown in the text.

The relationships presented in Table 4.18 are by no means conclusive, but they do suggest that Eisenhower's lack of political background may have had some positive connotations, particularly for the critically important group who switched from the Democrats to the Republicans in 1952.

Comparison of Perceptions of Parties and Candidates in the 1948 and 1952 Elections

We have noted a number of differences in the perceptions of the Democratic and Republican parties and candidates in the 1952 election. It would be interesting to be able to compare these perceptions with those from the 1948 election, particularly in view of the significant shift in the vote that occurred between the two election years. This comparison cannot be made for the data discussed thus far in this chapter, since they were obtained from questions and coding operations unique to the 1952 study. However, there are some limited data from the 1952 study bearing on the popular perceptions of the parties and candidates that are roughly comparable to data gathered in our 1948 survey. In the postelection interviews of both studies, all respondents who voted

were asked to give the reasons for their presidential votes. In the 1952 study the question was, "What would you say is the most important reason you voted for him?" In the 1948 study the question was phrased, "What made you decide to vote the way you did?" Although the responses were coded somewhat differently in the two studies, fairly parallel distinctions can be made among responses that referred to party allegiance, candidate personality, domestic issues, foreign policy, and other broad factors of this kind. It is possible, therefore, to obtain

TABLE 4.19

RELATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR TO REASONS FOR VOTE, 1948 AND 1952

Reasons for Choice of Candidate†	1948		1952	
	Dewey Voters	Truman Voters	Eisenhower Voters	Stevenson Voters
Party allegiance	25%	27%	8%	32%
Domestic policies and issues‡	15	36	36	56
Foreign policy	10	3	32	2
Personal characteristics of candidate	10	6	24	18
Experience of candidate§			8	14
Tautological, voted for best man	28	21	15	14
"Time for a change"	26	—	37	—
General satisfaction: no time for a change	—	9	—	3
Total	**	**	**	**
Number of cases	178	212	687	494

** Columns total more than 100 per cent because some people gave more than one reason for their vote.
† The questions used are shown in the text.
‡ In order to make this category comparable to the one used in the 1948 study, it includes the "association with groups" category.
§ This category was not included in the coding of the 1948 responses.

some indication of the changes that occurred in the significance of these different factors for the Democratic and Republican presidential supporters between 1948 and 1952.

These data are presented in Table 4.19. The coding categories of the 1952 study have been combined here to make them comparable to those of the 1948 study, but certain unavoidable differences remain. In general, a somewhat greater attempt was made in the 1952 study to code out the specific reasons for the vote. Because of the greater refinement of the code, general categories such as "general satisfaction: no time for a change" and "tautological, voted for best man" were used less often than they had been in 1948. For example, a number

of responses which would have been coded "tautological, voted for best man" in 1948 may have been coded in the "candidate experience" category in 1952. Another difference is that in 1948 only the first two reasons given by an individual respondent were tallied, whereas in 1952 the maximum was set at three. This change helps to explain the larger total number of responses shown for 1952.

Because of these differences, the figures in Table 4.19 should be interpreted cautiously, particularly when comparing the extent to which any particular category is mentioned in the two election years. For example, the fact that "personal characteristics of candidate" was mentioned much more often by both groups of voters in 1952 than in 1948, while probably reflecting the greater salience of the candidates in the 1952 election, is also probably a function of some of the differences in the coding operations employed in the two studies. These qualifications are much less applicable when Table 4.19 is viewed as a comparison of the *relative* prominence of the different factors for Republican and Democratic voters in the two elections. Therefore, in examining the table the reader should look primarily for increases or decreases in one group of voters' responses in a given category that are not paralleled by increases or decreases in the other group.

Looking at Table 4.19 from this point of view, we may observe a number of interesting findings. First of all, "party allegiance," which was a prominent reason given by both Dewey and Truman supporters in 1948, was much more exclusively a Democratic factor in 1952. Relatively few Eisenhower voters gave this as an important reason for their vote. Secondly, foreign policy, which was not particularly salient for either group of voters in 1948 (although even then more often mentioned by Republican voters), was one of the most prominent factors mentioned by the Eisenhower supporters but remained inconsequential among Democratic voters. Thus, two of the main differences we have already noted in our discussion of the perceptions of the parties and candidates in 1952—the greater relevance of party allegiance in the responses of the Stevenson voters and the almost exclusive relevance of foreign policy as a Republican argument—were both very different from the comparable perceptions in 1948.

A third finding, less striking than the two already mentioned, may also be noted in the table. In 1952, domestic issues were again more often mentioned by Democratic than Republican voters as a reason for their votes, but the ratio had changed somewhat. Whereas over twice as many Truman as Dewey voters mentioned domestic issues, the comparable ratio for Stevenson and Eisenhower voters was only about 1.5 to 1. Domestic issues seem to have been relatively more salient for the Republican voters in 1952 than they were in 1948.

Summing up these differences between 1948 and 1952 in another way,

we may say that the differences in the rationale of voting given by the Republican presidential supporters in the two elections are much greater than the differences in those of their Democratic counterparts. Both in 1948 and 1952, party allegiance and domestic issues were the two major factors stressed by the people who voted for the Democratic presidential candidate. Among the Republican presidential voters, however, party allegiance was given much less prominence and issues (particularly foreign policy issues) were relatively more frequently mentioned in 1952 than in 1948.

These findings are not surprising when we recall the 1952 election situation and the Republican and Democratic campaigns. The Democrats in 1952 were running on their New Deal–Fair Deal record, on the Democratic party as the party of prosperity, the party of "the people." Even with the substitution of Stevenson for Truman, the Democrats presented a traditional appeal. Their arguments were basically the same in 1952 as they had been in 1948, and this fact was reflected in the similarity of the perceptions of their supporters in the two election years. Much of the Republican campaign, on the other hand, was devoted to issues that had arisen since 1948, particularly "Korea" and "corruption," and one would expect their supporters to have evidenced an increased consciousness of issues. The much lower reference to traditional party allegiance on the part of Eisenhower supporters in 1952 no doubt derived in part from the fact that a large proportion of Eisenhower's support came from people who had previously been Democratic supporters or nonvoters. It may also reflect the more immediate significance of issue and candidate considerations to the Eisenhower voters, who gave higher priority to these specific factors than they did to the more traditional, general factor of party loyalty.

It should be noted that in Table 4.19 there is an interesting discrepancy with respect to other data from the study. The small difference between Eisenhower and Stevenson voters in their references to "candidate personality" does not indicate the greater relevance of the Eisenhower personal appeal that one would expect to find. This apparently results from the fact that a large proportion of the favorable comments given by Republican voters regarding Eisenhower linked him with the international situation. They favored him because a central aspect of his appeal was his presumed ability to do something personally about Korea and the cold war. In answering the question, these people explained their approval of Eisenhower in specific terms, rather than in more general terms that would have been coded in the "personal characteristics" category. This peculiarity of coding makes it difficult to compare the two candidates directly in this table, and the disagreement of these data with the tables presented earlier is probably not real.

Summary

The data presented in this chapter have given us, at least in broad outline, a picture of the two parties and candidates as they were seen by the electorate. Noteworthy differences have been pointed out between the perceptions of the two candidates and also between the images of their respective parties. We have also indicated some of the differences between the perceptions of the parties and candidates in the elections of 1948 and 1952.

In summary, it appears that people in general had more feeling about the Democratic party than about the Republican, and although they were critical of it in the 1952 election their perception of it as the party of the common people and the "prosperity" party persisted. Ability to deal with international problems—which to many in 1952 consisted of the Korean War—was seen almost exclusively as an attribute of the Republican party, but it was associated more with the candidate of that party than with party philosophy. The Democrats were also somewhat handicapped by the public's lack of acquaintance with their candidate, particularly in comparison to the well-known popular figure representing the Republican party.

The reader will recognize that these are broad generalizations from data of considerable complexity. They do not establish a clear causal relation between any of these data and the vote, suggestive though they may be. Along with the information presented in the next chapter, on the demographic characteristics of the voters, the data presented here regarding the public images of the parties and candidates will serve to provide a setting for the analysis of political motivation to be undertaken in Part Two.

V

The Demography of the Vote

The broad sociological differences between the Republican and Democratic followings have long been a matter of common knowledge. Throughout the Roosevelt-Truman period the Democrats drew their support largely from the voters of the big cities, the less advantaged socio-economic groupings, the ethnic and religious minorities. The 1948 election showed this political pattern quite clearly. What happened to the pattern in 1952?

What happened, too, to some of the occupational groups for which the parties were bidding so vigorously during the campaign? Is it true, as some observers believed, that the women's vote was especially attracted to Eisenhower? And how about young people—did their political bias differ from that of voters whose political education began under the New Deal? Many such questions may be asked, and for some of them answers may be found in the tables in this chapter.

1948 and 1952

Table 5.1 presents the relationships between presidential preference in the 1948 and 1952 elections and a number of demographic characteristics. It also enables us to compare the turnout of the various demographic groups. There we may see the party biases of, for example, people of different levels of income (as evidenced by their choice of presidential candidate), how these biases differed as between 1948 and 1952, and what the ratio of voters to nonvoters was at each level in each election.

Study of the table as a whole shows that in the general shift to the Republicans in 1952 the Democrats lost their large majorities in many of the groups formerly associated with them, but that, since most of the other classifications also became more Republican, the usual relationships between demographic characteristics and voting behavior tended to persist.

The most significant conclusion to be drawn from Table 5.1 is that the force or forces which made the 1952 election so different from that of 1948 were felt throughout the entire population. If one examines the two-party division among the groupings, it becomes obvious that

TABLE 5.1

RELATION OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS TO PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE IN 1948 AND 1952 ELECTIONS

Demographic Characteristic	Voted for:			Total Voting	Did Not Vote, but Preferred:			Total Not Voting	Number of Cases§
	Republican	Democratic	Other†		Republican	Democratic	Other‡		
SEX									
1952									
Male	44%	34	1	79%	9%	10	2	21%	738
Female	41%	28	*	69%	13%	15	3	31%	876
1948									
Male	28%	36	5	69%	7%	17	7	31%	302
Female	26%	29	4	59%	5%	29	7	41%	357
AGE									
1952									
21–34	37%	31	*	68%	13%	17	2	32%	485
35–44	41%	34	1	76%	11%	11	2	24%	381
45–54	45%	33	1	79%	10%	9	2	21%	284
55 and over	48%	27	2	77%	9%	11	3	23%	442
1948									
21–34	19%	32	5	56%	6%	32	6	44%	199
35–44	24%	38	4	66%	5%	21	8	34%	174
45–54	37%	33	5	75%	3%	16	6	25%	125
55 and over	31%	27	5	63%	8%	21	8	37%	156

TABLE 5.1 (*continued*)

Demographic Characteristic	Voted for:			Total Voting	Did Not Vote, but Preferred:			Total Not Voting	Number of Cases§
	Republican	Democratic	Other†		Republican	Democratic	Other‡		
RELIGION									
1952									
Protestant	45%	26	1	72%	12%	13	3	28%	1,156
Catholic	41%	43	1	85%	5%	10	*	15%	343
1948									
Protestant	28%	25	5	58%	6%	28	8	42%	461
Catholic	25%	49	5	79%	2%	15	4	21%	140
RACE									
1952									
White	47%	31	1	79%	10%	9	2	21%	1,453
Negro	6%	26	1	33%	15%	42	10	67%	157
1948									
White	29%	33	4	66%	6%	22	6	34%	585
Negro	10%	18	8	36%	3%	46	15	64%	61
TYPE OF COMMUNITY									
1952									
Metropolitan areas	44%	33	2	79%	8%	13	*	21%	438
Towns and cities	42%	31	*	73%	11%	13	3	27%	928
Rural areas	42%	25	1	68%	16%	10	6	32%	248
1948									
Metropolitan areas	32%	46	5	83%	2%	12	3	17%	182
Towns and cities	30%	28	5	63%	6%	25	6	37%	354
Rural areas	12%	25	4	41%	8%	37	14	59%	126

TABLE 5.1 (*continued*)

Demographic Characteristic	Voted for:			Total Voting	Did Not Vote, but Preferred:			Total Not Voting	Number of Cases§
	Republican	Democratic	Other†		Republican	Democratic	Other‡		
EDUCATION									
1952									
Grade school	31%	30	1	62%	15%	18	5	38%	660
High school	46%	34	*	80%	9%	10	1	20%	712
College	65%	24	1	90%	6%	4	—	10%	238
1948									
Grade school	16%	35	4	55%	6%	30	9	45%	292
High school	29%	34	4	67%	6%	21	6	33%	266
College	54%	17	8	79%	4%	13	4	21%	100
OCCUPATION OF HEAD OF FAMILY									
1952									
Professional and managerial	59%	27	2	88%	7%	5	—	12%	333
Other white collar	52%	28	1	81%	9%	9	1	19%	155
Skilled and semi-skilled	34%	39	1	74%	11%	13	2	26%	462
Unskilled	19%	40	1	60%	12%	23	5	40%	174
Farm operators	42%	24	1	67%	17%	11	5	33%	178
1948									
Professional and managerial	58%	14	3	75%	7%	14	4	25%	118
Other white collar	38%	38	5	81%	7%	9	3	19%	78
Skilled and semi-skilled	15%	52	4	71%	5%	21	3	29%	164
Unskilled	12%	33	5	50%	6%	34	10	50%	85
Farm operators	13%	25	4	42%	3%	41	14	58%	105

TABLE 5.1 (*continued*)

Demographic Characteristic	Voted for:			Total Voting	Did Not Vote, but Preferred:			Total Not Voting	Number of Cases§
	Republican	Democratic	Other†		Republican	Democratic	Other‡		
TRADE UNION AFFILIATION OF HEAD OF FAMILY									
1952									
Member	33%	43	1	77%	8%	13	2	23%	411
Nonmember	46%	26	1	73%	12%	12	3	27%	1,165
1948									
Member	13%	55	5	73%	2%	23	2	27%	150
Nonmember	32%	26	4	62%	6%	24	8	38%	493
INCOME									
1952									
Under $2,000	30%	23	*	53%	17%	22	8	47%	315
$2,000—2,999	36%	31	1	68%	13%	15	4	32%	255
$3,000—3,999	40%	35	1	76%	11%	12	1	24%	364
$4,000—4,999	41%	41	1	83%	8%	8	1	17%	233
$5,000 and over	59%	28	1	88%	6%	6	*	12%	415
1948									
Under $2,000	16%	28	2	46%	8%	35	11	54%	178
$2,000—2,999	17%	38	6	61%	6%	28	5	39%	185
$3,000—3,999	35%	34	5	74%	3%	18	5	26%	142
$4,000—4,999	36%	33	6	75%	5%	14	6	25%	66
$5,000 and over	53%	25	4	82%	4%	7	7	18%	84

† Includes respondents whose vote was not ascertained as well as those who voted for minor-party candidates.
‡ Includes nonvoters who expressed no preference as well as those who preferred minor-party candidates.
§ The 1952 sample consisted of 1,614 cases, the 1948 sample of 662 cases. The number of cases within a set of demographic groups does not always add to the full total, because of the omission of those respondents who did not fall into the categories represented or from whom the relevant information was not obtained.

the same trend persisted in almost all of them: groups strongly Democratic in 1948 were but weakly Democratic in 1952, groups evenly divided in 1948 were likely to be clearly Republican in 1952, and groups predominantly Republican in 1948 remained strongly Republican in 1952. Inasmuch as many of the groups of nonvoters in 1948 were heavily Democratic in their sentiments that year, it is not surprising to discover that a slight pro-Democratic margin persists in many groups of nonvoters in 1952. Despite this pro-Democratic margin, it seems evident that the nonvoters were affected by the same pervasive pro-Republican forces which attracted their voting counterparts to the Republican candidate.

The generality of the movement from Democratic to Republican is highlighted by the fact that in only three of the numerous demographic groupings represented in Table 5.1 can one observe clear evidence of a deviation from the general 1948–1952 trend. Negroes, the college educated, and the professional and managerial groups all showed a slightly greater proportion voting Democratic than was found in 1948. None of these shifts was large enough to be very significant, but they stand out against the general trend. Why these particular groups should not have moved with the others is a question which requires closer examination than we can give it here.

The greatest shift in preference between 1948 and 1952 was reported by people living in rural areas and their occupational subgrouping, farmers. These rural people moved from a strong majority for Truman to an almost as strong majority for Eisenhower. We do not know whether they were merely returning to a traditional Republican position they had temporarily abandoned in 1948, or whether they have become a politically volatile group capable of swinging from one party to the other as the political scene changes.

While the 1952 election brought a shift toward the Republican candidate in most of the demographic classes, the increase in turnout was somewhat less evenly distributed. If we examine Table 5.1 again, we see that although many of the groupings increased their turnout, several did not. The most striking change was again found among people living in rural areas, of whom some 68 per cent reported casting a ballot where only 41 per cent had so reported in 1948. It is significant that most of the groups that fell below the general level of increase in turnout were nominally Democratic groupings. These were headed by metropolitan dwellers. Far from increasing their 1948 voting record, residents of the large cities dropped from 83 per cent voting in 1948 to 79 per cent voting in 1952. Negroes also had a lower record in 1952 than in 1948, although the change was not significant. Three other pro-Democratic groups showed a disproportionately small increase in turnout. Union members changed only from 73 per cent voting in

1948 to 77 per cent in 1952, skilled and semi-skilled workers went from 71 to 74 per cent, and Catholics increased their voting record from 79 per cent in 1948 to 85 per cent in 1952. All of these groups are largely metropolitan, of course, and their performance may reflect some general factor that affected metropolitan and other people differently. These findings are particularly interesting in the light of the rather commonly held belief that a large turnout in national elections should favor the Democratic party. This belief is based on the fact that the traditionally pro-Republican classes uniformly have a high turnout, even when the vote as a whole is light, so that increases in size of vote might be expected to come mainly from working-class groups. This expectation was clearly not fulfilled in the 1952 election.

We may summarize these 1948–1952 comparisons by stating that no single demographic class was responsible for the great increase in the Republican vote. Farmers and rural people generally made the most dramatic shift of votes, but they were not a large enough group to account for the Eisenhower majority. Women did not contribute any greater proportion of the Republican vote in 1952 than they had in 1948. Young people gave Eisenhower a small majority, but their contribution to his total vote was proportionately less than that of any of the older groups. General Eisenhower won because virtually every major demographic group in American society gave him more votes than it had given the preceding Republican nominee.

Regional and Ethnic Differences

The study also undertook to provide information regarding the voting behavior of two other social classifications which have been thought to have political relevance. They are geographical region and ethnic background. Since there are no comparable data from the 1948 survey, we cannot relate these 1952 data to any earlier election.

Regional Differences and the 1952 *Vote*

The South has for many years been politically unique among the regions of the United States. In 1952, even though the Democrats' grip on this region was severely shaken by the Eisenhower sweep of six of its states, the South, taken as a whole, still gave Stevenson some 52 per cent of its total presidential vote (Table 5.2). This, of course, was in contrast to the rest of the nation, where the Democrats succeeded in capturing about 40 per cent of the two-party vote. The high rate of nonvoting among Southerners was also evident in 1952. Less than half of the sample of this region reported casting a vote for president.

We also see in Table 5.2 that the Northeast and Midwest resembled each other very closely, both in turnout and in party preference. The

Far West, however, reported half again as many nonvoters as did the other two regions outside of the South, and those nonvoters preferred the Democratic candidate to the Republican candidate by a margin of approximately two to one.

The sample of this study was specifically designed to make possible the separate study of each of the four major geographical regions.

TABLE 5.2

RELATION OF REGION TO PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE IN THE 1952 ELECTION

Region	Voted for:			Total Voting	Did Not Vote, but Preferred:			Total Not Voting	Number of Cases
	Eisenhower	Stevenson	Other†		Eisenhower	Stevenson	Other‡		
Northeast	49%	34	1	84%	8%	6	2	16%	390
Midwest	51%	33	1	85%	8%	6	1	15%	580
South	24%	25	*	49%	20%	25	6	51%	440
Far West	47%	29	1	77%	7%	15	1	23%	204

† Includes respondents whose vote was not ascertained as well as those who voted for minor party candidates.
‡ Includes nonvoters who expressed no preference as well as those who preferred minor party candidates.

While the data on the vote presented in Table 5.2 might also have been derived from the election statistics as they were reported by states, it will be apparent to the reader that the other data of the survey make possible an intensive study of each of the major areas. It is expected that subsequent analysis will provide a detailed statement of political differences among the four regions.

Ethnic Background and Presidential Preference

Although there is a substantial folklore regarding the voting proclivities of different ethnic groups in this country, evidence of these relationships is based almost exclusively on the relatively gross data afforded by studies of voting districts, rather than on studies of individual voters. In order to supplement the available data in this interesting area of study, a series of questions on nationality background was included in the pre-election survey. All respondents were asked where they were born. Those born in the United States were asked the birthplace of their parents. When the parents were also native-born Americans, the respondents were asked to identify the birthplace of their grandparents. No attempt was made to identify national origins beyond the grandparents' generation. Only six national groupings were represented by more than a scattering of individuals in the sample: Scandinavian, German, English-Scotch, Irish, Italian, and Polish.

The 1952 voting behavior of these six groupings is presented in Table 5.3. Because of the separate ethnic identity maintained by the Jewish group in most European countries, these six classifications do not include Jews. Also, since most speculation about the "Irish" vote refers to Irish Catholics, Protestants are not included in the Irish grouping.[1]

Although the figures in Table 5.3 are based on small numbers of cases, the ethnic differences shown are consistent with those commonly noted by political observers. Americans of Scandinavian, German, and

TABLE 5.3

RELATION OF ETHNIC BACKGROUND TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN THE 1952 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Voting Behavior	Ethnic Background†					
	Scandinavian	German	English-Scotch	Irish-Catholic	Italian	Polish
Voted for:						
Eisenhower	59%	58%	55%	38%	38%	42%
Stevenson	24	20	25	55	49	40
Other, or not ascertained	—	2	1	2	2	5
Did not vote	17	20	19	5	11	13
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	54	139	76	42	63	38

† The questions on which these classifications are based are described in the text. Ethnic background was not ascertained for native-born individuals whose parents and grandparents were all native-born, and such respondents are not included here. Jews are also omitted.

English-Scotch background favored the Republican candidate much more than did Americans of Irish, Italian, and Polish descent. The findings with respect to amount of political participation are also of interest. The "Democratic" ethnic groupings tended to vote in somewhat greater proportion than the "Republican" groupings, a fact associated with their urban residence.

[1] Although the number of Americans of Irish Protestant background represented in the sample was small (28) and figures based on them consequently unreliable, it is interesting to note that their voting preference was very different from that of the Irish Catholics. As we see in Table 5.3, Irish Catholics tended to support the Democrats, 55 per cent having voted for Stevenson and only 38 per cent for Eisenhower. The Irish Protestants in the sample, on the other hand, favored the Republicans, 57 per cent having voted for Eisenhower and only 21 per cent for Stevenson.

Because of the history of immigration in America, factors related to ethnic background also tend to be related to the period of arrival in America. Scandinavians, Germans, and English tended to predominate among the earlier immigrants, while Italians, Poles, and to some extent Irish were among the later arrivals. We would expect, therefore, that the relationship between voting preference and ethnicity would be paralleled by a relationship between voting preference and generation-time in America. This is borne out by the findings presented in Table 5.4. Third-generation Americans were more Republican than were foreign-born first-generation American citizens or

TABLE 5.4

RELATION OF GENERATION-TIME IN AMERICA TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1952 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Voting Behavior	Generation-Time in America†			
	First Generation	Second Generation	Third Generation	Fourth Generation or More
Voted for:				
Eisenhower	41%	45%	57%	44%
Stevenson	35	40	26	27
Other, or not ascertained	5	1	1	*
Did not vote	19	14	16	29
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	120	362	328	548

† Negroes, and individuals whose generation-time in America was not ascertained, are omitted from this table. First generation refers to foreign-born American citizens; second generation, native-born Americans one or both of whose parents were foreign-born; third generation, native Americans of native American parents, but with at least one foreign-born grandparent; fourth generation, native Americans with native-born parents and grandparents.

native-born Americans whose parents were foreign born. The relationship is not a completely linear one, since people from families who have been in America for more than three generations were somewhat less Republican than third-generation Americans. This deviation reflects the heavy concentration of Southerners among the old American group.

The relationship between voting preference and generation-time in America raises the question of the extent to which the relation between voting preference and ethnic background would hold up, if length of time in this country were controlled. Are the political inclinations of the "Democratic" ethnic groupings a function of their more recent immigrant status, and do these groups become increasingly Republican as they become "integrated" into American society?

The size of the sample was too small to permit us to compare the political characteristics of the six ethnic groupings within each of the different generations. However, we may estimate what the result of such an analysis would have been from an examination of the relation between voting preference and religious affiliation within the different generations. Since people of Scandinavian, German, and English descent are predominantly Protestant, and people of Irish, Italian, and Polish background predominantly Catholic, relationships involving the "Democratic" and "Republican" ethnic groupings should be very similar to those involving the two major religious groupings. These relationships involving religious background, generation-time in America, and voting preference, are presented in Table 5.5.

TABLE 5.5

RELATION OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION TO 1952 VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, WITH GENERATION-TIME IN AMERICA HELD CONSTANT

Religious Affiliation	Generation-Time in America†			
	First Generation	Second Generation	Third Generation	Fourth Generation or More
	Proportion of Two-Party Vote for Eisenhower			
Protestant	71%	70%	71%	64%
Number of cases	31	138	193	354
Catholic	53%	42%	64%	46%
Number of cases	40	137	67	28

† Negroes and individuals whose generation-time in America was not ascertained are not included.

Although some of the figures in Table 5.5 are based on small numbers of cases, it would appear that the greater Republicanism of the Protestant groupings is not merely a reflection of the fact that Protestants are more heavily concentrated among the older American settlers. Protestants of all generations were more likely to vote for Eisenhower than were Catholics of the same generation. By implication, this was probably also generally true of the major ethnic groupings which make up these religious categories (although not, of course, necessarily true for each particular ethnic group).

Summary

We have devoted this chapter to a statement of the demographic characteristics of voters and nonvoters because of the widespread

interest in this type of data. There is an undoubted fascination in the concept of great blocs of voters moving from one party to another, or from apathy to action, and much political analysis has sought to explain political behavior in these terms.

We have not attempted to elaborate the implications of the differences we have pointed out between the various social classifications that make up American society. Previous authors have examined the historical origins of these group differences; others have related them to considerations of economic and other types of self-interest. It is possible to analyze them in terms of group effects and group identification. There is clearly much more that might be said about the data presented in this chapter.

Our approach to the study of political behavior is not, however, at the level of groups. We are interested in analyzing the motivation of the individual voter or nonvoter. How does he regard himself politically? Does he feel himself to belong to one or the other party? Is he involved in partisan issues—does he take a partisan position regarding issues? Is he concerned with the candidates? It is from the point of view implicit in such questions that the next section of our analysis proceeds.

Part Two

THE MOTIVATION OF VOTING BEHAVIOR

VI

Introduction to Part Two

Part One has presented a wide range of information regarding the vote cast for president in November, 1952. We have seen how the vote crystallized from the period prior to the nominations down to Election Day, we have noted the extent and character of individual participation in the campaign, we have examined in detail public perceptions of the parties and the candidates, and we have compared the demographic characteristics of the Eisenhower and Stevenson supporters. Where possible, data from the 1948 presidential election have also been presented so as to provide a comparison between the two elections.

Many interesting facts may be singled out of the tables which have been presented in Part One, and many intriguing interpretations are suggested by them. It is now appropriate to ask, "Have these data told us why the voters turned out in record numbers in 1952 and why they elected General Eisenhower by a sizable majority?" The data we have examined do not in fact answer these questions. They do offer a detailed documentation of the manner in which these events came about, but the forces which impelled the voters can, as yet, only be inferred. How can we come to a closer account of the motivation of the vote? Three methods of approaching this problem come to mind.

The Study of External Events

Any survey of voters will uncover an occasional individual who will explain that his voting decision was in doubt until he heard a particular speech, saw a convincing television program, or read something impressive in his magazine or newspaper. How well can we explain the motivations of the general electorate through the analysis of such individual events during the campaign and pre-campaign period?

The prospects of this procedure of linking events directly to action do not seem encouraging. It would be a hopeless undertaking to attempt to record and assess all of the individual stimuli which enter the individual mind during the period prior to an election, hopeless indeed if we were to think of doing this for any significant group or sample of people. A sheer enumeration of all of the conversations, advertisements, media appeals, exhortations both oral and written of

which one becomes aware, would pose a problem of discouraging proportions—and infinitely more so if an attempt were made to assess the relative intensity of all these experiences.

It is, moreover, very questionable whether one can accept without reservation a voter's report of the influence of specific campaign events on his decision. The lifelong Republican who tells us that Eisenhower's promise to visit Korea settled the issue for him may satisfy his own need to sound reasoned and deliberate, but his explanation may not be very convincing if we examine the total range of factors to which he may be reacting. No single campaign experience exists in a vacuum. Every new event is perceived against a background of attitudes and predispositions of which the individual himself may be only dimly aware. Perceiving is a highly selective process, influenced both by past experience and present needs. Few voters could be expected to introspect so accurately as to be able to assess reliably the impact of the specific attributes of a situation as complex as an election campaign.

For these reasons, the present study did not attempt to take a detailed record of the campaign events which the members of the sample could remember and considered important. It sought rather for some more generalized conceptualization of the factors which underlie the vote.

The Study of Sociological Setting

Certainly the most widely current explanation of voting behavior which goes beyond the simple accounting of campaign events is that which depends on the concept of broad group or class interest. Practical politicians have for many years attempted to exploit the pulling power of an Irish, Italian, Jewish, or other name on their tickets. Special appeals to the farm vote, the labor vote, the women's vote, and to numerous other special groups in the population are a dependable feature of political campaigns in this country. All of this group-directed pleading is based on the assumption that people of like national, religious, occupational, or other characteristics will respond similarly to appeals which invoke the special interests of their particular group.

There is, of course, ample evidence that, during the past twenty years at least, some of these social groupings have in fact given a large majority of their votes to one or the other of the major parties in the presidential elections. It is apparent that during the Roosevelt-Truman period knowledge of a voter's religion, occupation, income, and place of residence made it possible to predict his vote with much better than random success. An early demonstration of this fact may be found in Lazarsfeld's 1940 study in Erie County, Ohio, from which the authors

concluded that "A person thinks, politically, as he is, socially. Social characteristics determine political preference." This sweeping observation was based on a high relationship found among Erie County voters that year between party preference and an index of political predisposition based on three sociological variables: socio-economic level, place of residence, and religion. According to the authors this "simple combination goes a long way in 'explaining' political preferences."

The experience of the last two presidential elections has shown us, however, that the simple classification of voters into sociological categories does not have the explanatory power that at first appeared. It has been demonstrated[1] that the application of the Lazarsfeld index to the national electorate in 1948 resulted in a prediction of the vote not remarkably better than chance. In 1952, the great shifts in group preferences which we have seen would have been very difficult to predict on the basis of previous voting records. Many a political prognosticator has been led into difficulties by the confident assumption that the major population classes will vote in the next election as they have voted in the recent past, and seldom has this been more true than it was in 1952.

It is sometimes possible to infer the motivations of certain classes of voters by analyzing the changes in their votes rather than the consistencies. This has been done, for example, by Lubell in his study of the vote in counties predominantly German in ethnic background.[2] The behavior of the vote in these counties from 1936 to 1948 led him to conclude that "ethnic and emotional" factors related to the Second World War were motivating large blocs of voters in these areas. Can we find evidence of this kind in our data regarding the 1948 and 1952 votes of the major sociological classes?

We have seen in Chapter V that the most impressive fact about the 1948–1952 shifts in group voting was their generality; the movement toward Eisenhower occurred in virtually all of the groups represented. The broad character of the shift suggests that some factor or factors which transcended narrow class interests were operating in the 1952 election, and we shall have to look beyond the simple demographic comparisons for evidence as to what these factors were.

The Study of Intervening Variables

Additional information regarding the dynamics of voting behavior can be obtained by an approach at the level of attitudes, expectations, and group loyalties, the psychological variables which intervene

[1] Janowitz, M., and Miller, W. E., "The Index of Political Predisposition in the 1948 Election," *Journal of Politics*, 1952, **14**, 710–27.

[2] Lubell, S. *The Future of American Politics* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951, vii–285).

between the external events of the voter's world and his ultimate behavior. Successful identification and analysis of these "intervening variables" should provide insights into the problem of voter motivation beyond anything we can hope to achieve through attempting to relate specific campaign events to the vote, or by classifying the votes of the major demographic classes.

What are the major psychological variables that we might think of as relevant to an individual's decision to vote and to his choice of candidate? In the planning of the present study, six factors were proposed as having sufficient importance to warrant specific investigation in the interviews. They were:

1. Personal identification with one of the political parties;
2. Concern with issues of national governmental policy;
3. Personal attraction to the presidential candidates;
4. Conformity to the group standards of one's associates;
5. A sense of personal efficacy in the area of politics;
6. A sense of civic obligation to vote.

Each of these factors may be thought of as having significance in the total motivation of the vote. The first four of the six have the effect of not only stimulating the individual to vote but also of influencing the direction of his vote. The remaining two have relevance only to the act of voting, not to the direction of the vote.

Although data were collected in the interviews regarding each of these six variables, particular attention was given to the first three—those representing concern with parties, issues, and candidates. The other three factors have all been subjected to detailed analysis (portions of which are presented in the Appendices of this volume), but it seemed apparent from the outset that the major factors of parties, issues, and candidates would make the largest contribution to our understanding of voter motivation.

Part Two will deal with three concepts which we have labeled *party identification*, *issue orientation*, and *candidate orientation*. Although we shall be mainly concerned in this volume with relating these concepts to political behavior in the 1952 election, it may be hoped that they will have interest beyond the confines of this limited objective. Because of this broader interest, each of these concepts will be discussed in some detail in the chapters which follow. The variables used to represent these conceptualized forces are described in each case, and certain expectations regarding the behavior of each of the variables in relation to other data of the study are tested. This discussion is followed by three chapters in which we consider the way in which the three variables interact, how they are related to voting behavior, and how they may be applied in an analysis of the motivation of the 1952 vote.

It must be emphasized that the argument of Part Two is based on the assumption that no single-factor theory will account for voting behavior. In other words, we assume that most citizens are acted upon by more than one of the factors we are considering and probably by others as well. We expect their behavior to be a resultant of the total impact of these forces. That is to say, we expect that the greater the number of positive forces activating an individual in the election situation the more likely he will be to respond. When the forces acting on a person are in conflict, however, we expect that his response will be reduced. These two hypotheses will be tested in the chapters which follow, as they relate both to participation in the election and to choice of candidate.

VII

Party Identification

Political activity during the national election campaigns is centered around the major political parties. These sprawling, loosely knit organizations, relatively quiet during the off-election years, provide the mechanism through which the activities of millions of partisan followers are stimulated and integrated during the campaigns.

The nature of the political parties, their history, their internal organization, their techniques and activities, have interested students of politics for many years. Much detailed information is available regarding these attributes of the parties. Our present objective is to explore a different aspect of the total phenomenon of political parties than has ordinarily been the subject of investigation. We propose to consider the parties as social groups and in this and later chapters, to analyze the perceptions, evaluations, and actions of those who identify with them.

Broadly defined, a group is any aggregation of individuals who share a sense of common characteristics or common goals. Every member of our society relates himself either formally or vicariously to a variety of different kinds of groups, some of a small, face-to-face character, others of a much more diffuse and impersonal nature. The particular groups with which a person may choose to associate himself differ in different strata of society, at different stages of life, and in different areas of experience. Some groups imply actual physical proximity among members. Other important groupings are physically dispersed and have little or no ritual of membership. Group-belonging in this latter sense may consist largely of a person's considering himself a member of the group—of identifying himself with it.

Group membership may be said to have importance psychologically in the degree to which it influences the attitudes and behaviors of those who share it. The same group may have very different degrees of significance to different individual members. To some church members the dogma pronounced by the official hierarchy may have the force of law; to others it may seem merely casual. If the group has high positive significance to the individual, he will tend to conform to what he perceives to be its standards.

The sense of personal attachment which the individual feels toward

the group of his choice is referred to in this chapter as identification and, with respect to parties as groups, as *party identification.* Strong identification is equated with high significance of the group as an influential standard.

Political Parties as Groups

The political parties represent a unique kind of social grouping in American society. They are not formal membership groups in the usual definition of the term. Most of their adherents are not elected or invited to membership, they pay no dues, they go to no meetings and they have no contact with any official representative of the party. On the other hand, it is apparent that for many of these silent partisans the fact of "being a Republican or a Democrat" represents much more than a merely nominal association. As V. O. Key observes:

> Despite the informality of acquisition of legal membership in a party the psychological attachment of the great mass of partisans to their party possesses remarkable durability. Even if the party member is an unfaithful attendant at party functions and an infrequent contributor to its finances, he is likely to have a strong attachment to the heroes of the party, to its principles as he interprets them, and to its candidates on election day.

The two major parties in the United States have served as rallying points for political partisans for almost one hundred years. Generations of Americans have sorted themselves into Republicans and Democrats, usually for reasons of a purely pacific variety, but occasionally with implications of more serious conflict. The executive and legislative branches of both federal and state government have been controlled by the two parties as long as contemporary Americans can remember. An elaborate folklore regarding the parties, their history, their great leaders, their policies, has grown up and is widely shared in the population.

One of the important peculiarities of political parties is the fact that for the most part they make no formal requirements of their followers. An individual is free to call himself a Democrat and to consider himself such without getting anyone's approval, paying any fee, or taking any pledge. He is equally free to desert the Democratic party whenever he sees fit and proclaim himself a Republican. While some people have a much more formal connection with their party, for the most part association with a political party in the United States is largely a matter of what one regards himself as being, a Republican or a Democrat.

The fact that people are free to choose their party or shift from one party to the other should not be taken to imply that party identification is typically a frivolous attachment with no serious implications. It is a commonplace experience that some fervid individuals arrange their

lives around their partisan obsessions, giving money, doing volunteer work, following the party line in word and deed. Of course most people are a good deal more restrained about their political interests, although as we have seen a good many of them can be stimulated into action during the heat of a presidential campaign. The fact is that individuals differ greatly in the involvement they feel with political events, and it may be taken for granted that great variation exists in the degree of influence party identification exerts.

The present analysis of party identification is based on the assumption that the two parties serve as standard-setting groups for a significant proportion of the people of this country. In other words, it is assumed that many people associate themselves psychologically with one or the other of the parties, and that this identification has predictable relationships with their perceptions, evaluations, and actions. These relationships would be expected to be in areas of experience relevant to the activities of political parties. We would expect high party identification to be associated with conformity to perceived party standards and support of perceived party goals.

We are asking the reader to think of the influence of personal attachment to a political party as one of the important factors that act as psychological forces in determining political behavior. Two other factors, issue orientation and candidate orientation, will be considered in the chapters which follow. An analysis of the interaction of these three motivational factors and of their combined relation to voting and related behavior will be presented in Chapters X and XI.

The Measurement of Party Identification

The first step we can take in attempting to establish an individual's group attachment is to ask him whether or not he associates himself with this or that organization or social grouping. Is he a Baptist, a Californian, a Rotarian, a Rutgers alumnus? If answered honestly, this can serve as a screening question to divide the population into nominal groups, with no implication as to the personal importance of these group associations.

A direct categorical question of this kind was asked in the present study to separate the respondents into party groups. It read as follows: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?" Of the sample, 22 per cent answered this question by saying they were "independents." They were asked a second question, as follows: "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?" Most of these self-styled independents agreed that they were closer to one party than the other, and they are subsequently referred to as independent

Republicans and independent Democrats. Those independents who insisted they were not closer to either party are henceforth referred to simply as independents.[1]

It may be assumed that some of these people who accepted a party label when it was offered to them in the interview gave a merely superficial answer to the question. The fact that they chose one party label rather than the other may imply very little regarding the actual importance of the preferred party to them. It is clearly necessary to assign those people who placed themselves in one or the other party a value representing the strength of their identification with that group. If we propose to correlate party attachment with various aspects of political behavior, it is essential for our analysis that we at least be able to divide the party identifiers into those for whom party connection is purely nominal and those for whom it has some psychological importance.

Since party identification is regarded in this study as the perception of oneself as attached to one or the other of those vaguely defined agglomerates known as the Democratic party or the Republican party, it was decided to rate the intensity of this identification on the basis of the individual's own perception of himself as being strongly or weakly associated with these party groups. Each respondent who answered the first question on party identification by saying he usually thought of himself as a Republican (or a Democrat) was asked, "Would you call yourself a strong (R) (D) or a not very strong (R) (D)?" In each case the party identifiers divided themselves about equally into strong and weak partisans. Those people who classified themselves as strongly attached to one or the other party often expanded their remarks in terms which left no doubt as to their preference. The following excerpts illustrate the language which they used in speaking of their party:

> "All my ancestors all the way up have always voted Democratic and I felt like it would have made my poor old daddy turn over in his grave if I voted any other way. He fought in the Civil War and went through too much."

[1] The reader will recognize that there are a variety of ways of defining political "independents." Usually some aspect of voting record, such as ticket-splitting or irregular voting, is taken as the basis of classification. Eldersveld ("The Independent Vote: Measurement, Characteristics, and Implications for Party Strategy," *The American Political Science Review*, September, 1952, **46**, No. 3, 732–53) has pointed out that the method of self-designation used in this study does not yield the same results as the more familiar methods of definition. It should be emphasized that in the present context the "independents" were defined as those people who rejected the party labels when asked to identify their political affiliation. Their voting behavior was not considered as a criterion of classification.

"There's no party but the Democratic party as far as I'm concerned. Eisenhower's a good man—he's got a good record, but he's with the wrong party."

"I was just raised to believe in the Democrats and they have been good for the working man—that's good enough for me. The Republicans are a cheap outfit all the way around. I just don't like Republicans, my past experience with them has been all bad."

"I'm a borned Republican, sister. We're Republicans from start to finish, clear back on the family tree. Hot Republicans all along. I'm not so much in favor of Eisenhower as the party he is on. I won't weaken my party by voting for a Democrat."

"I think the differences between the parties are so wide they can't be calculated. It's a matter of personal experience. I've always found the Republicans a finer type of mind and conduct. I think they are on the right side and whatever they do is right."

"It's hard to explain, but I've always been a Republican and I just don't know why or anything about the reasons, issues, or such. I just think they're better than the Democrats in everything, nothing in particular."

As a consequence of this series of questions, it was possible to sort all but a small fraction of the sample into seven categories ranging from strong Democrats to strong Republicans.[2] The distribution of the population into these categories within the four major geographical areas of the nation is presented in Table 7.1.

It is apparent from this table that in October, 1952, about three out of four Americans identified themselves at least nominally with one or the other of the traditional parties, while almost one in four called himself an "independent." It is also clear that at the time of this survey many more people thought of themselves as Democrats (47 per cent) than thought of themselves as Republicans (27 per cent).

If our basic assumption is to be supported—the assumption that party identification is a psychological force with important relationships to political behavior—these self-classifications must imply something more than a capricious choice of proffered labels at the time of the interview. It would have been very desirable if the stability of reported party identification could have been studied by means of panel surveys extending over months or years, with successive reinterviews with the same sample of respondents. Lacking this, a measure of group, rather than individual, reliability can be obtained by comparing the distributions of identification scores obtained from independent samples at different points in time. Evidence of this kind is available from two surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center,

[2] Some four per cent of the respondents, largely Southern Negroes, seemed unable to relate themselves to this type of classification.

one in June, 1952, and the other in September, 1953, in which the same questions[3] on party identification were asked as were asked in the October survey. Table 7.2 demonstrates the way these three independent samples of the national population identified their party association. The distributions are essentially similar, the only difference being a drop in the independent category after June, 1952, with a

TABLE 7.1

DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION WITHIN REGIONS

PARTY IDENTIFICATION†	REGION				TOTAL SAMPLE
	North-east	Mid-west	South	Far West	
Strong Democrat	18%	17%	31%	22%	22%
Weak Democrat	18	25	32	24	25
Independent Democrat	13	9	8	10	10
Independent	8	7	2	7	5
Independent Republican	9	8	5	6	7
Weak Republican	18	15	8	13	14
Strong Republican	14	18	6	16	13
None, minor party, or not ascertained	2	1	8	2	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	390	580	440	446‡	1,614

† The questions on which this classification is based are shown in the text.
‡ See pages 3 and 4.

corresponding small rise in both the party categories.[4] In other words, within the limits of the present data, the self-classification of party identification appears to be relatively stable. The difference between the three distributions only slightly exceeds what might have been expected from errors resulting from sampling, even though the period between the first two surveys was one of intense political activity, and a change in the national administration intervened between the second and third.

[3] They differed slightly in the wording of the question on strength of party identification, which in June read, "Would you say you are a strong (R) (D) or a weak (R) (D)?" and in the later surveys read, "Would you call yourself a strong (R) (D) or a not very strong (R) (D)?"

[4] In the June survey those respondents who did not identify themselves in any of the categories offered were classified with the "independents."

A procedure commonly used to establish the validity of a classification, such as the one with which we are here concerned, is to correlate it with other classifications or scales which may be considered on the basis of a priori judgment to be measuring the same trait or variable. In order to accomplish this in the present study, two questions were asked which posed the problem of party loyalty in suppositional terms. The expectation was that people who had classified themselves

TABLE 7.2

DISTRIBUTION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN JUNE, 1952, OCTOBER, 1952, AND SEPTEMBER, 1953

Party Identification	June, 1952	October, 1952	September, 1953
Strong Democrat	19%	22%	22%
Weak Democrat	20	25	23
Independent Democrat	9	10	8
Independent	14	5	4
Independent Republican	7	7	6
Weak Republican	13	14	15
Strong Republican	15	13	15
None, minor party, or not ascertained	3	4	7
Total	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	999	1,614	1,023

as strong party adherents would be more likely to express a willingness to follow their party line than would people of weak party attachment, or people independent of parties.

The first of these questions asked the respondents to imagine what they would do if their party ran a candidate they "didn't like or didn't agree with." Only those people who had identified themselves as Democrats or Republicans were asked this question, the answers to which are summarized in Table 7.3.

Although the conjectural character of this question may be thought to have introduced some degree of unreality into the answers, the differences between the party groups are marked. Strong partisans were very much more likely to say they would support their party in spite of a candidate they didn't like than were party identifiers who had been classified as less strong.

The second question read, "Some people think that if a voter votes

TABLE 7.3

RELATION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION TO EXPECTED REACTION TO UNATTRACTIVE CANDIDATE ON PARTY TICKET

"SUPPOSE THERE WAS AN ELECTION WHERE YOUR PARTY WAS RUNNING A CANDIDATE YOU DIDN'T LIKE OR YOU DIDN'T AGREE WITH. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING THINGS COMES CLOSEST TO WHAT YOU THINK YOU WOULD DO?"	PARTY IDENTIFICATION				TOTAL IDENTIFIERS
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Weak Republican	Strong Republican	
I probably would vote for him anyway because a person should be loyal to his party	40%	11%	9%	28%	22%
I probably would not vote for either candidate in that election	26	25	18	18	23
I would probably vote for the other party's candidate	32	61	71	53	53
Don't know	1	1	*	—	1
Not ascertained	1	2	2	1	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	351	402	222	217	1,192

TABLE 7.4

RELATION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION TO ATTITUDES TOWARD STRAIGHT PARTY VOTING FOR NATIONAL OFFICES

". . . A VOTER SHOULD VOTE FOR THE SAME PARTY [FOR CONGRESS AS FOR PRESIDENT]. DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE . . .?"	PARTY IDENTIFICATION							TOTAL SAMPLE†
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent Democrat	Independent	Independent Republican	Weak Republican	Strong Republican	
Agree	57%	33%	24%	26%	24%	41%	58%	40%
Don't know, it depends	5	9	10	5	8	7	6	9
Disagree	37	57	66	68	67	51	36	50
Not ascertained	1	1	—	1	1	1	*	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	351	402	164	87	114	222	217	1,614

†Including 49 people who identified themselves otherwise than as Democratic, Republican, or independent, and eight whose party identification was not ascertained.

for one party for president he should vote for the same party for senator and congressman. Do you agree or disagree with that idea?" It will be noted that this question has a stronger ideological content than the first question and is not framed in terms of specific, personal behavior. The answers to this question are shown in Table 7.4.

Half of the respondents rejected this basic proposition of the party system, most of them on the grounds that the voter should always select "the best man." However, those with strong partisan attachments were more than twice as likely as the independents to agree with this statement.

Two conclusions are apparent from these two tables. In the first place, it is clear that the relationships between the classifications of party identification and the expressions of willingness to conform to party position are in the expected direction and are high. To this extent, we may feel some reassurance regarding the validity of the party identification measure. It is also evident, however, that the two conjectural questions posed more severe tests of party discipline to the respondents than did the simple naming of oneself as a strong Republican or Democrat. One-third of the people classified as strong Democrats and one-half of the strong Republicans declared themselves prepared to vote for the other party's candidate in the event that they didn't approve of the man put up by their own party.[5] A third or

[5] It is of interest that a larger proportion of the Republican party identifiers than of the Democratic identifiers declared themselves ready to vote for the other party's candidate. The explanation of this may lie in the difference in the average educational levels of the followers of the two parties, Republicans having a considerable advantage in years of formal schooling. It is known from the Survey Research Center study of the 1948 election that higher education was clearly associated with ticket-splitting in the election of that year, and this relationship has been found again in the present study. It may be surmised that advanced education may tend to free the individual from the restraints of party voting, make him better informed and more selective regarding the individual candidates, and give him greater confidence in his ability to manipulate a split rather than a straight ticket. In other words, the somewhat greater Republican willingness to cross party lines may be a characteristic of highly educated people primarily and of Republicans only secondarily. It will be noted in Table 7.4 that the followers of the two parties did not differ in their reaction to the somewhat sophisticated concept of party uniformity in presidential and congressional votes. In this case the relationship to education disappears. People of high education are no less likely to accept the desirability of party voting on national officers than are people of low education. It appears that the concept of party responsibility in the executive and legislative branches of the federal government is sufficiently well understood and accepted among more highly educated people to make this otherwise relatively selective group of people as willing as other sections of the public to conform to party nominations at this particular level, or at least to accept the stereotype of party responsibility when they recognized it in the question.

more of both these groups rejected the concept of party uniformity in voting for national officers. These distributions lead us to conclude that while for the most part we are justified in regarding our "strong" identifiers as having greater party attachment than our "weak" identifiers, we must keep in mind that these classifications are relative and that the "strong" categories undoubtedly contain some individuals whose party loyalty is not as great as the term "strong" might imply.[6]

Finally, returning to Table 7.2, it should be remarked that the five-to-three advantage which went to the Democratic party in the self-identifications of the October sample contrasted sharply with a five-to-four advantage which these same people gave to the Republican nominee for president. This discrepancy supports the presumption which is implicit in this analysis that for most people party identification is not the same thing as current intention to vote for one party or the other. This distinction was made very explicitly by some of the respondents who answered the question on whether "they usually thought of themselves" as Democrats, Republicans, or independents in the following kind of language:

> "I'm a Democrat. There are times when I split my vote but I've always considered myself a Democrat. I'm going to split my vote for Eisenhower this time."

It is possible, of course, that some people answered the party identification questions entirely in terms of their current voting intentions. In other words, they called themselves strong Republicans or strong Democrats because at that moment they were strongly supporting Eisenhower or Stevenson and not because of any attachment to either party. The ensuing section of this chapter, which presents data on the personal history of party identification, suggests that for most people these party attachments do not change easily as candidates come and go on the national scene.

The Personal History of Party Identification

Virtually nothing is known about the genetic development of personal identification with political parties. Some vague awareness of party politics is probably widespread among American schoolchildren, but there has been no systematic study of how party consciousness develops. The present study has made some preliminary explorations

[6] It would have been possible to "refine" the two groups of strong identifiers by taking out those who rejected the party position on either of the two questions regarding support of party candidates. However, this would have reduced the size of the "strong" groups below a desirable level and would not have proved advantageous in the analysis which is presented in this chapter.

into the personal history of party identification. It has had to rely on the respondents' recall of early experiences, a notoriously fallible source of information. The data are presented here with full recognition of their shortcomings and with the expectation that they will subsequently be replaced by new data gathered by more adequate methods.

Most Americans of voting age, when asked if their parents "thought of themselves mostly as Democrats or Republicans," remember their parents as being associated with one or the other party rather than as shifting between parties (Table 7.5). As might have been expected, those people who remember both their parents as preferring one of the two parties tend strongly to prefer that party themselves. When parental partisanship was reported as mixed or unknown, the identification of the offspring was more evenly divided.

These findings are subject to three possible interpretations: (*a*) Party attachment, like church preference, may tend to be passed from parent to child and to persist into adult life. (*b*) It may be that most people remain in the same class, ethnic, and religious groups as their parents and are subject to the same group influences as their parents. (*c*) People may tend consciously or otherwise to make their memory of their parents' partisanship conform to their own current attachments. While there is no way of assessing the relative weight of these mechanisms from the data of the present study, there is no apparent reason to expect that the factor of biased recall should have been pre-eminent among them. In our society, no public opprobrium attaches to a person who votes differently from his parents. The need to conceal intrafamily differences would seem rather slight.

It will be observed from Table 7.5 that more people identified their parents as Democratic (41 per cent) than as Republican (24 per cent). A sizable proportion of this discrepancy was contributed by the South with its traditional adherence to the Democratic party. Of the Southern respondents, 56 per cent remembered both their parents as Democrats; 15 per cent classified their parents as Republicans. When the rest of the country is considered without the South, the division of parental partisanship is more nearly equal, although the Democrats hold an advantage in every region (Table 7.6).

There is also a substantially greater tendency for younger respondents to report their parents as Democratic than for older. Those people reaching voting age prior to the 1928 election reported their parents as dividing about 55 to 45 in favor of the Democratic party, an advantage contributed entirely by the South. Those people coming of age after the 1928 election reported their parents as favoring the Democrats by slightly more than a two-to-one margin.

In considering these data on family partisanship, it must be remembered that they cannot be directly equated with the division of the

TABLE 7.5

RELATION OF PARENTS' PARTY IDENTIFICATION TO THAT OF OFFSPRING

PARTY IDENTIFICATION	"DO YOU REMEMBER WHEN YOU WERE GROWING UP WHETHER YOUR PARENTS THOUGHT OF THEMSELVES AS MOSTLY DEMOCRATS, OR REPUBLICANS, OR DID THEY SHIFT AROUND FROM ONE PARTY TO ANOTHER?"						
	Both Parents Democrats	Both Parents Republicans	One Democrat, One Republican	One Democrat or Republican, Other Uncertain	Both Parents Shifted	Don't Know About Either	Neither Parent Voted
Strong Democrat	36%	7%	12%	14%	11%	15%	15%
Weak Democrat	36	9	32	23	23	21	22
Independent Democrat	10	6	10	13	13	14	14
Independent	3	4	—	10	14	5	15
Independent Republican	3	10	—	10	12	11	7
Weak Republican	6	30	22	12	14	9	9
Strong Republican	6	33	22	15	11	3	3
None, minor party, or not ascertained	*	1	2	3	2	22	15
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	657	387	41	102	103	140	59
Proportion of total sample†	41%	24%	3%	6%	6%	9%	4%

† Omitted from this table are 125 respondents whose parents belonged to minor parties, whose parents had unusual combinations of party connections, who did not grow up with their parents, or from whom this information was not ascertained.

TABLE 7.6

DISTRIBUTION OF PARENTS' PARTY IDENTIFICATION WITHIN REGIONS

Parents' Party Identification	Region			
	North-east	Mid-west	South	Far West
Both parents Democrats	33%	35%	56%	37%
Both parents Republicans	25	31	15	27
One Democrat, one Republican	1	2	3	4
One Democrat or Republican, other uncertain	8	7	4	7
Both parents shifted	7	9	2	5
Don't know about either	6	5	15	8
Neither parent voted	8	2	2	3
Other combinations, including minor parties	10	7	2	8
Not ascertained	2	2	1	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	390	580	440	446

presidential vote during the period when the respondents were "growing up." People over 40 in this country grew up at a time when the Republican party was rather consistently in power in Washington. One would expect that the total number of votes cast during the period when the present electorate was growing up would show a Republican majority. However, there is evidence both from this study and from earlier research that, as a group, people who regard themselves as Democrats are significantly less likely to vote than those who identify themselves as Republicans (see Table 7.7). If this differential in turnout has characterized the two parties for any significant period of time, as Table 7.7 indicates it has, it would be reasonable to expect that reported family partisanship would run more strongly Democratic than the recorded vote.

It would have been very desirable for the study of the development of party identification, if a full record could have been obtained from each respondent of his voting history from the time he reached voting age. This seemed clearly beyond the possibility of achievement, and it was not attempted. However, it was felt that an individual's first vote for president might be a sufficiently salient experience to be reliably recalled many years later. A question regarding first vote was asked in the survey with the results shown in Table 7.8. Three-fourths of the people who report their first vote as going to one or the

TABLE 7.7

RELATION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION TO REGULARITY OF VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

"IN THE ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT SINCE YOU HAVE BEEN OLD ENOUGH TO VOTE, WOULD YOU SAY YOU HAVE VOTED IN ALL OF THEM, MOST OF THEM, SOME OF THEM, OR NONE OF THEM?"	PARTY IDENTIFICATION							TOTAL SAMPLE
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent Democrat	Independent	Independent Republican	Weak Republican	Strong Republican	
All of them	42%	36%	41%	32%	51%	47%	65%	43%
Most	22	17	21	23	9	20	19	18
Some	15	22	15	23	13	15	5	16
None	14	18	15	16	17	12	5	16
Not of age or not a citizen in previous elections	6	7	8	4	9	4	4	6
Don't know	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	*
Not ascertained	1	*	—	1	1	2	2	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

other of the two major parties still associate themselves to some degree with the same party. Only one person in ten has clearly shifted his allegiance from the party of his original choice to the other.

Additional evidence regarding the constancy of party attachment was obtained by asking those people who called themselves Democrats

TABLE 7.8

RELATION OF REPORTED FIRST VOTE TO PARTY IDENTIFICATION

PARTY IDENTIFICATION	FIRST VOTE FOR PRESIDENT		
	Democratic	Republican	Don't Remember or Have Never Voted
Strong Democrat	33%	4%	20%
Weak Democrat	34	6	27
Independent Democrat	12	6	10
Independent	5	6	5
Independent Republican	5	11	7
Weak Republican	7	27	13
Strong Republican	4	39	8
None, minor party, or not ascertained	*	1	10
Total	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	710	387	498
Proportion of total sample†	44%	24%	31%

† Nineteen people who voted for minor parties or whose first vote was not ascertained are omitted from this table.

or Republicans whether they had ever thought of themselves as identified with the opposite party. As Table 7.9 demonstrates, at the time of the survey 90 per cent of the Democrats said they had never thought of themselves as Republicans, while approximately one-quarter of the Republicans admitted that they had once thought of themselves as Democrats.

The character of the party switching reported by people calling themselves Republicans in 1952 becomes clearer when it is found that most of it occurred in the late 1930s and 1940s, and in large part among people who reported their first vote as pre-Roosevelt Republican, or who came from families with a Republican preference. In other words, the apparent instability in the Republican ranks is largely an expres-

sion of a return to the Republican party of those who had strayed into the Roosevelt camp in 1932 and 1936.[7]

First vote, as reported by the respondents, is clearly associated with region. For the South, first votes, like family partisanship, are heavily Democratic (82 per cent, as against 17 per cent Republican).

TABLE 7.9

RELATION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION TO PARTY SWITCHING

"WAS THERE EVER A TIME WHEN YOU THOUGHT OF YOURSELF AS A REPUBLICAN [DEMOCRAT] RATHER THAN A DEMOCRAT [REPUBLICAN]?"	PARTY IDENTIFICATION			
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Weak Republican	Strong Republican
Yes, a Democrat	—%	—%	30%	16%
Yes, a Republican	6	12	—	—
No	92	87	68	83
Don't know	1	—	—	—
Not ascertained	1	1	2	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

In the other three regions, first votes for Democrats outnumbered those for Republicans by about three to two.

The explanation of the heavy Democratic majority among first votes (44 per cent Democratic to 24 per cent Republican) becomes apparent when the first votes are divided by election years. Two types of analysis are possible:

1. We can examine the votes cast by the respondents in the first election after they reached voting age. Considering each election beginning with 1916, we find that these coming-of-age voters followed the national trend in every election down to 1932. In 1932 there was a massive shift of preference to the Democratic party among this group. This heavy Democratic majority continued through the Roosevelt era, although it declined somewhat in the Truman victory of 1948, reaching a low of slightly over five to three. The total coming-of-age vote from 1916 through 1948, as reported in this survey, favored the Democratic party by a two to one majority.

2. It is also possible to look at the character of the "delayed" first votes, votes cast sometime later than the first election for which the

[7] There is also evidence that Republican identifiers are less rigid in other aspects of political behavior, i.e., split-ticket voting, and that this may be associated with their high education level.

person was eligible. This brings to light a significant number of delayed first votes reported for Roosevelt in 1932 and to a lesser extent in his subsequent elections. Virtually no compensatory delayed first votes appear during these years for the Republican nominees. The total number of delayed first votes brought into the Democratic column, from 1932 to 1948 inclusive, outnumbered those captured by the Republicans by a margin of five to one.

Although these data on first votes are consistent with the general trend of election statistics over the last 40 years, there is no sure way of establishing their validity. It is possible to compare the reported coming-of-age vote in recent elections to data on the young voters obtained in earlier surveys. The two kinds of data support each other closely. There is, however, no external criterion against which the survey information on delayed first votes can be checked. In view of these facts, the possibility must be admitted that the high degree of internal consistency which characterizes these data on first votes may result from a conscious or unconscious wish on the part of the respondents to tell a consistent story.

Data on one further aspect of the political history of the respondents are available from the survey. Those people who reported that they had at some time or another voted in a presidential election were asked whether they had always voted for the same party. As Table 7.10 demonstrates, about two-thirds of the people who claimed to have voted said they had always voted for the same party, and among them the Democratic party enjoyed a two-to-one advantage.

The high degree of party regularity indicated by this table needs to be modified by one important consideration. When a person reported that he "always" had voted Republican, this might mean in fact that he had voted only once and then for the Republican candidate. Number of times voted is disregarded in this table. With this provision, it is not surprising that the proportion of party regulars is as high as it is reported. As shown in Table 7.9, the amount of switching of party identification is relatively small, especially among Democrats.

The large majority of Democratic voters among the party regulars is very largely a phenomenon of the Roosevelt era. It must be kept in mind that approximately half of the adult population in 1952 had reached voting age after the 1928 presidential election. An even larger proportion of the 1952 population had cast their first votes after 1928, approximately 60 per cent. Thus, the Roosevelt period, with its great appeal to coming-of-age voters and delayed first voters, contributed a substantial Democratic bloc to the 1952 electorate. It must also be noted that a sizable number of Republicans crossed into the Roosevelt column during the thirties, and even though they later returned to their party they could not be classified here as party

TABLE 7.10

RELATION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION TO PARTY REGULARITY IN VOTING

"HAVE YOU ALWAYS VOTED FOR THE SAME PARTY OR HAVE YOU VOTED FOR DIFFERENT PARTIES FOR PRESIDENT?"	PARTY IDENTIFICATION							TOTAL SAMPLE
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent Democrat	Independent	Independent Republican	Weak Republican	Strong Republican	
Always Democratic	71%	56%	30%	9%	8%	6%	2%	34%
Mostly Democratic	2	3	2	1	*	1	1	2
Always Republican	*	*	2	3	24	39	66	16
Mostly Republican	—	—	—	—	—	5	7	2
Different parties	6	15	41	64	40	32	15	22
Don't know	—	*	1	3	—	*	—	1
Not ascertained how voted	1	*	1	—	2	1	*	1
Have not voted, or not ascertained whether voted	20	26	23	20	26	16	9	22
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

regulars (see Tables 7.9 and 7.10). Considering these facts and the fact that Democrats were more likely to fail to vote in some of the elections for which they were eligible, it is reasonable to expect that a majority of the people who have never crossed party lines should be Democrats.

Two additional facts of interest emerge from Table 7.10. It will be seen that a small but visible fraction of those people who called themselves Republicans in October, 1952, said they had always voted Democratic in previous years. This switching of allegiance is almost entirely absent in the Democratic columns; virtually none of the self-identified Democrats reported having voted Republican exclusively in earlier elections. This discrepancy is a reflection of the sizable drift of Democrats into the Eisenhower camp which occurred in the 1952 election. Most of these defectors still called themselves Democrats but, as Table 7.10 shows, a small number of them not only supported Eisenhower, but now called themselves Republicans.

The second interesting item from the table is the distribution of people who say they have voted for different parties. Reasonably enough, these people appear in greatest proportion among those who call themselves independent of party affiliation and in decreasing proportions among the groups with increasing party attachment. As noted above, the proportion of bipartisan voters among Republicans is considerably higher than that among Democrats, largely a consequence of the Roosevelt inroads into the Republican ranks during the 1930s.

In summarizing these data on the personal history of party identification, we must observe again that report based on recall of events years in the past is subject to serious question. However, the data presented have a reassuring consistency with such outside information as is available. If we were to assume that within the limits of random memory error the respondents were reporting the facts as they remembered them, we would be justified in stating the following conclusions:

1. As of the time of the survey in October, 1952, about two Americans out of three remembered both their parents as identified with one of the two major parties, more commonly with the Democratic party than with the Republican. They tended very strongly to hold the same party identification they attributed to their parents.

2. Most people who identified themselves with one of the major parties had cast their first vote for that party and had never voted for the presidential candidate of the other party.

3. First votes were more frequently reported as Democratic than as Republican, largely as the result of the appeal of the Roosevelt administration to young voters and to older people who had not voted prior to 1932.

4. People who identified themselves as Democrats were more likely to be nonvoters and occasional voters than people who called themselves Republicans. However, Democrats who had voted were more likely to have stayed with their party in votes for president than were Republicans.

Relation of Party Identification to Participation and Presidential Preference

The evidence presented in the preceding pages documents our assumption that most people in the United States recognize the political parties as significant social entities toward which they feel a continuing sense of personal identification. The high degree of family similarity in party identification, the relatively small percentage of party switching, the small number of people who call themselves independents—all these indicate the importance of the parties as points of psychological anchoring.

It has also been assumed in the preceding discussion that identification with parties has predictable relationships with the way the individual sees the political world around him and how he reacts to it. A full development of the nature of these relationships cannot be undertaken here, but we can examine the degree to which differences in party identification were associated with differences in participation, and preference, in the 1952 election.

Our concept of party identification leads us to assume that a person who associates himself strongly with a party will conform to what he sees to be party standards and will support party goals. Taking the role of party member means, of course, supporting the candidates of the party. This, in a sense, is the ultimate test of party regularity. We might thus expect the strong party identifiers to be most unwavering in their preference for their party's standard bearers and most active in supporting them during the campaign and on Election Day.

If we look first at the extent of participation in the 1952 campaign reported by the different party groups, we discover that they do not differ as much as one might have expected (Table 7.11). The strong Republicans were much the most active of all the groups, both in percentage voting and in the proportion supporting their votes with other activity. Strong Democrats were the most active of the Democratic groups, although their record was not outstanding. However, there is not a high relationship between party identification and extent of participation.

What are we to deduce from Table 7.11 regarding the nature of party identification? It appears that the degree to which a person actively takes part in an election is determined largely by factors which

are not reflected in our measure of party identification. At least, this was true in 1952. In that year we could not have made a very much better prediction of whether a person would vote or otherwise support his candidate from knowing which party category he put himself in than if we knew nothing about his party identification—unless he called

TABLE 7.11

RELATION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political Participation†	Party Identification						
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent Democrat	Independent	Independent Republican	Weak Republican	Strong Republican
High	30%	19%	26%	22%	32%	29%	42%
Medium	46	50	48	52	46	49	50
Low	24	31	26	26	22	22	8
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of participation‡	+6	−12	0	−4	+10	+7	+34

† It will be remembered that the three steps of participation ("high," "medium," and "low"), as discussed in Chapter III, refer respectively to voting plus other participation, voting only, and nonvoting.
‡ The index of participation is derived by subtracting the proportion of "low" participators from the proportion of "high" participators. It is included in this and following tables to summarize the data as an aid to the reader.

himself a strong Republican, in which case we could have been almost sure he would vote and reasonably sure he would participate in other ways, too.

We must conclude that, for many people, calling oneself a Democrat or a Republican does not imply a serious obligation to exert oneself on behalf of that party, even to the extent of voting for it. This is especially true of those people who call themselves Democrats. On the other hand, it is clear that many people vote and otherwise support their candidate without any admitted sense of strong attachment to either party. Their behavior must derive from other kinds of motivation.

It may be that for many people party identification does not have the capacity to stimulate overt activity, but does have the power to command support on the psychological level of preferences and attitudes. That is to say, a party-identified person might feel impelled to take his party's position when confronted with a choice between parties, even though his sense of party loyalty was not sufficient to move him into action. This would seem to be implied from the data presented in

Table 7.12, where we see the presidential preferences of the voters and nonvoters. The high relationship between party identification and preference for that party's candidate is apparent.

We saw in Chapter II that there were serious defections in the 1952 election among former Democratic voters. As we would expect, this

TABLE 7.12

RELATION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION TO PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE OF VOTERS AND NONVOTERS

Presidential Preference of Voters and Nonvoters	Party Identification						
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent Democrat	Independent	Independent Republican	Weak Republican	Strong Republican
Voted for:							
Eisenhower	12%	26%	28%	57%	73%	73%	91%
Stevenson	63	42	44	14	5	5	1
Other, or not ascertained	1	1	2	3	—	*	*
Did not vote but preferred:							
Eisenhower	3	12	7	17	16	17	8
Stevenson	20	17	17	6	4	5	—
Other, none, or not ascertained	1	2	2	3	2	*	—
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

is reflected in the groups of Democratic party identifiers, especially among weak Democrats. In contrast, the strong and weak Republicans were virtually monolithic in their preference for Eisenhower, both those who voted and those who did not.

Two explanations might be put forward to clarify these impressive differences in the support given the candidates of the two parties by those who identify with these parties. It might be proposed, on the one hand, that those people who identify themselves with the Republican party in fact have a stronger group attachment than those people who identify with the Democratic party, and that the questions used in this survey to classify people by party identification were too crude to show this difference. On the other hand, it might be argued that in 1952 those factors other than party identification which influenced the public favored the Republican party, in which case the identifiers of the two parties may have been equally loyal to their

parties, but the Democrats were subjected to a greater degree of pressure to break away from their party ticket.

There are three facts which make it appear that the first of these two explanations will not adequately account for the data: (*a*) The preceding tables in this chapter have not shown any consistent evidence that Republicans are more strongly attached to their party than are Democrats. A review of these data will show that in some cases the Republican partisans seem less ready to follow party discipline than are the Democrats. (*b*) As an inspection of Table 7.13 will show, the

TABLE 7.13

RELATION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION TO VOTE FOR CONGRESSMAN IN 1952

Vote for Congressman in 1952	Party Identification							Total Sample
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent Democrat	Independent	Independent Republican	Weak Republican	Strong Republican	
Republican	6%	12%	21%	43%	54%	58%	75%	31%
Democrat	54	42	39	16	13	7	4	30
Other	1	1	—	1	—	—	—	*
Party not ascertained	5	7	7	6	7	6	8	6
Voted but not for Congressman	5	5	5	5	3	5	3	4
Not ascertained whether voted for Congressman	5	2	2	3	1	2	2	3
Did not vote	24	31	26	26	22	22	8	26
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

difference between the voting regularity of Democrats and Republicans in 1952 was much smaller in the congressional vote than it was in the presidential vote. Although defections among the Democrats were still more common than among the Republicans, the discrepancy between parties was not so large. (*c*) It seems evident that the preponderance of Republican votes, both presidential and congressional, among the independent group must be due to factors other than party loyalty, probably to the same factors which produced the defections among the Democrats.

The present discussion may be concluded by the statement that conformance to party line in preference for candidate for president in the 1952 election was high among strong partisans of both parties, and less high among those less strongly identified with party. Factors conflicting with party loyalty were apparently more important for Democrats than Republicans in 1952.

Summary

The data of this chapter have been organized around the assumption that most Americans identify themselves with one or the other of the two major political parties, and that this sense of attachment and belonging is predictably associated with their political behavior.

The measurement of this experience of party identification presents difficulties. For some people party identification is undoubtedly largely nominal, implying little or no influence on the individual's perception of the political world and his reactions to it. For others, it is obviously a factor of great importance, affecting every aspect of their political lives. The present study has had to content itself with a simple division of those who identified themselves with each party into the strong partisans and the weak partisans, based on their own statements of the strength of their party attachment.

Following this method of classification, it has been found that party identification has both wide distribution and high stability. Three-fourths of the sample usually thought of themselves as either Republicans or Democrats, and there is substantial evidence that for the most part these party attachments are lasting and unchanging. A large majority of these people deny ever having thought of themselves as belonging to the party other than the one of their current choice.

We have conceptualized the personal attachment an individual feels toward his party as a psychological force which, along with other motivating factors, accounts for his voting behavior. Our analysis indicates that the extent of active participation people engaged in during the 1952 election was largely determined by factors other than party identification. The partisan direction of their choice for president, however, was very highly related to their sense of party attachment. We have not demonstrated, of course, that party identification has a direct causal effect on these presidential preferences, but the data follow the pattern we would expect to find if it did.

As we pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, party identification is not the only variable we need to consider in our analysis of the motivation of the vote. The presence of other important factors which influence political attitudes and behavior has been clearly indicated in the tables which have been presented. The succeeding chapters are devoted to their analysis.

VIII

Issue Orientation

If the party identifier is a person for whom parties provide the focus of political thought and action, the issue-oriented citizen is a person for whom questions of governmental policy are of paramount importance. We would expect this individual to perceive parties and candidates as they give promise of coping with major problems of state. Such a person is not, at least in his conscious thought processes, bound by traditional allegiance to the party of his fathers. He will not knowingly accept the warmth and kindliness of one candidate's personality, nor will he reject the retiring or arrogant candidate. For him the party and candidate are but vehicles through which one policy or its alternate will be enacted. He will not "vote for the man" nor will he "vote his party," except as the man or the party represents governmental policies which he himself wishes to see enacted or protected. For him, we assume, the electoral contest is given meaning by the backdrop of congressional voting behavior or administrative action which precedes it.

We propose to treat the concept of *issue orientation* as embracing two major components. These components are—

1. Sensitivity to differences in party positions on issues related to governmental action;
2. Involvement in issues which are perceived as being affected by the outcome of an election.

In the context of the American political system, most issue-oriented behavior will be determined by the perceived choices of action which the two major parties offer the citizen. A vote for party A, or candidate X, will follow from the perception that support of party A, or candidate X, may result in governmental action which will enhance values dear to the heart of the issue-oriented citizen, while support of party B, or candidate Y, might lead to governmental action which would threaten those same values. Inasmuch as the issue-oriented person evaluates his own behavior in terms of its eventual consequences for governmental action, it is postulated that he will be more likely to see policy differences between contesting parties or candidates than will citizens who are more prone to candidate or party orientations. In the midst

of an election campaign, the candidate-oriented individual responds primarily to the personal attributes of the candidates for office, the party-oriented individual responds to his party's appeal for his support, and the issue-oriented individual responds to both parties and candidates in terms of what he sees to be the relative differences in their stands on issues.

The second and perhaps more obvious component of issue orientation is the involvement that the individual himself has in controversial questions of governmental policy and action. Personal involvement in issues has in turn two distinct dimensions. One dimension is the quantitative extent of involvement, varying from lack of concern with any issue to intense preoccupation with a multitude of issues. The second dimension is direction of involvement. Where extent of involvement varies in quantity or strength, direction of involvement varies in quality or kind. In the American political system, with its two clearly dominant political parties, the direction of involvement may be said to vary, for the most part, on a single continuum from pro-Democratic on one extreme to pro-Republican on the other.[1]

Although there may be a theoretically infinite variation from pro-Democratic to pro-Republican on a single issue, the data used in this analysis are not so refined as to allow distinctions among more than three different positions on a given issue. Throughout this presentation these positions will be: pro-Democratic (D), neutral (?), and anti-Democratic (R).[2] Consequently, for this discussion any greater complexity in the partisan nature of issue involvement can be expressed only with involvement in more than one issue.[3]

[1] To some degree, the neatness of such a simple conceptualization is achieved at the expense of ignoring the wide range of ideologies exhibited by prominent members within either of the two major parties. Many of the data which will be examined indicate that this is not a fatal flaw in the conceptualization. Nevertheless, the reader should keep this limitation in mind throughout the discussion.

[2] For the purpose of this discussion anti-Democratic attitudes will be equated with pro-Republican attitudes. If the focus of our interest were state and local elections, or the nomination of presidential candidates, this implied congruence would not be acceptable. In partisan strongholds of the North or the South, or in a presidential convention, opposition to the policies espoused by the major party can be expressed (or must be expressed) by support of likeminded candidates *within* the party. However, in the study of a presidential election the two points of view (anti-Democratic and pro-Republican) must, for many purposes including the purposes of this discussion, be interpreted as equivalent points of view. With only two real alternatives available to the voter, anti-Democratic behavior must be the same as pro-Republican behavior. Carrying this one step further, anti-Democratic attitudes must, in determining a presidential vote, have much the same meaning as pro-Republican attitudes.

[3] Once involvement includes two or more issues, direction of issue involvement may include being pro-Democratic on at least one issue while being pro-Republican or ambivalent on one or more additional issues, etc. Involvement in three issues,

In developing measures of issue orientation as a factor influencing political behavior, we shall need to take account of all three of these elements: *sensitivity to partisan differences* on issues, represented by the degree to which the individual sees differences in the parties' stands on major issues; *extent of involvement* in issues, represented by the existence or nonexistence of partisan attitudes toward issues involving governmental action; and *direction of issue involvement*, represented by the extent to which the individual favors the position of one of the two parties in his own attitudes toward issues. Simultaneous handling of all the data pertaining to the three aspects of issue orientation will not be attempted. We propose, instead, to create two measures based on these three variables. One measure is intended to represent the extent or amount dimension of issue orientation, as expressed in sensitivity to party differences and in extent of involvement in issues. This we shall refer to as *extent of issue orientation*. The second measure will focus on the partisan character of issue orientation, again using sensitivity to party differences, but this time in combination with direction of issue involvement. This we shall call *issue partisanship*.[4]

These components of issue orientation are analogous to the single measure of party identification discussed in Chapter VII. We may speak either of strong party identifiers or of people who are highly issue oriented, and we may refer to a nonidentifier as well as to a person who is not issue oriented. In either instance, the strength of the orientation in question can be specified without regard for the partisan nature of the orientation. It is, of course, also appropriate to describe people as

for example, would allow the following variations in direction of involvement: DDD, DDR, DRR, RRR, DD ?, DR ?, RR ?, D ? ?, R ? ?, and ? ? ?. At the same time, the amount of involvement might be any one of four degrees, namely, (*a*) involvement in three issues, DDD, DDR, DRR, or RRR, (*b*) two issues, DD ?, DR ?, or RR ?, (*c*) one issue, D ? ? or R ? ?, or (*d*) none, ? ? ?.

[4] The third possible measure, created by pairing the two dimensions of involvement and ignoring the sensitivity to differences component, will not be used. Although the two dimensions of issue involvement can be combined to form an issue matrix which provides a rather full description of the patterns of issue involvement within a population, their study without a consideration of the sensitivity to differences component is not appropriate to this particular discussion of issue-oriented behavior.

The sensitivity variable will be included in each of the two measures to be used because it is essential both to the theory of the nature of issue-oriented behavior and to the empirical demonstration of its existence. Its existence is crucial to the production of either major dependent variable, i.e., amount of participation and direction of participation. On the other hand, sheer amount of issue involvement is *not* related to direction of political partisanship, and, with one notable exception, direction of issue involvement is not pertinent to amount of political participation.

Republican party identifiers or as Republican issue partisans in instances where the directional or partisan components of the orientation are pertinent.

Although the similarities between the dimensions of issue orientation and party identification are most important, the nature of the two variables differs in at least one important respect. It is reasonable to expect that many people will be strongly issue oriented and yet show no extreme issue partisanship. Questions of governmental policy are of crucial importance for those people, but they may well be pro-Republican on some issues while being equally pro-Democratic on others. This sort of balanced partisanship cannot be experienced by a party identifier. By the very nature of party identification, being a strong Democrat rules out being a Republican identifier, and vice versa.

While the two orientations differ in this fashion, they are again similar in that extreme partisanship within either orientation also implies a high degree of involvement with the orientation. Thus, issue orientation is very important to the person who is an extreme Democrat on issue partisanship, just as party identification is very important to the person who calls himself a strong Democrat.

The Measurement of Issue Involvement

The relevance of governmental activity to individual goals may take many forms, varying from the enduring and all-embracing relevance experienced by the ideologically persuaded individual to an occasional and probably casual feeling that "Washington" could or should do something to alleviate or eliminate a personal grievance. The relevance may be perceived as strictly personal, as with the concern over taxes, or prices, which affect the individual's pocketbook. It may also be much broader, perceived as affecting not only the individual but his or her business or social associates as well. In the latter case, the issue involvement is possibly reinforced by a sense of group involvement in which the individual feels that his group, and not he alone, has a stake in some governmental action. Issue involvement may also be experienced in relation to governmental action which has no conceivable consequences for the individual's material well-being, or for that of family or friends, but which, rather, enhances or threatens values held by the individual.

Just as the range and depth of involvement in issues may vary, so may the particular content of the issues include all manner of items. The ideology may be focused on the extent of governmental economic activity, or on the amount and kinds of governmental participation in foreign affairs. The more particularized concern with issues may

concentrate on specific economic, social, or social welfare activities of the government, even raising questions about the execution of authorized policies rather than about the policies themselves. A proposed change in import duties on pocket watch crystals, a bill to accept 100 additional immigrants from the country of one's nativity, or a Senate resolution condemning all opposition to military conscription—any of these may prompt the issue-oriented citizen to act.

A full exploration of issue involvement would seem to call for at least two areas of study. The first step would be the collection and treatment of data which would allow one to specify, concerning each individual being studied, that there is or is not evidence of issue involvement or commitment. The second step could then entail exploration and specification of the content of each involvement. The following discussion will not give detailed consideration to this second step but will, instead, center on questions of the existence and relative importance of issue involvement.

Data Regarding Issue Involvement

The data on issue involvement were provided by responses to seven specific questions asked in the pre-election interviews. The questions were chosen for inclusion in the interview schedule on the basis of their judged relevance to political behavior in the 1952 election. Although the final selection was quite adequate for providing issue information which was related to the total context of the election study, it did impose severe limitations on the independent analysis of issue involvement.

In the first place, the questions were deliberately constructed to encompass a wide range of issues. No two questions were intended to tap any single dimension of issue involvement. Consequently, the task of constructing meaningful scales or typologies by combining items which have a single dimension in common becomes quite difficult. Second, the additional criteria which were employed in selecting issues for investigation were not, except coincidentally, criteria which were relevant to a study of different types of issue involvement.

The questions were chosen to represent (*a*) both domestic and foreign policies, (*b*) differences of partisan opinion which, in point of time, were both of long duration and of very recent origin, and (*c*) broad, more or less fundamental or ideological controversies, as well as the more particularized "bread and butter" disagreements over specific policy acts. Using the three criteria as guides, issues were chosen to represent a broad range of government activities which were judged to be foci for relatively clear expressions of party differences. The only additional limiting criterion was an insistence that all questions be about issues on which the incumbent Truman admini-

stration had accepted responsibility for a particular position. This, of course, eliminated specific inquiry about "corruption" or "communism in government," although these and other such controversial areas are usually included in discussions of campaign issues of 1952. We have seen evidence of the role of some of these latter items in Chapter IV.

Inasmuch as the questions were chosen to explore partisan differences, the categorization of responses which was used highlighted such differences.[5] The responses to each question were grouped under one of three headings, namely, "Support Democratic Administration Policy," "Oppose Democratic Administration Policy," and "Not Partisanly Committed on Democratic Administration Policy."[6] This procedure minimized the extent to which the data could accommodate the factional differences which existed within both parties. It opened the possibility of a certain lack of precision in thinking about partisan differences in that it obscured very real differences which did exist within the parties. It did, however, provide an understandable and communicable basis for specifying a common meaning attached to responses. The seven questions are listed below.

GOVERNMENTAL SOCIAL WELFARE ACTIVITY: "Some people think the national government should do more in trying to deal with such problems as unemployment, education, housing, and so on. Others think that the government is already doing too much. On the whole, would you say that what the government has done has been about right, too much, or not enough?"

FEPC: "There is a lot of talk these days about discrimination, that is, people having trouble getting jobs because of their race. Do you think the government ought to take an interest in whether Negroes have trouble getting jobs or should it stay out of this problem? Do you think we need laws to deal with this problem or are there other ways that will handle it better? Do you think the national government should handle this or do you think it should be left for each state to handle in its own way? Do you think the state governments should do something about this problem or should they stay out of it [also]?"

TAFT-HARTLEY LABOR LAW REVISION: "Have you heard anything about the Taft-Hartley Law? [If yes] How do you feel about it—do you think it's all right as it is, do you think it should be changed in any way, or don't

[5] Although there were many possible dimensions which could be utilized in establishing categories for responses to the questions, the categories actually used in the coding operation were directed only at capturing that substantive content of each response which was directly relevant to the question asked. Dimensions such as specificity-generality of response were not coded.

[6] Detailed description of the responses subsumed under each of the three categories may be found in the *American Political Science Review*, June, 1953, **47**, No. 2, 359–85.

you have any feelings about it? [If should be changed] Do you think the law should be changed just a little, changed quite a bit, or do you think it should be *completely* repealed?"

U.S. FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT: "Some people think that since the end of the last world war this country has gone too far in concerning itself with problems in other parts of the world. How do you feel about this?"

U.S. CHINA POLICY: "Some people feel that it was our government's fault that China went communistic—others say there was nothing that we could do to stop it. How do you feel about this?"

U.S. ENTRY IN KOREAN WAR: "Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Korea two years ago or should we have stayed out?"

CURRENT U.S. KOREAN POLICY: "Which of the following things do you think it would be best for us to do *now* in Korea? (*a*) Pull out of Korea entirely? (*b*) Keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement? (*c*) Take a stronger stand and bomb Manchuria and China?"

Issue Involvement and Presidential Preference

Each of the seven questions evoked responses which were significantly related to the presidential preference of the respondents. On all issues people taking a pro-Democratic attitudinal position were the

TABLE 8.1

RELATION OF DIRECTION OF INVOLVEMENT IN ISSUES TO PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE

Issue†	Presidential Preference‡	Issue Involvement		
		Pro-Democratic	Anti-Democratic	Neutral
Governmental social welfare activity	Eisenhower	43%	85%	48%
	Stevenson	52	14	49
	Other	5	1	3
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of presidential preference§	−9	+71	−1
	Number of cases	400	293	921
FEPC	Eisenhower	48%	59%	54%
	Stevenson	48	39	35
	Other	4	2	11
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of presidential preference	0	+20	+19
	Number of cases	732	765	117

TABLE 8.1 (*continued*)

Issue†	Presidential Preference‡	Issue Involvement		
		Pro-Democratic	Anti-Democratic	Neutral
Taft-Hartley Law	Eisenhower	29%	77%	52%
	Stevenson	68	23	43
	Other	3	*	5
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of presidential preference	−39	+54	+9
	Number of cases	275	355	984
U.S. foreign involvement	Eisenhower	45%	62%	39%
	Stevenson	53	36	49
	Other	2	2	12
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of presidential preference	−8	+26	−10
	Number of cases	521	899	194
U.S. China policy	Eisenhower	45%	71%	52%
	Stevenson	52	27	42
	Other	3	2	6
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of presidential preference	−7	+44	+10
	Number of cases	776	406	432
U.S. entry in Korean War	Eisenhower	45%	62%	54%
	Stevenson	54	35	38
	Other	1	3	8
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of presidential preference	−9	+27	+16
	Number of cases	641	664	309
Current U.S. Korean policy	Eisenhower	45%	61%	53%
	Stevenson	51	37	35
	Other	4	2	12
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of presidential preference	−6	+24	+18
	Number of cases	734	772	108

† The questions asked in the interview about each of these issues are shown in the text.

‡ The term "presidential preference" is used to cover the choice of candidate made by voters and also the preference expressed by nonvoters in answer to the question, "Who would you have voted for if you had voted?"

§ The index of presidential preference is derived by subtracting the proportion who preferred Stevenson from the proportion who preferred Eisenhower. It is included in this and following tables to summarize the data as an aid to the reader.

most Democratic group on presidential preference, while people expressing anti-Democratic attitudes were the most pro-Republican (Table 8.1). On most issues, the people in the neutral issue position were, as a group, clearly less partisan than either of the other groups. The relationship between direction of issue involvement and presidential preference was lowest for the FEPC issue. This might be expected both because of the extreme division within the Democratic party on that issue, and because the issue was not a salient issue for a large part of the population. Even this relationship, however, was high enough so that it clearly could not be attributed to errors of sampling. The relationships appeared to be somewhat higher for the other two domestic issues than for any of the foreign affairs issues.[7]

Issue Involvement and Participation

Involvement with issues was, in the case of six issues, unmistakably related to level of political participation as we have defined it in Chapter III. For each of the six issues, people who took either a pro-Democratic or an anti-Democratic stand on an issue participated significantly more than did people who were categorized as neutral on the issue (Table 8.2). For the seventh issue, U.S. Entry in Korean War, the over-all relationship is clearly lower than that for all other issues, but is still significantly high.

[7] The question labelled U.S. Foreign Involvement had been asked in a number of earlier Survey Research Center studies. In surveys in 1946, 1947, and 1948 approximately one-third of our national samples answered this question by saying they thought this country had "gone too far" in its foreign involvements; this figure stood at 56 per cent in our 1952 pre-election survey. The implications of this shift cannot be developed here, but it is undoubtedly related to the increased significance that the general problem of foreign policy had in the 1952 election as compared to 1948.

TABLE 8.2

RELATION OF INVOLVEMENT IN ISSUES TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Issue	Political Participation	Issue Involvement		
		Pro-Democratic	Anti-Democratic	Neutral
Governmental social welfare activity	High	29%	40%	23%
	Medium	48	45	46
	Low	23	15	31
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of participation	+6	+25	−8
	Number of cases	400	293	921

TABLE 8.2 (*continued*)

Issue	Political Participation	Issue Involvement		
		Pro-Democratic	Anti-Democratic	Neutral
FEPC	High	25%	32%	14%
	Medium	47	47	45
	Low	28	21	41
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of participation	−3	+11	−27
	Number of cases	732	765	117
Taft-Hartley Law	High	42%	39%	19%
	Medium	43	48	47
	Low	15	13	34
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of participation	+27	+26	−15
	Number of cases	275	355	984
U.S. foreign involvement	High	33%	27%	12%
	Medium	46	49	38
	Low	21	24	50
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of participation	+12	+3	−38
	Number of cases	521	899	194
U.S. China policy	High	27%	41%	16%
	Medium	47	47	45
	Low	26	12	39
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of participation	+1	+29	−23
	Number of cases	776	406	432
U.S. entry in Korean War	High	33%	24%	23%
	Medium	45	49	45
	Low	22	27	32
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of participation	+11	−3	−9
	Number of cases	641	664	309

TABLE 8.2 (*continued*)

Issue	Political Participation	Issue Involvement		
		Pro-Democratic	Anti-Democratic	Neutral
Current U.S. Korean policy	High	24%	31%	20%
	Medium	46	48	45
	Low	30	21	35
	Total	100%	100%	100%
	Index of participation	−6	+10	−15
	Number of cases	734	772	108

The data which we have examined suggest the following conclusions with respect to involvement in each of the seven issues:

1. Direction of issue involvement was clearly and positively related to presidential preference.
2. Amount of issue involvement was highly related to political participation.

The Measures of Issue Involvement

The measures of issue involvement which will be used henceforth in this analysis are based on four issues selected out of the seven available. These issues include the four which are most highly related to both participation and voting preference. They are: Governmental Social Welfare Activity, Taft-Hartley Labor Law Revision, U.S. Foreign Involvement, and U.S. China Policy. This selection also results in choosing two general and two specific items, two on foreign policy and two on domestic affairs, two on which a relatively large number of people are not partisanly committed and two on which most of the population have taken sides. It also results in omitting the two foreign policy questions of most recent development, and omitting the one domestic question which is most likely a unique issue insofar as regional differences are likely to occur.

When the four issues are combined, 15 different patterns of involvement result. Amount or extent of issue involvement will be measured on a three-point scale ranging from High to Medium to Low. The 15 different patterns of issue involvement will be distributed among the three categories, as shown in Figure 8.1.

High Involvement	Medium Involvement	Low Involvement
DDDD	DD??	D???
DDDR	DR??	????
DDRR	RR??	R???
DRRR		
RRRR		
DDD?		
DDR?		
DRR?		
RRR?		
Number of cases		
813	497	304
Proportion of total population		
(50%)	(31%)	(19%)

Fig. 8.1.—Amount of Issue Involvement

The directional component of issue involvement will be measured on a five-point scale. The scale will include the following categories: pro-Democratic with no conflict, pro-Democratic with conflict, no predominant partisan commitment, pro-Republican with conflict, and pro-Republican with no conflict (Fig. 8.2).

Democratic No Conflict	Democratic with Conflict	No Partisan Predominance	Republican with Conflict	Republican No Conflict
DDDD	DDDR	DDRR	RRRD	RRRR
DDD?	DDR?	DR??	RRD?	RRR?
DD??		????		RR??
D???				R???
		Number of cases		
357	252	391	268	346
		Proportion of total population		
(22%)	(16%)	(24%)	(17%)	(21%)

Fig. 8.2.—Direction of Issue Involvement

The Measurement of Sensitivity to Partisan Differences on Issues

The possible importance and meaning which may be attached to the data on perception of difference between party positions falls somewhere between two rather wide extremes. The minimum expectation concerning the role of perception of partisan issue differences is that an individual's perceptions of party positions on a given issue will affect only the single relationship between his involvement in that issue and his presidential preference and participation. At the other extreme lies the possibility that, in the context of the defined nature of issue orientation, the perception of difference in the parties' positions on a

major item of policy may be a crude manifestation of the individual's general predisposition to perceive most political phenomena in terms of partisan differences on issues.

An immediately apparent limitation of the perception of difference data is found in the fact that the available data pertain only to perceptions of the political parties and omit perceptions of the candidates. It is, of course, quite possible that many issue-oriented citizens may have perceived the 1952 election as a contest between the major candidates, with parties playing only a secondary role, and with party differences being consequently much less salient. If this were in fact the case, the available data could not be expected to provide a satisfactory reflection of issue orientation. This would follow because many people who did perceive differences in the candidates' positions on issues might, in this analysis, be incorrectly classified as perceiving no partisan differences, because the data relate only to the parties and not to the presidential candidates.

Accepting the fact that the data do not provide full information, it is still possible to explore the adequacy of the interpretation that the questions which were asked about perceptions of party issue positions did provide crude measures of a basic component of issue orientation.

Data Regarding Perception of Partisan Differences on Issues

Information on perception of differences between the parties was obtained in connection with two issues, Governmental Social Welfare Activity and U.S. Foreign Involvement. Immediately following the response to each of these two issue questions, the people being interviewed were asked, "Now, how do you think the two parties feel about this question—do you think there are any differences between the Democratic and Republican parties on this issue, or would you say they feel the same?" The responses to these questions about party differences were categorized in five groups: (*a*) Democrats will (go further) (do more) than the Republicans; (*b*) both parties have the same position; (*c*) Republicans will (go further) (do more) than the Democrats; (*d*) I don't know the parties' positions on the question; and (*e*) not ascertained.

As can be seen in Table 8.3, very few responses fit the third or the fifth categories.[8] There are, therefore, three principal distinctions

[8] The last category is somewhat larger for these two questions than for other questions asked in the interview. This probably was a function of two factors—level of difficulty of the question and the relatively narrow framework of the code. The question was undoubtedly difficult both for the well-informed people who were aware of intraparty differences on the two issues and for the poorly informed people who were not accustomed to differentiating party stands on policy matters. Following from this, the code for perceptions of differences did not

among the respondents: (*a*) people who see the parties as taking different stands (and, specifically, see the Democrats being more active); (*b*) people who see the parties taking the same position; and (*c*) people who don't know on which side of the issue either party is to be found.

TABLE 8.3

DISTRIBUTIONS OF VARYING PERCEPTIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN PARTY POSITIONS ON TWO ISSUES

Perception of Difference†	Governmental Social Welfare Activity	U.S. Foreign Involvement
Democrats will (go further) (do more)	30%	30%
The two parties have the same position	34	33
Republicans will (go further) (do more)	2	2
Don't know the parties' positions	27	26
Not ascertained	7	9
Total	100%	100%
Number of cases	1,614	1,614

† The interview questions on which this table is based are shown in the text.

One factor which lends not inconsiderable weight to the broader of the two interpretations of the meaning of "perception of difference" is the nature of the issues which were the basis for the inquiries. These two issues were the most fundamental of all seven issues. They represented both domestic and foreign policies, and they represented issues which have more or less defined the major Democratic and Republican differences in Congress and elsewhere for two or more decades. It is not hard to imagine that people who had no perceptions of party positions on those issues were people who, by and large, would not likely be aware of other issues either. People specifying "both parties have the same position" on the two issues would, presumably, be generally less aware of issue differences between the parties than would people who saw differences on the test issues.[9] Finally, people

accommodate the carefully weighed pro-con responses nor the evaluative responses ("I think the Republicans should do more," or "The Democrats have done too much").

[9] There are, however, at least three additional possible interpretations of the meaning of the "Same" response (interpretations which do not assume that "Same" means lack of awareness). People who said the parties did not differ may also have been responding to any of the many observable instances in which the wide range of difference within each of the two parties is more spectacular

who did perceive differences between the parties' policy positions, are more likely to be issue-oriented in their behavior than are people who saw no such crucial difference.

Perceptions of Difference and Presidential Preference

There is nothing in the assumed meaning of the perception of difference variable which would lead to any particular expectation concerning possible relationships between perceptions of difference and presidential preference. Consequently, the only prediction which could be made concerning possible relationships between the variables was that varying perceptions of party differences would be distributed in the same manner among both Democratic and Republican presidential preferrers. This expectation was confirmed by the data.

Perceptions of Difference and Participation

The three major categories of response to the perception of difference questions did, however, demonstrate very different relationships with level of political participation. It can be seen in Tables 8.4 and 8.5 that the differences in relationships persisted for perceptions based on both the foreign and domestic issues. People who, on either issue, perceived differences between the parties' positions participated significantly more than any other group.[10] People who perceived the parties as not differing exhibited a distribution on participation which was no different from that of the total population. At the bottom extreme, people who did not know the parties' positions tended to be low participators. For both issues, the people whose perceptions of party positions were not ascertained showed a distribution which was similar to that of the intermediate, nondifferentiating "both parties have the same position" group.[11]

than the relatively obscure difference between them. They may include those people who perceive differences as existing among candidates but not among parties. They may also include people who wish to minimize the deficiencies which they perceive in their own party, or who are unwilling to grant a possible popular advantage to the opposing party.

[10] People perceiving the Republicans as "doing more" were not significantly different from those seeing no difference between parties, but on the social welfare issue they were most like the people who said "Democrats will do more." The empirical position of the "Republicans will do more" group, relative to the other groups, was quite ambiguous. This ambiguity, combined with the apparent lack of reality orientation of the response, made this a suspect category. It probably contained both poorly informed people and people who were highly involved in politics, but who were experiencing severe enough conflicts to create distorted perceptions. In the absence of further clues concerning this group they were eliminated from the analysis.

[11] In the analysis which follows, the "Not ascertained" categories were combined with the "Same" categories. This can be defended only on the basis that

TABLE 8.4

RELATION OF PERCEPTIONS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTY POSITIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL SOCIAL WELFARE ACTIVITY TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political Participation	Perception of Difference				
	Democrats Will Do More	No Difference	Republicans Will Do More	Don't Know	Not Ascertained
High	41%	25%	36%	16%	23%
Medium	43	51	47	46	43
Low	16	24	17	38	34
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of participation	+25	+1	+19	−22	−11
Number of cases	477	551	36	443	107

TABLE 8.5

RELATION OF PERCEPTIONS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTY POSITIONS ON U.S. FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political Participation	Perception of Difference				
	Democrats Will Do More	No Difference	Republicans Will Do More	Don't Know	Not Ascertained
High	41%	26%	24%	12%	30%
Medium	46	49	52	44	45
Low	13	25	24	44	25
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of participation	+28	+1	0	−32	+5
Number of cases	489	534	33	417	141

empirically they were most like the "Same" group, and the arbitrary lumping together of the groups thereby preserved some 230 cases which would otherwise have been eliminated from the analysis. Those respondents who were classified as "Not ascertained" on *both* questions were, at this point, eliminated from the analysis.

Measurement of the Perception of Difference Variable

It will be remembered that in Table 8.3, and the tables which followed, perceptions of party differences on Governmental Social Welfare Activity and perceptions of party differences on U.S. Foreign Involvement were observed to be similarly distributed throughout the population and similarly related to participation. This demonstrated similarity of the two items, and the absence of any theoretically relevant difference between them, appeared to justify combining them into a single measure.[12]

The first step in constructing a single measure of the perception of difference variable involved combining the data to create the six possible patterns of response to the two trichotomized items. The three content categories retained from each item were: (*a*) Democrats will (do more) (go further); (*b*) the parties' positions are the same; and (*c*) I don't know the parties' positions.[13] The six resulting patterns included: (*a*) different-different (D-D), (*b*) different-same (D-S), (*c*) different-don't know (D-DK), (*d*) same-same (S-S), (*e*) same-don't know (S-DK), and (*f*) don't know-don't know (DK-DK). (In each instance, "different" refers to "Democrats will (do more) (go further).") These six categories included over 95 per cent of the total sample, with the remaining 84 cases combined in a nonmeaningful "other" category.[14] Table 8.6 shows the relationship between the new measure of perception of difference and level of participation.

TABLE 8.6

RELATION OF PERCEPTIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN PARTY POSITIONS TO LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION

Political Participation	Perceptions of Differences					
	D-D	D-S	D-DK	S-S	S-DK	DK-DK
High	48%	36%	28%	24%	18%	8%
Medium	41	49	47	50	51	41
Low	11	15	25	26	31	51
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of participation	+37	+21	+3	−2	−13	−43
Number of cases	226	356	132	343	231	242

[12] The two measures were, of course, highly correlated with each other. They did not, however, combine to form any sort of an ordered scale.

[13] See footnotes 10 and 11, this chapter.

[14] This includes people who responded "Republicans will do more" to either of the issue questions, and people whose responses were coded "Not ascertained" on both questions. See footnotes 10 and 11, this chapter.

Sensitivity to partisan differences will be measured by a three-point scale (Fig. 8.3). Adjoining pairs of positions in the above six-point measure of perception of difference will be collapsed (e.g., D-D will be combined with D-S, D-DK with S-S and S-DK with DK-DK), and only the three resultant positions will be retained. Three degrees of sensitivity to differences will be distinguished as High, Medium, and Low. High will therefore include people who saw differences on both

	High Sensitivity	Medium Sensitivity	Low Sensitivity
Perceptions of Difference	Different-Different Different-Same	Different-Don't Know Same-Same	Same-Don't Know Don't Know-Don't Know
Number of cases	582	475	473
Proportion of total population	(36%)	(30%)	(29%)

Fig. 8.3.—The Measure of Sensitivity to Differences

issues and people who saw differences on one, but said the parties did not differ on the other. Medium will include people who saw differences on one issue but did not know the parties' positions on the other, and people who saw no difference on either issue. Low sensitivity will include people who saw no difference on one issue and did not know the parties' positions on the other, and people who did not know the parties' positions on either issue.

The Measurement of Issue Orientation

The development of the measure of sensitivity to party differences provides a tool for manipulating the third and last independent variable needed for our study of issue orientation. As suggested earlier, these three variables can be combined to form relatively simple summary measures of two different aspects of issue orientation. We have designated these two summary measures of issue orientation as the measure of extent of issue orientation and the measure of issue partisanship. These measures are produced by a simple combination of the measure of sensitivity to party differences with the measure of one of the issue involvement components, amount or direction.

Extent of issue orientation will be measured by a five-point scale on which greatest extent of issue orientation, position 1, designates high amount of issue involvement and high sensitivity to party differences, position 2 designates either medium involvement and high sensitivity *or* high involvement and medium sensitivity, and position 3 designates low involvement and high sensitivity *or* medium involvement and

medium sensitivity *or* high involvement and low sensitivity, etc. (Fig. 8.4).

Issue partisanship is also measured on a five-point scale. The combinations of direction of issue involvement and sensitivity to

Sensitivity to Party Differences	Amount of Issue Involvement		
	High	Medium	Low
High	1	2	3
Medium	2	3	4
Low	3	4	5

Fig. 8.4.—The Measure of Extent of Issue Orientation

party differences which form each scale position are similar to those observed in the measures of extent of issue involvement (Fig. 8.5).

Sensitivity to Party Differences	Direction of Issue Involvement				
	Democrat	Weak Democrat	Non-Partisan	Weak Republican	Republican
High	1	2	3	4	5
Medium	2	2	3	4	4
Low	2	3	3	3	4

Fig. 8.5.—The Measure of Issue Partisanship

With our two measures of issue orientation thus established, we can now examine the relationships which exist between these variables and the extent and character of political participation.

Issue Partisanship

In Table 8.7 the presidential preferences of people differing in issue partisanship are compared. The very strong tendency for people of extreme partisan position on issues to prefer that party's candidate for president is apparent. It may be remarked, however, that this relationship has many individual exceptions—a sixth or so of each extreme group preferred the candidate of the other party.

In the basic planning of this study, attention was given to the hypothesis that conflict among independent variables will tend to reduce the incidence of resultant variables. This may now be translated to the case of conflict within issue partisanship as it is related to political participation. Inasmuch as weak partisanship and non-partisanship (as defined by the mid-positions in the issue partisanship measure) are, in large part, reflections of conflict over issues, it should follow from the hypothesis that political participation will be lower for the middle categories of issue partisanship than for the extreme categories.

The data do, in fact, indicate that some people who were in conflict over their commitments on various issues may have resolved that

TABLE 8.7

RELATION OF ISSUE PARTISANSHIP TO PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE

Presidential Preference	Issue Partisanship Score					Total Sample
	(Democrat) 1	2	3	4	(Republican) 5	
Eisenhower	17%	36%	52%	69%	86%	54%
Stevenson	81	59	43	29	14	43
Other	2	5	5	2	—	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of presidential preference	−64	−23	+9	+40	+72	+11
Number of cases	118	417	449	406	140	1,614
Proportion of total sample	7%	26%	28%	25%	9%	

conflict by refraining from becoming involved in an election which focused on those issues. For each of the four comparisons which can be made in Table 8.8 between patterns of more or less conflict (comparisons between steps 2 and 1, 3 and 2, 3 and 4, and 4 and 5 of issue partisanship) members of the group with greater conflict participated significantly less than the members of the group with less conflict.

Before we accept these relationships involving issue partisanship,

TABLE 8.8

RELATION OF ISSUE PARTISANSHIP TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political Participation	Issue Partisanship Score					Total Sample
	(Democrat) 1	2	3	4	(Republican) 5	
High	37%	26%	20%	29%	43%	27%
Medium	45	45	47	47	51	47
Low	18	29	33	24	6	26
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of participation	+19	−3	−13	+5	+37	+1

we must check one additional factor. Reference to the description of the way in which the issue partisanship measure was constructed (pages 123 and 130) may suggest that variations in the *amount* of issue involvement for various steps on the issue partisanship scale could have been responsible for the correlation shown in Table 8.8. In other words, it may be that people fall into the middle (neutral) positions on the issue partisanship scale because they are not involved in issues and have no opinion on them. Their low record of participation may depend more on their lack of involvement than their lack of partisanship.

This possibility is easily explored by examining the relationship between issue partisanship and participation found among people involved in different numbers of issues. When this is done (Table 8.9)

TABLE 8.9

RELATION OF ISSUE PARTISANSHIP TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION FOR VARYING LEVELS OF ISSUE INVOLVEMENT

Amount of Issue Involvement	Issue Partisanship Score				
	(Democrat) 1	2	3	4	(Republican) 5
Four issues	+64†	+23	+20	+35	+61
Three issues	+30	+13	− 9	+20	+38
Two issues	0	− 9	−10	+ 2	+31
One issue	−29	−40		−36	+ 5
No involvement			−57		

† Cell entry is index of participation.

it is immediately apparent that the sheer number of issues in which the person is involved is not responsible for any large part of the relationship between issue partisanship and participation. The evidence is quite striking, particularly at the upper two levels of involvement. At the highest level of involvement (groups with the patterns of DDDD, DDDR, DDRR, DRRR and RRRR), three of the four differences are statistically significant. All four differences support the conflict hypothesis. In like manner, all four differences on the next level of involvement (issue patterns DDD ?, DDR ?, DRR ?, and RRR ?) are in the correct direction and statistically significant. In the middle level, although the differences are not all statistically significant, they are all in the predicted direction. It seems clear that variations in amount of issue involvement do not affect the conclusion that conflict in issue partisanship is related to lowered political participation.

Extent of Issue Orientation

We see in Table 8.10 that extent of issue orientation is also highly related to the level of political participation. People broadly concerned with issues and party positions on issues are very likely to vote and to take other political action.

TABLE 8.10

RELATION OF EXTENT OF ISSUE ORIENTATION TO LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION

Political Participation	Extent of Issue Orientation					Total Sample
	(High) 1	2	3	4	(Low) 5	
High	46%	32%	20%	13%	7%	27%
Medium	43	50	51	53	35	47
Low	11	18	29	34	58	26
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of participation	+35	+14	−9	−21	−51	+1
Number of cases	405	371	336	228	190	1,614
Proportion of total sample	25%	23%	21%	14%	12%	

The degree of success with which the extent measure separates people with high and low participation scores is apparent in Table 8.10. Only 11 per cent of the people receiving a high score failed to vote (and were therefore rated "low" in participation). Over one-half of the people showing the least evidence of issue orientation did not vote. Conversely, almost one-half of the people who were ranked high on issues both voted and participated in the election in some other manner and only 7 per cent of the low scorers were such active participants. Its ability virtually to eliminate nonvoters from the category of high issue orientation and active participators from the lowest category of issue orientation suggests that the measure of extent of issue orientation may prove a powerful tool for future analysis of issue-oriented behavior.

"Third Factors" and the Measures of Issue Orientation

Statistical analyses of the kind under discussion here are constantly plagued by the possible existence of crucial "third factors." Any simple relationship which is apparently discovered between two variables must remain suspect until the effect of additional factors known

to be highly related to them have been explored. For example, in the instance of issue orientation it is possible to establish that extent of issue orientation is positively correlated with education so that strong orientation and college education are very often characteristics of the same people, while the absence of issue orientation and little formal education frequently go hand in hand. It is also true that participation is positively correlated with the same education variable. These facts open the possibility that a correlation between extent of issue orientation and participation is merely a reflection of some common third factor which is associated with years of formal education. Only by demonstrating that the orientation-participation relationship exists within each level of education, or within levels of any other variable that is significantly correlated with both orientation and participation, can we discard the possibility that our supposed relationship is merely a function of a "third factor." It is not appropriate in this particular discussion to engage in a lengthy exploration of all possible third factors. It does seem desirable, however, to examine the one most obvious item—education—which is well known to be related to attitudinal data on issues.

Education is related to both issue partisanship and extent of issue orientation, and to both presidential preference and level of participation. These five variables almost certainly have some degree of common determination. The important fact for our present analysis is that when variations in education are removed by the method we have indicated, the crucial relationships involving our two measures of issue orientation with either presidential preference or participation still remain. It is clear that in using our measures of issue partisanship and extent of issue orientation we are not simply manipulating some underlying factor that might just as well have been represented by years of formal education.

Summary

The argument of this chapter has been sustained by the repeated demonstration that personal involvement with matters of governmental policy is related in a predictable way to political behavior.

The measurement of issue orientation has been accomplished by ignoring and omitting many of the nuances and refinements which would be necessary to a thorough understanding of the phenomenon. In particular, no attempt was made to distinguish various types of issue orientation in order to place domestic and foreign problems in some relationship to each other. The presentation was focused, instead, upon simple measures of the gross tendency toward issue orientation and crude distinctions between the major parties' positions on selected national issues. These measures were sufficient, however, to allow us

to discriminate between different degrees of extent of issue orientation and between varying partisan positions with regard to issues.

The extent of issue orientation has been demonstrated to be highly related to the amount of political participation in an election. The partisan nature of issue orientation has been demonstrated to be highly related to the presidential preference of both voters and nonvoters. As with party identification, there has been no crucial proof that issue orientation bears a direct causal relationship to voting behavior, but all hypotheses compatible with such a notion of causality have been firmly supported.

IX

Candidate Orientation

Candidate orientation may be broadly defined as the structuring of political events in terms of a personal attraction to the major personalities involved. Paralleling the argument presented in the discussion of issue orientation, two dimensions of candidate orientation may be distinguished which, following the terminology of the preceding chapter, will be referred to as *extent of candidate orientation* and *candidate partisanship*. Extent of candidate orientation refers to the degree of personal involvement with the candidates, and candidate partisanship refers to the direction of this involvement (varying in the 1952 election from strongly pro-Eisenhower to strongly pro-Stevenson).

In Chapter IV we described in some detail the electorate's perceptions of the presidential candidates in the 1952 election. We examined Eisenhower's and Stevenson's appeal in terms of the complex interaction of many factors—their experience and background, their personal qualities, their party representativeness, their relation to the crucial issues of the day. In evaluating the total impact of a candidate on the electorate and attempting to assess his effect on the vote, all of these factors must be considered. However, candidate orientation, as utilized in this study, is defined in terms of a much more limited aspect of this candidate appeal, and is restricted to the response to the personal attributes of the candidates.

Limitation of the concept of candidate orientation in this manner is consistent with most other general theorizing in this area. Conceptualizations of reactions to public figures evidenced in such terms as "identification," "father figure," "charismatic leader," "authoritarian follower," all imply a personal attraction to these figures, and not a response to such things as their "liberalism," or "governmental experience," or "Republicanism." Restriction of the concept of candidate orientation is also dictated by the demands of the theoretical framework of the study. Since we are concerned, in the analysis, with differentiating "party identification," "issue orientation," and "candidate orientation," it is important to exclude from the concept (and measures) of the candidate variable, reactions to the candidates in "party" or "issue" terms. In making this distinction we do not, of course, imply that people in their reactions to the candidates psychologically separate the "personal" qualities of the candidates from their

other characteristics. In defining the concept of candidate orientation, as in our definitions of party identification and issue orientation, we are attempting to differentiate analytic constructs, and are not attempting to isolate psychologically pure "types."

Because of the psychological difficulty of separating one's reactions to the "personal" qualities of a candidate from one's total reaction to him, any attempt to measure candidate orientation by forcing the respondents to make such a separation would probably not be particularly fruitful. As a result, it seemed more meaningful to base the measures of candidate orientation on the spontaneous personal references to the candidates made by the respondents during the course of the interview. In separating out "personal" references to the candidates, certain arbitrary distinctions had to be made, since no response can be coded as purely "personal" or "nonpersonal." Consequently, the selected responses included only the most obvious personal references—statements about personal characteristics (leadership, honesty, sincerity) or statements suggesting the respondents' personal attraction toward a candidate ("I like him," "he's wonderful"). This meant that a number of responses with probable "personal" overtones were excluded. For example, the positive reference to Eisenhower's ability to do something about the Korean situation was coded as an "issue" response and not included in the measures of candidate orientation, even though we have observed that for many people this undoubtedly was a response to "Eisenhower" and not just an expression of concern over the Korean War. However, since the measures of candidate orientation were based on material gathered from most of the pre-election interview, it was assumed in such cases that there would be adequate opportunity for other responses to occur during the course of the interview that could be coded in the "personal" categories.

One serious problem in measuring candidate orientation on the basis of spontaneous references involved the weighting of these responses in combining them into meaningful summary scores. There was no theoretical or empirical basis on which differential weightings for various responses could be systematically assigned. Although "he's a great leader" is obviously indicative of a stronger personal attraction than the cliche "he's a man of integrity," the intensity of most of the responses could not be so clearly differentiated. Since any weighting system would be arbitrary, and any summary score a crude approximation at best, the simplest weighting procedure was adopted. This meant giving equal weights to positive and negative responses, and to different types of personal responses. The measure of extent of candidate orientation was formed from a simple tally of all positive and negative personal references to the candidates. A five-point index was

constructed, with a score of 5 indicating that no personal references were made to either candidate and a score of 1 indicating that 4 or more such references were made. For the measure of candidate partisanship, each pro-Eisenhower and anti-Stevenson personal reference was given a weight of +1, each pro-Stevenson and anti-Eisenhower reference was given a weight of −1, and a summary score based on the algebraic sum of these weightings was assigned to each respondent. Since relatively few scores exceeded +2 or −2, those which did were included in the +2 and −2 classifications. This yielded a five-point index of candidate partisanship, with a score of +2 representing a "strong" personal preference for Eisenhower, +1 a "moderate" pro-Eisenhower attraction, a score of 0 representing a point of balance or indifference with respect to the personal qualities of the two candidates, and −1 and −2 representing a "moderate" and "strong" personal response to Stevenson.

Before relating these measures to voting behavior in the 1952 election, one further comment might be made. In neither dimension of candidate orientation are we considering the nature of the personal reaction to the candidates. For example, no distinction is being made between the individual attracted to the strong leadership qualities of a candidate and one attracted to a candidate's broad humanitarian qualities. This is not meant to imply that such a distinction is not an important one, just as the lack of differentiation among the different issues in the issue orientation measures does not negate the meaningfulness of those differences. For many interesting and significant investigations in this area, one would want to make such distinctions. However, for the purposes of the present analysis we have attempted only to delineate a very broad and general concept, parallel to the party and issue concepts discussed in the two preceding chapters. In our two dimensions of candidate orientation we are attempting to differentiate people who evidence a personal reaction to the candidates from those who don't (the "extent" dimension), and people attracted to Eisenhower from those attracted to Stevenson (the "partisanship" dimension). The use of these dimensions will thus be restricted to the analysis of those relationships where these broad differentiations are meaningful.

Candidate Orientation and Presidential Voting Behavior

The major analyses involving the use of the two measures of candidate orientation will be presented in the chapters that follow. We shall confine ourselves, in the remainder of this chapter, to a brief presentation and discussion of the relationships between candidate orientation

and the two main dependent variables, political participation and presidential preference in the 1952 presidential election.

Let us first examine the relationship between extent of candidate orientation and level of political participation. As we see in Table 9.1, these two variables are highly related. People showing a high personal attraction to the candidates were very likely to vote and to take other political action in the 1952 election. Political participation was much lower among people who gave no evidence of any personal reactions to the candidates. Their participation, when it occurred, was mostly confined to voting, and almost two out of five did not even do that.

TABLE 9.1

RELATION OF EXTENT OF CANDIDATE ORIENTATION TO LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION

Political Participation	Extent of Candidate Orientation Score					Total Sample
	(High) 1	2	3	4	(Low) 5	
High	46%	44%	32%	25%	18%	27%
Medium	44	45	52	52	43	47
Low	10	11	16	23	39	26
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of participation	+36	+33	+16	+2	−21	+1
Number of cases	166	161	254	342	691	1,614
Proportion of total sample	10%	10%	16%	21%	43%	100%

In the discussion of the parallel relationship in the previous chapter (i.e., the relation of extent of issue orientation to political participation) we discussed the problem of the relationship being merely the reflection of possible "third factors," and showed that this was not true for the most obvious possible one, education. Controlling for education is even more relevant in the case of the candidate measure because of the means by which the measure was derived. Since extent of candidate orientation is a function of the number of remarks made by a respondent during the course of an interview, it is in part a reflection of verbal facility, and is thus highly related to education. It should be noted, therefore, that when variations in education are removed by the method of control, a high relationship between extent of candidate orientation and political participation still remains.

One other possible contaminating factor should be noted. Although theoretically the extent dimension has no directional component, in the 1952 election it was actually significantly related to voting choice. Because of the greater personal appeal of Eisenhower, people who indicated a high personal reaction to the candidates tended to be Eisenhower supporters, and those evidencing minimal personal attraction to the candidates were more often Stevenson voters. However, this does not seriously affect the relationship shown in Table 9.1; when

TABLE 9.2

RELATION OF CANDIDATE PARTISANSHIP TO PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE

Presidential Preference	Candidate Partisanship Score					Total Sample
	(Stevenson)			(Eisenhower)		
	−2	−1	0	+1	+2	
Eisenhower	21%	31%	42%	67%	90%	54%
Stevenson	78	67	52	32	10	43
Other	1	2	6	1	*	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of presidential preference	−57	−36	−10	+35	+80	+11
Number of cases	83	160	778	276	317	1,614
Proportion of total sample	5%	10%	48%	17%	20%	100%

Eisenhower and Stevenson voters are examined separately, the strong relationship between extent of candidate orientation and political participation persists.

Turning to the partisanship dimension of candidate orientation, Table 9.2 shows the relationship between this dimension and presidential preference. As expected, this relationship is very high. One may also note in this table the much stronger personal predilection for Eisenhower recorded in the survey. Of our sample, 37 per cent were scored as Eisenhower partisans as contrasted to only 15 per cent scored as Stevenson partisans.

Candidate partisanship is also clearly related to level of political participation, as Table 9.3 demonstrates. Candidate partisans (particularly those favoring the Republican candidate) both voted and took other political action more often than the nonpartisan group.

A problem arises in interpreting the relationship demonstrated in Table 9.3. Since the group with a candidate partisanship score of 0 consists mainly of people who made no personal references to the candidates at all, the different score positions on the candidate partisanship dimension vary not only with relation to the partisan nature of the personal references, but also differ with relation to the total number of personal references made. Consequently, the relation obtained between candidate partisanship and political participation may be a function of the *number* of personal references made (i.e., the extent of

TABLE 9.3

RELATION OF CANDIDATE PARTISANSHIP TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political Participation	Candidate Partisanship Score					Total Sample
	(Stevenson)			(Eisenhower)		
	−2	−1	0	+1	+2	
High	36%	28%	20%	30%	41%	27%
Medium	45	51	44	49	50	47
Low	19	21	36	21	9	26
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of participation	+17	+7	−16	+9	+32	+1

candidate orientation) and not of the degree of partisanship of the references. Does the relationship between candidate partisanship and political participation add anything to the relationship between extent of candidate orientation and political participation already observed in Table 9.1? We can answer this question by presenting the relationship between candidate partisanship and political participation, and controlling for the extent of candidate orientation. This is done in Table 9.4. (Because of the small number of cases in the two highest "extent" categories, they are combined in this table.)

Because of the large number of empty cells, and the small number of cases (23) in one of the most crucial cells, Table 9.4 should be interpreted cautiously. However, it is clear that political participation is much more related to the number of personal candidate references made than it is to the homogeneity in partisan direction of these references. For people who indicate some reaction to the candidates in personal terms, the lack of a clear choice between the candidates does not appear greatly to inhibit their political participation. This

presents an interesting contrast with the issue partisanship dimension, where a "middle" position was strikingly associated with lower political participation (see Table 8.9). This difference may possibly be explained in terms of the different meaning of a "middle" position with respect to the candidates and issues in the 1952 election. To take one party's position on the issues investigated in this study necessarily involved opposition to the other party's position. Therefore, to have a Democratic position on some issues and a Republican

TABLE 9.4

RELATION OF CANDIDATE PARTISANSHIP TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION FOR VARYING LEVELS OF EXTENT OF CANDIDATE ORIENTATION

Number of Personal Candidate References	Candidate Partisanship Score				
	(Stevenson)			(Eisenhower)	
	−2	−1	0	+1	+2
Three or more	+34†	+24	(+22)‡	+38	+39
Two	−3		+8		+24
One		0		+2	
None			−21		

† Cell entry is index of participation.
‡ Figure is based on only 23 cases.

position on others meant that whatever voting choice was made involved the support of some things that one was opposed to. We would expect that in some cases this would create a conflict situation and would lead to nonparticipation. In contrast to this situation, the positive perception of one candidate does not necessarily involve the negative perception of the other. Since data presented earlier (Chapter IV) indicate that there was very little negative personal reaction to either candidate, a "middle" position on candidate partisanship probably represents, in most cases, a favorable perception of both candidates. Voting either way, in such a case, would not involve supporting anything one was opposed to, and represents a situation of much less potential conflict than that existing for the person with conflicting partisan positions on issues. We would not expect that this type of situation would exert any inhibiting effect on political participation.

In conclusion, then, we have indicated two relationships between candidate orientation and political behavior in the 1952 election. High relationships have been demonstrated between the extent of candidate orientation and political participation, and between the

partisan nature of this orientation and presidential preference. The usual caution that the existence of a correlation between two variables does not necessarily imply any particular causal relationship should be particularly stressed in the interpretation of these two relationships. We do not know to what extent people with certain voting predilections tend to stress the good points of their candidate and the bad points of the opposing candidate, or to what extent personal attraction to a candidate tends to influence people's voting preferences. The meaningfulness of our conceptualization of candidate orientation as a force influencing voting behavior, and the adequacy of the indices developed to measure it cannot be judged on the basis of the analysis presented thus far. Such a judgment can more properly be made after the discussion of the following chapters.

X

Differences Among the Motivating Factors

The preceding three chapters have presented and discussed three concepts which we have felt to be important to the understanding of the motivation of voting behavior. Each of the concepts—party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation—has been considered independently of the other two. In the remaining chapters we shall compare and integrate our measures of these three forces. The present chapter will be devoted to an examination of the relationships of each of the three measures to the others and to certain attitudinal, behavioral, and demographic characteristics. Chapter XI will demonstrate how combinations of the three measures relate to various facets of voting behavior. Finally, Chapter XII will present a motivational analysis of the different patterns of voting change that occurred between the 1948 and 1952 elections. The reader will recall that we have identified two dimensions for each of these three variables. However, in order to simplify the presentation and avoid repetition, most of the discussion in these concluding chapters will refer to the partisanship measures.

We have seen that, with the exception of party identification, the three factors with which we have been concerned are closely related to our measure of participation, and that they are without exception highly related to presidential preference. This raises the natural question as to whether our three measures are not in fact merely reflecting some common underlying factor which we have not identified. If we cannot demonstrate that the three variables we have developed have a significant degree of independence of one another, the preceding chapters will lose most of their force.

There are three methods by which degree of independence may be shown. First, and most obvious, we shall want to see how closely the three variables correlate with one another; second, we shall find out whether the capacity of one variable to order our participation and preference data is eliminated if one or both of the other variables is controlled; and finally, we shall determine whether the three variables behave in different ways in their relationships with some of the other variables we have considered.

The simple intercorrelations of the three measures are shown in Table 10.1. Considering only the partisanship dimension in each case,

TABLE 10.1

INTERRELATIONS OF THREE MEASURES OF POLITICAL MOTIVATION

Issue Partisanship	Party Identification				
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent	Weak Republican	Strong Republican
Strongly Democratic	18%	8%	5%	3%	1%
Moderately Democratic	37	30	26	21	13
Nonpartisan	23	38	30	33	21
Moderately Republican	18	19	27	33	42
Strongly Republican	4	5	12	10	23
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Candidate Partisanship	Party Identification				
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent	Weak Republican	Strong Republican
Strongly Democratic	9%	5%	6%	2%	1%
Moderately Democratic	18	9	9	8	6
Nonpartisan	56	54	45	37	33
Moderately Republican	11	18	18	23	19
Strongly Republican	6	14	22	30	41
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Candidate Partisanship	Issue Partisanship				
	Strongly Democratic	Moderately Democratic	Nonpartisan	Moderately Republican	Strongly Republican
Strongly Democratic	17%	5%	4%	3%	2%
Moderately Democratic	21	12	9	7	4
Nonpartisan	42	54	55	44	31
Moderately Republican	14	18	15	19	21
Strongly Republican	6	11	17	27	42
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

we find that each variable correlates significantly with each of the other two. In general, people who identify themselves as Democrats are more likely to take a Democratic position on issues and to regard the Democratic candidate more favorably than are the Republicans. Republican identifiers similarly tend to have Republican attitudes and preferences. It would be remarkable if this were not true. A close inspection of Table 10.1 will reveal, however, that there are many exceptions to these general trends. There is clearly sufficient independence between the three variables to justify the separate consideration they have been given.

The technique of partialling out the influence of one or two variables in order to reveal the independent relationship of the third variable to the participation and preference scores requires a more elaborate presentation than is appropriate here. It is essentially a procedure of observing the correlation of the third variable with the dependent variables within segregated brackets of the other two variables. This analysis results in very small numbers of cases in some of the final cells, but the fact can be clearly shown that each of the variables correlates independently, both with extent of political participation and with the direction of presidential preference.

The third type of analysis proposed has particular significance, since it permits us not only to extend our demonstration of the relative independence of the three variables, but also to reveal to some extent the ways in which they are different. In comparing the relationships of party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation to other variables, two types of findings may be anticipated. Since all three variables are intended to represent positive motivational influences on political attitudes and actions, we would expect to find some types of data with which they would show similar relationships. However, since we have conceptualized these motivational forces as qualitatively different, we would also expect to find other variables to which they would relate differently.

Although we shall present both similar and differential relationships in the present chapter, our primary interest lies in demonstrating the latter. It is important to show that our three variables do in fact relate to meaningfully distinct constructs, and are not merely different measures of the same thing. The major usefulness of these variables as analytic constructs depends not on their ability to predict the same dependent variables, but on their ability to make differential predictions, derived from their differentiating characteristics.

Let us look first at variables that we would expect to be similarly related to party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation. Since all three of these concepts carry the inherent implication of personal awareness and sensitivity to political affairs, we

would expect all three to be positively related to the various non-behavioral measures of interest and involvement in the election that were investigated in the study. As we noted in Chapter III, three direct questions were asked in the pre-election interviews concerning different aspects of interest in the 1952 election. The respondents were asked about their interest in "following the political campaigns," about how much they "personally cared" which party won the election, and whether or not they felt that the outcome of the election would make a "good deal of difference to the country." Without presenting the tables here, it can be said that party identification, issue partisanship and candidate partisanship are, as anticipated, all highly related to these three attitudinal measures of political interest and involvement. Although some minor variations occur in these relationships, one is struck by their high degree of similarity.

Considering now the differential relationships, we have already seen in the preceding chapters that party identification is much less closely related to level of participation than are the other two motivational variables. A further distinction among these three variables is revealed when we examine their relationships to the characteristics of the voting decision. The relationships of party identification, issue partisanship, and candidate partisanship to straight ticket voting, time of voting decision, and consideration of voting for the opposing candidate are presented in Tables 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4. It will be recalled from Chapter II that these measures of voting behavior were designed to tap the extent of conflict and ambivalence over the voting decision.

In our discussion of the concept of party identification, we emphasized the group conformance character of this postulated force on the voter. It was our assumption that a party-identified person would feel himself impelled, either from his own sense of loyalty or from outside pressures, to comply with the standards which his party sets. Early decision, lack of vacillation in decision, and straight-ticket voting may all be thought of as behavioral manifestations of conformance to party standards. We would therefore expect them to be highly related to party identification, with strong party identifiers who voted for their party showing a minimum of conflict and equivocation, and strong party identifiers who voted against their party showing a maximum of such conflict. We would also expect some evidence of conflict among people who voted in a direction inconsistent with their candidate or issue partisanship. However, because of the somewhat different nature of the issue and candidate variables, we would not expect the relationships to be as marked as those found for party identification.

The clearest test of this hypothesis which our data present is in the analysis of ticket splitting. The straight ticket is the traditional mark of party loyalty. The voter who resolutely follows his ticket down the

TABLE 10.2

RELATION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION, ISSUE PARTISANSHIP, AND CANDIDATE PARTISANSHIP TO SPLIT-TICKET VOTING

ALLOCATION OF VOTES FOR ALL CANDIDATES IN 1952	PARTY IDENTIFICATION					ISSUE PARTISANSHIP					CANDIDATE PARTISANSHIP				
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent	Weak Republican	Strong Republican	Strongly Democratic	Moderately Democratic	Nonpartisan	Moderately Republican	Strongly Republican	Strongly Democratic	Moderately Democratic	Nonpartisan	Moderately Republican	Strongly Republican
	A. Among Eisenhower Voters														
Voted straight Republican ticket	30%	30%	49%	71%	81%		58%	61%	59%	57%		59%	55%	62%	62%
Split away from their presidential votes:															
At national level only	5	5	4	—	3		2	3	2	6		—	2	3	4
At state or local level only	23	23	33	22	12		21	21	26	25		15	27	20	21
At both levels	42	42	14	7	4		19	15	13	12		26	16	15	13
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	†	100%	100%	100%	100%	†	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	43	104	178	160	197	17	108	175	230	116	15	39	225	147	261
	B. Among Stevenson Voters														
Voted straight Democratic ticket	86%	70%	57%			77%	77%	71%	80%		71%	80%	76%	71%	
Split away from their presidential votes:															
At national level only	3	4	8			7	3	3	5		6	2	4	7	
At state or local level only	7	19	27			6	17	17	10		19	13	13	13	
At both levels	4	7	8			10	3	9	5		4	5	7	9	
Total	100%	100%	100%	†	†	100%	100%	100%	100%	†	100%	100%	100%	100%	†
Number of cases	220	170	90	11	2	81	183	129	66	15	51	84	263	68	28

† Too few cases to permit computation of percentages.

ballot or pulls the party lever on his voting machine demonstrates thereby his unreserved support of his party. We see in Table 10.2 not only that strong party identifiers were heavily inclined to vote their party's ticket straight, but it is also evident that the less strongly attached a voter was to a party the less likely he was to vote a straight ticket. We also see that, in the case of Democrats at least, when a voter crossed party lines to support the opposing party's presidential candidate he usually stayed with his own party for part or all of the rest of the ticket. In marked contrast to this are the data showing the votes of issue- and candidate-oriented people. Although their presidential votes also followed the direction of their issue and candidate interests, voters strongly motivated by these factors were no more likely to vote a straight ticket than those weakly motivated or indifferent to issue or candidate considerations.

Differences of a similar kind, but less pronounced, are found when we compare the time at which people of different motivations reached their decision to vote (Table 10.3). Here again, strong party identifiers who supported their own party's candidate made this decision very early in the campaign. People of weaker party attachment were more deliberate, and people (Democrats) who voted against their own party's candidate were very late in reaching this decision. The same pattern between strength of motive and time of decision is seen in the case of the issue and candidate factors, but the relationship is not nearly as close. Attachment to a party seems to have a significance for early or late decision regarding voting that partisanship with respect to issues or candidates has only in much less degree.

The difference between party identification and the other two variables is much less apparent in the relationships with vacillation over voting decision, as measured by the extent to which the respondents reported considering voting for the candidate opposite to their final voting choices. As shown in Table 10.4, among Eisenhower voters party identification, issue partisanship, and candidate partisanship are all highly related to this particular measure of voting indecision. However, there is some evidence among the Stevenson voters that the relation of vacillation in voting decision to party identification is greater than its relation to the other two variables, although the incomplete data on party identification make such a comparison difficult.

To summarize these three tables, we may say that party identification as a motivating force has shown itself to have a somewhat different character than the issue or candidate factors. This is particularly apparent in its relation to straight- and split-ticket voting. This further supports our assumption that the three factors differ significantly in quality, and it reveals an important attribute of the phenomenon of party identification.

TABLE 10.3

RELATION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION, ISSUE PARTISANSHIP, AND CANDIDATE PARTISANSHIP TO TIME OF VOTE DECISION

Time of Decision	Party Identification					Issue Partisanship					Candidate Partisanship				
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent	Weak Republican	Strong Republican	Strongly Democratic	Moderately Democratic	Nonpartisan	Moderately Republican	Strongly Republican	Strongly Democratic	Moderately Democratic	Nonpartisan	Moderately Republican	Strongly Republican
	A. Among Eisenhower Voters														
Before the conventions	9%	12%	22%	27%	43%		17%	22%	34%	33%		20%	25%	29%	28%
At the time of conventions	30	35	38	44	44		37	39	40	42		38	34	40	48
During campaign	26	27	21	17	10		21	22	15	17		18	19	23	15
Within two weeks of election	28	18	12	7	2		22	9	7	7		15	15	6	5
On Election Day	5	2	2	1	—		1	2	*	—		3	2	—	1
Do not remember	2	1	1	—	—		—	2	*	—		3	1	—	*
Not ascertained	—	5	4	4	1		2	4	4	1		3	4	2	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	†	100%	100%	100%	100%	†	100%	100%	100%	100%
	B. Among Stevenson Voters														
Before the conventions	45%	31%	18%			31%	34%	39%	35%		26%	36%	41%	31%	
At the time of conventions	30	26	22			26	32	21	27		29	24	25	34	
During campaign	18	23	38			35	21	24	15		35	27	20	22	
Within two weeks of election	3	10	12			6	6	6	11		6	8	6	6	
On Election Day	1	5	8			2	4	4	6		2	4	4	4	
Do not remember	—	—	—			—	—	—	—		—	—	—	—	
Not ascertained	3	5	2			—	3	6	6		2	1	4	3	
Total	100%	100%	100%	†	†	100%	100%	100%	100%	†	100%	100%	100%	100%	†

† Too few cases to permit computation of percentages.

TABLE 10.4

RELATION OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION, ISSUE PARTISANSHIP, AND CANDIDATE PARTISANSHIP TO CONSIDERATION OF VOTING FOR THE OPPOSING CANDIDATE

Consideration of Other Candidate	Party Identification					Issue Partisanship					Candidate Partisanship				
	Strong Democrat	Weak Democrat	Independent	Weak Republican	Strong Republican	Strongly Democratic	Moderately Democratic	Nonpartisan	Moderately Republican	Strongly Republican	Strongly Democratic	Moderately Democratic	Nonpartisan	Moderately Republican	Strongly Republican
	A. Among Eisenhower Voters														
Considered Stevenson	47%	32%	23%	14%	6%		31%	19%	17%	12%		38%	21%	16%	13%
Did not consider Stevenson	51	67	77	86	94		69	80	83	87		59	78	84	87
Other	—	1	*	—	—		—	—	*	1		—	1	*	—
Not ascertained	2	—	—	*	—		—	1	—	—		3	*	—	—
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	†	100%	100%	100%	100%	†	100%	100%	100%	100%
	B. Among Stevenson Voters														
Considered Eisenhower	12%	28%	52%			25%	26%	22%	32%		22%	17%	23%	34%	
Did not consider Eisenhower	87	71	48			72	74	78	67		76	82	77	65	
Other	1	1	—			3	—	—	—		2	1	—	—	
Not ascertained	—	*	—			—	—	—	1		—	—	*	1	
Total	100%	100%	100%	†	†	100%	100%	100%	100%	†	100%	100%	100%	100%	†

† Too few cases to permit computation of percentages.

There is an additional way in which we can study the degree of independence and the qualitative differences of our three variables—through an exploration of their incidence in various demographic subgroups within the population. In other words, we can find out whether people in a particular occupational, economic, educational, or other classification have a common level of involvement in party, issue, and candidate considerations, or whether particular groups are characterized by particularly high concern with one or two of these factors with little apparent motivation from the third.

It is clearly impossible to present an analysis of the motivational characteristics of the great number of demographic groups which this study isolated. We may summarize these diffuse data by saying that evidence of differences among the variables is to be found within almost every demographic grouping studied.

The following illustrations may be sufficient to demonstrate the point:

1. Table 10.5 presents the motivational characteristics of people of college education. The figures in this table represent the proportion of college educated people in each category of the different motivational variables. For example, the first figure means that 11 per cent of the strong Democratic party identifiers are people of college education.

If all three partisanship dimensions were only measuring the same underlying factor of political motivation, we would expect them to relate similarly to college education in Table 10.5. Since college educated people voted heavily Republican, we would expect them to be much more heavily represented on the Republican end of the three partisan dimensions than on the Democratic end. This turned out to be true for both party identification and issue partisanship. College educated people contributed almost twice as heavily to the extreme Republican groups on these variables as they did to the comparably extreme Democratic groups. On candidate partisanship, however, an unmistakable difference in relationship occurred. The college educated group which was so markedly Republican in its vote did not contribute a larger proportion of the people attracted to Eisenhower than it did of those attracted to Stevenson.

The same rationale may be applied to the examination of the extent dimensions in Table 10.5. If the three extent dimensions had no significant degree of independence of each other, we would expect them to relate similarly to college education in the table. However, it is apparent from the table that such is not the case. Party identification shows a pattern that is very different from that of the other two variables. On both the issue and candidate variables, college educated people are over-represented in the "high" orientation groups, and under-represented in the "low" groups. Although the college educated

people made up 15 per cent of the total population studied, they made up 34 per cent of the high candidate orientation group and 27 per cent of the group most involved with issues. On the other end of these indices, they constituted only 1 per cent of all the people who were lowest on issue orientation, and only 7 per cent of the people who were least concerned about candidates. These findings are consistent with

TABLE 10.5

MOTIVATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PEOPLE OF COLLEGE EDUCATION†

Motivational Variables	Partisanship				
	Strongly Democratic	Moderately Democratic	Non-partisan	Moderately Republican	Strongly Republican
Party identification	11‡	10	19	19	23
Issue partisanship	14	13	11	19	25
Candidate partisanship	20	18	9	20	21
	Extent of Orientation				
	(High) 1	2	(Medium) 3	4	(Low) 5
Party identification	15		13		19
Issue orientation	27	19	10	7	1
Candidate orientation	34	27	17	13	7

† College educated people comprised 15 per cent of the sample, voted 72–28 for Eisenhower, with a participation index of +35.
‡ Figure is the percentage of the category which is made up of college educated people.

the fact that college educated people constituted one of the highest participation groups in the 1952 election. However, this disproportionate representation is not found among the strong party identifiers. Some 19 per cent of the group who were low in extent of party identification were college educated, whereas the college educated contributed no more than their share, 15 per cent, to the strong party identifiers. (This distinction between party identification and the other two variables parallels the finding already noted that party identification is less clearly related to political participation than are the other two variables.)

2. Although members of labor union families were much less pro-Democratic in 1952 than in 1948, they were the largest demographic grouping to give the Democrats a clear majority of their 1952 votes. The rather "average" participation rate of union people, as contrasted

to the college educated group, is consistent with their less intense concern about two of the three major orientations. While union people did not differ from the rest of the population in the extent of their concern with parties or candidates, they were clearly more likely to be concerned with issues (Table 10.6). Union people (who made up 27 per cent of the total population) contributed 31 per cent of the people

TABLE 10.6

MOTIVATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MEMBERS OF UNION FAMILIES†

Motivational Variables	Partisanship				
	Strongly Democratic	Moderately Democratic	Non-partisan	Moderately Republican	Strongly Republican
Party identification	32	31	27	25	21
Issue partisanship	43	31	26	22	17
Candidate partisanship	37	36	25	27	23
	Extent of Orientation				
	(High) 1	2	(Medium) 3	4	(Low) 5
Party identification	28		29		27
Issue orientation	31	29	28	22	17
Candidate orientation	28	25	25	33	26

† Members of union families comprised 27 per cent of the sample, voted 58–42 for Stevenson, with a participation index of +5.

who were in the strong issue-oriented category and only 17 per cent of those weakest on issue orientation.

Union membership was associated with a pro-Democratic predisposition on all three of the partisan measures, and union people showed most partisanship on the variable with which they were most involved, issue orientation. The association with issue partisanship was clearly higher than with either of the other two measures, with union people constituting 43 per cent of the extreme Democratic issue partisans and only 17 per cent of the extreme Republican partisans.

3. The vote division among women in 1952 was not significantly different from that among men, and their participation, although somewhat on the restrained side, was not greatly different from that of men. The relationship between sex differences and partisanship conforms, by and large, to the lack of a sex difference in the vote

(Table 10.7). On the measures of partisanship their pattern is one of balance. The interesting differentials between variables occur in relation to the measures of extent or amount of the orientations. Of particular interest is the sex difference concerning issues and candidates. Women were disproportionately low in their concern with issues, contributing only 39 per cent of the highly issue-involved people

TABLE 10.7

MOTIVATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WOMEN†

MOTIVATIONAL VARIABLES	PARTISANSHIP				
	Strongly Democratic	Moderately Democratic	Non-partisan	Moderately Republican	Strongly Republican
Party identification	52	58	48	58	53
Issue partisanship	50	52	61	52	51
Candidate partisanship	55	50	53	57	58
	EXTENT OF ORIENTATION				
	(High) 1	2	(Medium) 3	4	(Low) 5
Party identification	52		58		48
Issue orientation	39	47	61	65	75
Candidate orientation	61	58	56	53	51

† Women comprised 53 per cent of the sample, voted 56–44 for Eisenhower, with a participation index of −8.

and 75 per cent of the uninvolved. On the other hand, they showed a somewhat greater than average concern with candidates. While 61 per cent of the people in the group much concerned with candidates were women, only 51 per cent of the people in the group least concerned with candidates were women.

In each of these three cases, we have seen clear evidence of differences among the three motivational variables. Moreover, it should be stressed that the differences seem to be meaningful ones, and not merely capricious variations within a set of generally consistent relationships. College educated people's self-identification as "independents," the particular relevance of issues for the union vote, and women's concern with candidates, are all findings which, although not necessarily predicted, are consistent both with our conceptualization of the motivational variables and our expectations about the political attitudes of these demographic groupings.

One final point should be noted: In the above discussion we have deliberately emphasized the differences among the three variables, and have utilized the demographic groupings to demonstrate these differences. However, the same data serve not only to differentiate the variables, but also to demonstrate differences among the demographic groupings. By focusing our attention on the differences among these groupings, it would be possible to utilize the three variables as the basis for an analysis of the groupings' different political motivational patterns. Such an analysis could add to our understanding of the meaning of relationships between demographic characteristics and political behavior.

Summary

The analysis presented in this chapter has been necessary to establish the independent identity of the three factors with which Part Two has been concerned. We have accomplished this by intercorrelating our three measures, by looking for their independent effects when two of the three are held constant, and by comparing the relationships of each of them to certain other variables. The evidence seems to demonstrate that while these measures of party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation share an appreciable degree of common element, they nevertheless reflect factors which are qualitatively different.

Indications of the character of the qualitative differences between the motivational forces have been suggested by some of the different ways in which the various measures correlate with other variables. We have not, however, been able to develop this analysis as fully as would be desirable. Additional information is available from the study which could be used in this manner to illuminate further the content of our major variables, but this extension of the analysis cannot be undertaken here.

XI

The Interaction of the Motivating Factors

The evidence presented in Chapter X supports our original assumption that the three motivational forces we have conceptualized do in fact have a significant degree of independence of each other. It now becomes meaningful to ask, How do combinations of these forces relate to the vote? The reader will remember that in the Introduction to Part Two two basic hypotheses were proposed regarding the relations of these variables to the vote. It was proposed first that the greater the number of congruent forces activating a person in the election situation the more likely he will be to respond to them. Second, we expect that when the forces motivating a person are in conflict his response will be reduced. These hypotheses are tested in Table 11.1 as they apply to extent of participation in the 1952 election, and in Table 11.2 as they apply to the choice of candidate in that election.

In Table 11.1 people represented by different combinations of the three motivational factors we have been discussing have been combined and their participation records are presented.[1] Thus, we find the people who were Democratic in all three factors (DDD), party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation, had a relatively high participation record with 29 per cent in the most active category and only 17 per cent not voting. Their Republican counterparts (RRR) were even more active, having the highest record of participation of any of the pattern groups. If the reader will follow down the sides of the triangular matrix of Table 11.1, going either from DDD through DD? and D?? to ??? or from RRR through RR? and R?? to ??? he will find a decreasing amount of participation recorded. Since each of these steps represents a decrease in the number of effective motivational forces (from three to none) these findings may be seen to support our expectation that people would be found to be politically active in direct relation to the number of factors which motivated them.

[1] As described in the previous chapters, the three variables are measured on a five-point scale, which includes strong and moderate categories of pro-Democratic and pro-Republican response, and one nonpartisan category. To facilitate the handling of data for this discussion, the strong and moderate categories have been combined to form scales containing the following three categories: pro-Democratic (D), pro-Republican (R) and nonpartisan (?).

The hypothesis that conflict of forces would reduce political participation can be tested by reading across the top two rows of pattern groups in Table 11.1. In the top row the relevant comparisons are between the DDD and DDR groups and between the RRR and DRR groups, since these patterns are similar in the number of active forces (three)

TABLE 11.1

RELATION OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION TO MOTIVATIONAL PATTERNS

Political Participation	Motivational Patterns			
	DDD (90)†	DDR (99)	DRR (105)	RRR (138)
High	29%	29%	35%	46%
Medium	54	52	50	50
Low	17	19	15	4
	DD? (233)	D?R (248)	RR? (217)	
High	32%	20%	40%	
Medium	41	49	47	
Low	27	31	13	
	D?? (242)	R?? (160)		
High	16%	19%		
Medium	44	49		
Low	40	32		
	??? (82)			
High	10%			
Medium	38			
Low	52			

† Figures in parentheses are number of cases.

but differ in the consistency of these forces. In the first of these cases, the conflicted pattern does not have a lower participation record than does the nonconflicted group. In the second case, RRR as compared to DRR, the expected difference is found. In the second row the DD? and RR? patterns should be compared to the D?R pattern. In this case all three patterns have two active forces, but in D?R they are in conflict. Here again the conflicted pattern has a lower participation record. We may conclude that our data incline toward support of

our expectation that conflict in motivation would be associated with reduction in extent of political participation.

Two additional facts should be noted from Table 11.1. The reader will observe that the participation records on the Republican side of the triangular matrix are all higher than the corresponding values on the Democratic side. Our two hypotheses give us no clue as to why this should be the case. It may be conjectured that in the 1952 situation the factors we have been considering were not equally strong for Republicans and Democrats. It is possible, for example, that Republican candidate orientation may have been a stronger motivating force than Democratic candidate orientation. They have been regarded as equal in this presentation, and we have no way of assigning differential values to them.

On the other hand, the greater participation of the Republican pattern groups may result from other factors which are not taken account of in the three variables which we have been considering. Considering the demographic and regional differences which we have seen to exist between Republicans and Democrats, it would not be surprising to find that there are additional psychological factors which differentiate the party groups and are themselves correlated with readiness to participate in politics. Some of the factors which were measured in this study but not included in the present analysis, such as sense of political efficacy or sense of civic obligation, may be found in subsequent investigation to explain part of the difference we have seen between the participation records of people with Republican and Democratic motivational patterns.

One further aspect of Table 11.1 supports this suggestion that additional factors must be brought into the analysis before we can consider variations in political participation to be fully accounted for. The pattern at the bottom of the matrix shown in the table represents the participation record of those people who were given neutral or indifferent scores on all three of the major variables of this study. Half of these people reported having voted. Although this is a small group, comprising approximately 5 per cent of the total sample, we must assume that some other forces than the ones we have dealt with impelled them to go to the polls. It may be hoped that the analysis of additional data gathered in this study will tell us something of what these forces were.

Table 11.2 presents the preference between Eisenhower and Stevenson expressed by people in the various pattern groups. If the reader will examine this table in the same manner as he did Table 11.1, he will find that the same general trends appear. Clear-cut choice of one candidate over the other diminishes as one proceeds down the sides of the matrix, until the bottom pattern is found to show no preference between

the two candidates. Conflict between forces is reflected in ambiguity in preference for candidates, as may be seen by reading across the top two rows of pattern groups. And, just as in the previous table, the Republican-oriented patterns are in every case more consistent in their preference for the Republican candidate than are the corresponding

TABLE 11.2

RELATION OF PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE TO MOTIVATIONAL PATTERNS

Presidential Preference	Motivational Patterns			
	DDD (90)†	DDR (99)	DRR (105)	RRR (138)
Eisenhower	7%	29%	81%	98%
Stevenson	93	69	17	1
Other, or none	—	2	2	1
	DD? (233)	D?R (248)	RR? (217)	
Eisenhower	18%	50%	94%	
Stevenson	78	48	6	
Other, or none	4	2	—	
	D?? (242)	R?? (160)		
Eisenhower	28%	81%		
Stevenson	64	15		
Other, or none	8	4		
	??? (82)			
Eisenhower	39%			
Stevenson	40			
Other, or none	21			

† Figures in parentheses are number of cases.

Democratic-oriented patterns in their preference for the Democratic candidate.

The conclusions to be drawn from Table 11.2 are essentially similar to those we have drawn from Table 11.1. Preference for a candidate is strongest among people reporting the largest number of factors impelling them toward that candidate. This preference is weakened if conflict exists among these motivating factors. From a comparison of the two tables, we may conclude that our motivational analysis has been somewhat more successful in accounting for presidential preference

than it has for extent of political participation. In the "pure" positive patterns (DDD and RRR), the number of people properly classified as to presidential preference approaches 100 per cent; in the "pure" nonpartisan pattern (???), the difference in the proportions choosing each candidate falls to zero. Considering the fact that actual participation in an election is undoubtedly influenced by many factors that do not affect the simple statement of a preference between candidates, i.e., weather, illness, change of address, inconvenience, conflicting obligations and the like, it is not surprising that it should be relatively more difficult to predict.

Consistency and conflict in motivational forces relate not only to political participation and preference, but also to the other measures of voting behavior examined in the study. We would expect to find the character of the motivational pattern related to time of voting decision, presence or absence of vacillation between candidates, and straight- and split-ticket voting. The greater the summation of forces activating the voter, the earlier and less ambiguous we would expect his

TABLE 11.3

RELATION OF MOTIVATIONAL PATTERNS TO STRAIGHT-TICKET VOTING

A. AMONG EISENHOWER VOTERS

	Motivational Patterns			
	RRR	RR?	RRD	R?D
Voted straight Republican ticket	75%	69%	44%	52%
Voted split ticket	25	31	56	48
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	131	181	75	91

B. AMONG STEVENSON VOTERS

	Motivational Patterns			
	DDD	DD?	DDR	D?R
Voted straight Democratic ticket	84%	78%	75%	72%
Voted split ticket	16	22	25	28
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	70	137	56	78

decision to be. Where conflict in motivation is present, we would expect evidences of indecision in the choice of candidate.

Table 11.3 presents the record of the different motivational patterns in regard to straight-ticket voting. Only those patterns in which at least two of the motivational forces were active are considered. We see by reading across the table—comparing RRR and RR?, RRD and R?D, DDD and DD?, and DDR and D?R—that the summation hypothesis is generally supported, although there is one reversal among the Republican groups. In Table 11.4 we find similar results for the presence of vacillation over the choice of candidate. Table 11.5 shows the record of the different groups in time of decision. Here, strength of motivation is seen to be associated with early decision. One exception to this pattern appears among the DDDs, who were somewhat later in reaching their decisions than we would have expected.

In order to show the influence of conflict among the motivational forces, the number of forces should be held constant. Therefore, in testing the conflict hypothesis in these three tables, the relevant comparisons for the Eisenhower voters are the RRRs compared to the RRDs and the RR?s compared to the R?Ds. For the Stevenson voters

TABLE 11.4

RELATION OF MOTIVATIONAL PATTERNS TO CONSIDERATION OF VOTING FOR OPPOSING CANDIDATE

A. AMONG EISENHOWER VOTERS

	Motivational Patterns			
	RRR	RR?	RRD	R?D
Considered voting for Stevenson	5%	12%	25%	23%
Did not consider voting for Stevenson	95	87	75	75
Other, or not ascertained	—	1	—	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

B. AMONG STEVENSON VOTERS

	Motivational Patterns			
	DDD	DD?	DDR	D?R
Considered voting for Eisenhower	16%	16%	29%	35%
Did not consider voting for Eisenhower	81	84	69	64
Other, or not ascertained	3	—	2	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

the relevant comparisons are between the DDDs and the DDRs and between the DD?s and the D?Rs.

We see in Table 11.3 that people whose presidential vote was supported by a consistent pattern of motivational forces were more likely to vote a straight ticket than were those with a conflicting motivational pattern. Table 11.4 shows a similar relationship between conflict in the three motivational variables and the presence of vacillation in the voting decision and consideration of the opposing candidate. Finally, we see in Table 11.5 that a conflicting motivational pattern tended to be associated with a late decision regarding one's vote and a consistent pattern with an early decision, although, as we saw in the preceding paragraph, Stevenson voters who were Democratic on all three of the motivational measures were somewhat slower in coming to a decision than we would have predicted.

TABLE 11.5

RELATION OF MOTIVATIONAL PATTERNS TO TIME OF VOTING DECISION

A. AMONG EISENHOWER VOTERS

	Motivational Patterns			
	RRR	RR?	RRD	R?D
Before the conventions	40%	35%	20%	23%
At the time of conventions	47	42	47	35
During campaign	9	15	24	22
Within two weeks of election	3	4	7	16
On Election Day	—	—	—	2
Don't know, or not ascertained	1	4	2	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

B. AMONG STEVENSON VOTERS

	Motivational Patterns			
	DDD	DD?	DDR	D?R
Before the conventions	33%	42%	34%	24%
At the time of conventions	23	26	39	31
During campaign	33	22	14	23
Within two weeks of election	11	3	9	12
On Election Day	—	4	—	6
Don't know, or not ascertained	—	3	4	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Summary

The reader will recognize that the data presented in this chapter provide a critical test of the argument on which Part Two is based. We have talked about voting behavior in terms of individual citizens reacting to a complex of motivating forces. We have limited our analysis of these forces to three broad factors on the assumption that they, acting together, would represent a large part of the total motivation which underlies the vote. We have stated certain expectations, based on general motivational theory, as to how these three factors would interact. As we have seen, the data conform in a satisfactory way to these expectations.

It is important to add that while the conclusions reached in this chapter are based on data from 1952 we would expect the rationale of our analysis to apply equally well to any other presidential election in this country. The motivating factors we have conceptualized do not depend on any specific candidates, issues, or parties. The changes in candidates and issues that occur from year to year give each election a quality of its own, but as contributors to the total motivation of the voters, candidates, issues, and parties are present every year. The relative importance of each of the three factors may well vary from one election to the next, but we would assume that in any election they will account for a major share of the total motivational force affecting the public. We would also expect them to facilitate and inhibit each other in much the same way as we have observed in this report.

Chapter XI has described the interaction of the forces which the preceding chapters of Part Two have discussed individually. It remains now to apply this technique of analyzing motivational patterns to the particular circumstances of the 1952 election. Is it possible to go beyond the over-all generalities with which this chapter has dealt and come to specific conclusions regarding the forces which motivated the voters in 1952? We shall attempt to accomplish this by studying the motivational patterns of each of the major voting groups which made up the 1952 electorate.

XII

A Motivational Analysis of the 1952 Vote

Elections are won and lost by the ability of each of the contesting parties to hold and activate the support of their accustomed followers, to attract new voters entering the electorate, to capture the uncommitted voters with no party loyalties, and to win away, at least temporarily, the supporters of the opposition. It is apparent from analyses of the 1948 election that the Democratic success of that year resulted from the considerable advantage enjoyed by the Democratic party in the number of people who had, during the previous sixteen years, been supporting it rather than the Republican party, and from the inability of the Republican party to attract any substantial number of these Democratic voters to their side.[1] The closeness of the Truman victory resulted not so much from Republican strength as from the failure of large numbers of 1944 supporters of Roosevelt to go to the polls in Mr. Truman's behalf in 1948.

Chapter II of this volume has presented comparable data from the 1952 election. We have seen that one of the decisive factors in the Republican victory of that year was the switching of a large number of former Democratic supporters to Eisenhower. With the Republican party having only a narrow margin over the Democrats in the total number of their party faithful that they were able to muster out to the polls, and with no major advantage gained by the Republican party in its ability to attract the new voters, it was the shift of almost one out of every four of the 1948 Truman Democrats to the Republican ranks which gave General Eisenhower his clear margin over Governor Stevenson.

These conclusions regarding the nature of the Democratic successes and failures in 1948 and 1952 lead directly to the further question, What caused these crucial changes in voting behavior? We propose now to apply to the data of the 1952 election the method of motivational analysis which we have developed in the preceding chapters of Part Two.

There are two ways in which such an analysis may be undertaken. In one approach, we can focus our attention on the motivational

[1] From unpublished data in the Survey Research Center study of the 1948 election.

variables themselves, and attempt to estimate the changes that occurred in them between 1948 and 1952. This will be treated briefly in the concluding section of this chapter. In a somewhat more refined approach, we can consider the groups of people whose voting behavior changed between the two election years, and attempt to understand the factors influencing this change by comparing their motivational patterns with those of the people whose voting behavior remained unchanged from 1948 to 1952. This latter type of analysis, which provides us with much more detailed information regarding the motivational bases of the 1948–1952 change, will be our major concern in this chapter.

A Motivational Analysis of 1948–1952 Voting Groups

Inasmuch as all gains and losses in voting strength are of more or less importance in the outcome of an election, we need to consider each of the major categories of voters and nonvoters who contributed to the final balance of Republican and Democratic votes. The ensuing discussion will, consequently, focus on four segments of the population: (*a*) party regulars, people who voted Democratic both in 1948 and 1952 (DDs) or who voted Republican in both elections (RRs); (*b*) new voters, people who did not vote in 1948 but did vote in 1952 (NDs and NRs); (*c*) switchers, who voted Democratic in 1948, but Republican in 1952 (DRs);[2] and, (*d*) nonvoters, people who may or may not have voted in 1948, but did not vote in 1952 (NNs, DNs, and RNs). Because of the particular significance of the defection of a large segment of the normally "solid South" to the Republican fold in 1952, a further subdivision will be made within each of these groups to allow a comparison of voter change between Southern and non-Southern parts of the population.[3] The term "North" will be used to refer to all of the country outside the 15 border and Southern states. Each group of voters will be described in terms of the three major variables which make up our motivational pattern—party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation.[4]

[2] The number of 1948 Republicans who shifted to Stevenson in 1952 was too small to consider in this analysis.

[3] Only minor differences exist among the other three regions, Northeast, Midwest, and Far West. Although the question of regional differences demands further study, it seems clear that South–non-South differences constitute the most significant regional differences with regard to the motivational items considered here.

[4] Again Chapter XII deals mainly with the directional measures although references are also made to the strength of the three factors. In order to simplify the presentation only the directional measures are given in the tables which accompany the text.

An examination of the data for South and North immediately reveals a number of significant differences between the motivational patterns predominating in the two parts of the nation. It is evident from Table 12.1 that Southerners were much more often identified with the Democratic party than were people in the rest of the nation; moreover, Southerners were more likely to describe themselves as strong identifiers and less likely to accept the "independent" label than were residents of the other sections of the country. However, they were somewhat less clearly favorable to Eisenhower in their attitudes toward the candidates, and a smaller proportion of them showed an

TABLE 12.1

REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN MOTIVATIONAL PATTERNS

	Party Identification		Issue Partisanship		Candidate Partisanship	
	North	South	North	South	North	South
Strongly Democratic	18%	31%	8%	5%	6%	3%
Moderately Democratic	22	32	26	26	11	7
Nonpartisan	26	15	27	33	42	66
Moderately Republican	16	8	24	26	18	13
Strongly Republican	16	6	10	5	23	11
Other	2	8	5	5	—	—
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	1,174	440	1,174	440	1,174	440

interest in the candidates as individuals than was true of people of the North. Interestingly enough, neither of these two all-inclusive segments of the American electorate showed any over-all partisan bias in its attitudes on the major issues which were presented in the survey; pro-Democratic and pro-Republican sentiment on these issues was evenly balanced in both sections. Insofar as extent of involvement with governmental policy was concerned, however, people of the North were clearly more involved than were Southern residents.

Within each of the major regions, North and South, we find substantial differences in the motivational patterns reported by the four main classes of people we propose to consider, party regulars, new voters, switchers, and nonvoters. Consider first the characteristics of these four groups in the North.

Among people living outside of the South, new Democrats of 1952 were quite similar to regular Democrats insofar as the three motivational factors are concerned. Only two differences between these

groups merit comment. In the first place, while new Democrats were no less likely than regular Democrats to express an identification with the Democratic party, they were less inclined to call themselves "strong" party identifiers (Table 12.2). Second, the new Democrats did show somewhat less enthusiasm for Stevenson than did the Demo-

TABLE 12.2

RELATION OF 1948–1952 VOTE PATTERN TO PARTY IDENTIFICATION

PARTY IDENTIFICATION	1948–1952 VOTE PATTERN							
	ND	DD	DN	NN	RN	DR	RR	NR
	A. In the North							
Strong Democrat	28%	44%	42%	13%	—%	16%	1%	4%
Weak Democrat	46	34	37	29	9	32	3	18
Independent	26	19	12	36	22	36	22	32
Weak Republican	—	2	6	15	35	11	29	27
Strong Republican	—	1	—	*	30	5	44	16
Other	—	—	3	7	4	—	1	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	65	295	35	136	23	122	357	96
	B. In the South							
Strong Democrat	51%	65%	48%	21%		30%	—%	7%
Weak Democrat	38	25	40	32		47	11	41
Independent	11	6	4	15		14	28	14
Weak Republican	—	2	4	9		9	11	21
Strong Republican	—	—	—	4		—	50	17
Other	—	2	4	19		—	—	—
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	†	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	39	67	23	194	3	43	28	29

† Too few cases to permit computation of percentages.

cratic regulars (Table 12.4). However, in their views on issues the new Democrats were no less involved or partisan than the regular Democrats (Table 12.3).

It may be said, then, that as a group the new Democrats reacted positively to the influence of party and issues and, while not overly impressed with Stevenson, they were not sufficiently diverted by Eisenhower to throw their votes to him.

The new Republicans of 1952 were quite distinctly different from the regular Republicans. Although nearly half of the new Republicans

called themselves "Republican" in their party identification, the group included far fewer "strong" Republican identifiers, and many more independents and Democratic identifiers, than did the group of Republican regulars. Even more striking was the failure of the new Republicans to take a Republican position on issue partisanship. While regular Republicans clustered heavily at the Republican end of the issue distribution, new Republicans were about as likely to take a

TABLE 12.3

RELATION OF 1948–1952 VOTE PATTERN TO ISSUE PARTISANSHIP

Issue Partisanship	1948-1952 Vote Pattern							
	ND	DD	DN	NN	RN	DR	RR	NR
	A. In the North							
Strongly Democratic	18%	19%	14%	4%	—%	5%	1%	5%
Moderately Democratic	31	39	34	33	22	28	9	25
Nonpartisan	32	23	40	39	22	30	23	24
Moderately Republican	14	12	9	17	34	25	38	27
Strongly Republican	2	2	—	1	9	10	23	9
Other	3	5	3	6	13	2	6	10
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	B. In the South							
Strongly Democratic	13%	7%	13%	4%		—%	—%	—%
Moderately Democratic	28	45	22	26		14	25	10
Nonpartisan	31	26	26	37		40	18	31
Moderately Republican	20	16	35	26		28	39	45
Strongly Republican	3	4	4	1		9	18	10
Other	5	2	—	6		9	—	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	†	100%	100%	100%

† Too few cases to permit computation of percentages.

Democratic as a Republican position on this scale. Only in the direction of their attitudes toward the candidates did the new Republicans disclose a clear-cut explanation of their support of the Republican cause; they were almost as unreserved in their admiration of Eisenhower as were the party regulars.

Virtually the same pattern of motives was demonstrated by the DR switchers as by the new Republicans, with the major (and not unexpected) exception of the direction of their predominant party identification. Half of the switching group still called themselves Democrats, albeit "weak" Democrats for the most part. Relatively few of them (16 per cent) were prepared to identify themselves as

Republicans. As with the new Republicans, an even split among the switchers in the direction of their issue commitments removed issue partisanship as an effective motivational factor for them as a group, and only a strong positive orientation toward Eisenhower is left as clearly related to the switch.

The Northern nonvoters of 1952 may be divided into three groups: those people who voted neither in 1948 nor 1952 (NNs), those who voted Democratic in 1948 and did not vote in 1952 (DNs), and those

TABLE 12.4

RELATION OF 1948–1952 VOTE PATTERN TO CANDIDATE PARTISANSHIP

CANDIDATE PARTISANSHIP	1948–1952 VOTE PATTERN							
	ND	DD	DN	NN	RN	DR	RR	NR
	A. In the North							
Strongly Democratic	8%	12%	3%	7%	4%	2%	3%	1%
Moderately Democratic	15	21	23	8	4	5	6	3
Nonpartisan	49	49	60	63	26	35	26	40
Moderately Republican	22	13	11	15	40	24	21	25
Strongly Republican	6	5	3	7	26	34	44	31
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	B. In the South							
Strongly Democratic	3%	6%	4%	1%		2%	—%	—%
Moderately Democratic	13	6	4	7		9	—	3
Nonpartisan	61	70	66	76		42	43	55
Moderately Republican	13	14	26	10		14	32	11
Strongly Republican	10	4	—	6		33	25	31
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	†	100%	100%	100%

† Too few cases to permit computation of percentages.

who voted Republican in 1948 but did not vote in 1952 (RNs). The contribution which these people make to the outcome of an election is negative, but it is not unimportant. Their failure to vote provides an interesting opportunity for a further test of the hypotheses discussed in the preceding chapter.

The two-time nonvoters (NNs) are clearly the least highly motivated of any of the voting pattern groups in the North. They have the smallest proportion strongly identified with a party, they have the largest number indifferent to both candidates, and they are least involved in partisan issues. As a group they do not seem highly motivated by any one of the three factors we have considered. Their failure to participate in the election conforms, of course, to our expectations.

The 1948 Democrats who failed to vote in 1952 (DNs) are like the NNs in the weakness of their issue partisanship and candidate orientation, but differ sharply in the strength of their identification with the Democratic party. In the absence of support from the other two motivational factors, party identification alone was apparently not sufficient to activate these people to vote.

Unlike the NNs and DNs, the motivational pattern of the 1948 Dewey voters who failed to vote in 1952 (RNs) is not one of over-all weakness. This is a very small group in the sample (23 cases) and does not merit detailed discussion. Since they appear to contradict one of the basic hypotheses of this study, however, it is of interest to search for an explanation of this fact. For all three of the variables considered, the strength of motivation recorded for the RNs approaches (but does not equal) that of the regular Republicans. Taken as a whole, the pattern of the three factors would indicate considerably stronger motivation for this group than for either of the other two nonvoting groups. Why then did they not go to the polls? The reasons must lie beyond the components of our motivational pattern.

A variety of explanations will occur to the reader as to why a person who is highly motivated by political factors will fail to vote in a particular election. Several have been suggested in the preceding chapter. If we now look at the individual interviews of the 23 people who make up the RN group, we discover that in almost all of these cases some obvious impediment to their voting was present. Nine of these people reported being ill on election day, and three others had been called out of town on short notice. Four of this group were women in their seventies who felt too infirm to go to the polls. In five cases there had been a recent change of residence which prevented registration. In only two cases was there no apparent obstruction of this kind.[5]

This analysis of the RN group documents the observation made in the preceding chapter that, because of the kinds of extraneous obstacles to political participation we have just enumerated, it is impossible to account fully for differences in participation solely on the basis of psychological factors. It also explains why a group which, on

[5] In 19 of the 21 cases, the reason for not voting was either confirmed by the interviewer or was given credence by other evidence given in the interview. Two of the reports of illness, however, were not confirmed and may have been suggested by the wording of the question. The high proportion of apparently valid explanations of nonvoting in this highly motivated group contrasts sharply with the relatively low incidence of such explanations in the weakly motivated DN group in the North. Less than 1 out of every 3 members of this group reported being unable to vote because of residence requirements, illness, and the like. Twenty of the 35 persons in the DN group gave explanations such as "I just didn't feel like it; I had a cold," "I didn't want to walk that far," or "I was too tired after work."

the basis of their motivational pattern, we would have expected to be voters were in fact nonvoters.

Turning now to the South, we must note first that the sample from this area was much smaller than that from the North and conclusions regarding Southern voting groups must be drawn with this in mind.

We have seen that new Democrats in the North were very similar to Democratic regulars in that region. This is also true in the South where new Democrats even more closely resembled the Southern Democratic regulars. The greater tendency of DDs over NDs to be "strong" rather than "weak" party identifiers seen in the North persisted as a difference between DDs and NDs in the South. Otherwise, in concern and partisanship regarding issues and in candidate partisanship, new Democrats and regular Democrats in the South did not differ significantly.

Party identification and issue orientation apparently combined to form the basis for the new Democratic vote in the South as well as for the new Democratic vote of the North. Again, candidate orientation did not seem to exert any strongly partisan influence.

New Republicans and Republican regulars are both relatively small groups in the South. Keeping in mind the relative unreliability of our samples from these groups, we may observe that the similarity in positive attitudes toward Eisenhower found between Northern NRs and RRs was also found between Southern NRs and RRs, and was supplemented by a strong resemblance in attitudes on issues. Both groups showed a strong bias toward the Republican end of the issue scale. Only a relatively weak attachment to the Democratic party, held by a large minority of the new Republicans, stood as a barrier separating them from the Republican regulars of the South.

The Southern switchers constitute one of the most interesting of the voting groups. They comprised 43 per cent of the total 1952 Republican vote in the South (while the Northern switchers made up only 21 per cent of the Northern Republican vote).[6] These new-found supporters of the Republican presidential candidate still carried the marks of their earlier allegiance to the Democrats. In overwhelming numbers they maintained their identity as Democrats, with only a small minority willing to call themselves even "weak" Republicans. In the matter of partisanship regarding issues and candidates, on the other hand, Southern switchers were almost as Republican as regular Republicans in the South. Both groups were above the Southern average in their degree of involvement in issues. Although the DRs were not as solidly

[6] A number of these Southern Eisenhower voters who say they voted for Truman in 1948 are undoubtedly people who actually voted for Dewey. As we noted in Chapter I, there was an over-report of the Truman vote and under-report of the Dewey vote among our Southern respondents.

Republican in the direction of their attitudes on these issues, they were not likely to be found on the Democratic side of this scale. Both groups were decidedly Republican in their attitudes toward the presidential candidates.

Making allowance again for the restricted size of these samples, the similarity between Southern switchers and Southern Republican regulars is unmistakable on all these measures except direction of party identification.

Only one of the nonvoting groups in the South is large enough to warrant detailed analysis—those people who failed to vote both in 1948 and 1952, the NNs. Like their counterparts in the North, they are characterized by a very weak motivational pattern. Their concern with issues was lower than that of any of the other groups, North or South; their attitudes regarding these issues were weak and not predominantly biased toward either party position. Their indifference to candidates was virtually complete. Like all other of the Southern groups except the regular Republicans, they maintained a degree of attachment to the Democratic party, but even this was relatively weak. Their failure to vote is not difficult to understand.

A word may be added regarding the 1948 Democratic voters in the South who did not vote in 1952, the DNs. They are a small group (23 cases) and like the RNs in the North their three-factor pattern shows greater evidence of positive motivation than one would expect among nonvoters. Extraneous obstacles of the kind described earlier account for about half of these cases, but there still remains a much larger proportion unaccounted for than was the case with the Northern RNs. There is an interesting suggestion of conflict in the motives of this group with a high identification with the Democratic party and an inclination toward the Republican position on issues and candidates, but the data are too fragmentary to warrant drawing any conclusion regarding this.

If we now review the motivational patterns of the several groups of voters and nonvoters we have discussed, we shall find interesting differences in the components of the total Democratic and Republican votes.

The Democratic vote in 1952 totalled over 27 million, the highest vote for a Democratic presidential nominee since the Roosevelt sweep in 1936. In terms of the voting groups described in this chapter, this near-record turnout was made up almost entirely of two groups, a large group of party regulars (DDs) and a much smaller group of new voters (NDs), who were just reaching voting age or who had failed to vote in 1948. The contribution made by 1948 Republicans now voting Democratic was of no practical consequence in 1952.

The significant fact about these two Democratic components is their similarity. Both appeared to be motivated both by feelings of

party loyalty and by adherence to the Democratic position on partisan issues. Neither group took a strongly partisan position on the two candidates. North and South were alike in these respects. In spite of certain adverse issue factors, and in the face of the unusual personal appeal of the Republican candidate, these people stood firm for the Democratic standard-bearer.

The Republican vote in 1952 was composed of three groups—the party regulars (RRs) contributing the largest proportion, the new voters (NRs), and the erstwhile Democrats now supporting Eisenhower (DRs). These groups differed substantially in their commitment to parties and issues. They had only one strong resemblance—a positive attitude toward the Republican rather than the Democratic candidate. In the North only the party regulars were clearly Republican in all three of these respects. Both the new Republicans and those switching to the Republicans fell between the Democratic and Republican positions on issues. The situation of the switchers was further compromised by the fact that their party identification was still much more clearly Democratic than Republican. In the South there was more resemblance in the three components of the Republican vote in their issue position than there was in the North, all three groups inclining to the Republican end of the issue scale. While the Republican regulars in the South were strong in their identification with their party, the other two groups supporting Eisenhower maintained the traditional Southern identification with the Democratic party, especially those who were switching from a Democratic vote in 1948.

The tremendous importance of General Eisenhower to the Republican vote in 1952 cannot be doubted. This is not the only conclusion to be drawn from these data, however. Of possibly great long-term significance is the fact that General Eisenhower attracted the votes of several million people from the ranks of the Democrats and the young and previously inactive voters without thereby effecting any substantial reorientation in their attitudes regarding parties, and with only partial agreement from them with the Republican position on issues. Only in the South were the new adherents to his party people who, as a group, shared the Republican point of view regarding partisan issues. Even they maintained at least a nominal association with the Democratic party.

A Comparison of Motivational Forces in 1948 and 1952

In the preceding section, we sought to gain some understanding of the changes represented in the 1952 election by a motivational analysis of the different groups of 1948–1952 voters and nonvoters. We may also approach this problem by attempting a direct comparison of the motivational forces operating in the two election years.

Let us first consider the phenomenon of the great increase in turnout in 1952. If we extend the logic of our first major hypothesis, which related the likelihood of individual voting to the summation of motivating forces, we have the basis of an explanation of the substantial differences which occur from year to year in the total participation of the electorate in the current campaigns and elections. Thus it would follow that in those elections in which relatively large numbers of people were moved by a variety of reasons for voting, the voting turnout and general political activity would be relatively large. Conversely, when fewer factors were exerting widespread influence, the level of activity would be expected to be low.

The presidential elections of 1948 and 1952 present an interesting test of this hypothesis. Although we do not have information regarding voter motivations in 1948 comparable to that available for 1952, it is clear that in 1948 the total number of people voting was low, and the general level of public activation was comparatively modest. In 1952 the total vote was approximately 20 per cent higher and evidences of public excitement and involvement were manifest. What differences existed in public motivation in the two campaigns? If we consider only the three factors reviewed in this study, we would probably assume that so far as party identification was concerned no significant differences existed in the two years, either in the number of people who identified with one or the other party or in the intensity of their identifications. It seems evident, however, that the factors of issues and candidates both differed greatly in the two years.

There were clear party differences in 1948 in attitudes regarding domestic issues, and these differences were in some ways magnified in 1952. There were also marked differences in 1952 between followers of the two parties in reference to issues of foreign policy. The Korean War, the loss of China to the Communists, the Soviet threat in Europe, and the general frustrations of the period of cold war moved the American electorate to a degree quite unknown in 1948. Foreign policy became a dynamic component of total public motivation in 1952 in a manner which contrasted sharply with the "bipartisan" era of 1948.

The other great difference in the two elections was the candidates. Neither Truman nor Dewey could have been described as a popular hero in 1948. Truman was favorably seen by some people as a friend of the "little man," but it seems unlikely that either candidate influenced the election greatly through direct personal appeal. Our study in 1948 concluded that "neither of the candidates was seen as an inspiring leader by the voting population." The presence of General Eisenhower as a candidate in 1952 provided a personal element in the campaign which was largely missing in 1948. We have seen the very widespread

and favorable reputation he enjoyed among the public, even among people who voted against him. It is difficult to assess exactly the influence he personally exerted on the election, but it can hardly be doubted that, largely because of his candidacy, the total positive impact of the candidates on the 1952 electorate was greater than that created by Truman and Dewey in 1948.

Note one further interesting fact regarding these two factors. Not only was there a highly charged foreign policy issue and a candidate of great appeal but, perhaps most significantly, for many of his supporters the Eisenhower appeal was very largely in terms of his presumed ability to handle this very problem of foreign policy, specifically the Korean War. As we have seen, the voters found it much easier to associate him favorably with their concern over the international crisis than they did Governor Stevenson. For a great many voters, it was a happy combination of the man and the hour.

Following our hypothesis in this broad application, the increase in the vote in 1952 can be seen as the result of the increased pressure exerted by issues and candidates during the campaign of that year. Other factors, extraneous to the analysis presented here, doubtless had their effects on the voters as well. However, the high salience of both domestic and international issues, and the personal character of the Eisenhower candidacy, undoubtedly contributed heavily to the high turnout in 1952. Whether our reasoning regarding the relation of turnout to plurality of motivational forces can be usefully applied to other election situations is a question which remains to be investigated.

Although we have concentrated in this discussion on the increased turnout in 1952, the method of analysis also has obvious application to the change in the proportions of the total vote that went to each party. It appears that the increased pressures exerted by issues and candidates in 1952 were predominantly Republican in direction. They served, consequently, not only to increase participation in the 1952 election, but to incline it in favor of the Republicans.

It is not the function of this book to speculate as to the ultimate implications of these findings for party politics in the United States. It will suffice at this point to offer certain limited observations regarding the relative stability of the three factors with which we have been primarily concerned. It seems clear that the sense of political group attachment which we have been calling party identification does not change easily. There are numerous evidences, both in this chapter and in Chapter VII, of the tenacity with which most people hold to their party label, even when they are crossing party lines to support the opposition. We do not know how long it takes to convert any appreciable segment of the electorate from one party to the other, or under what conditions. Apparently such a phenomenon occurred during the

Roosevelt era. It has not occurred thus far during the Eisenhower period.

Issues undoubtedly fluctuate in the significance they have in succeeding national elections. There is survey evidence from as early as 1932[7] that the followers of the two parties differ in their views on domestic economic and social issues. We observed this difference in 1948 and we have seen it again in the present report. It would be pretentious to speak of a "party ideology" on these domestic policies, but it is clear that Republican and Democratic voters as groups have persistently held contrasting points of view on these matters, at least since the beginnings of the New Deal. As we have seen, foreign policy, on the other hand, assumed a much greater significance in 1952 than it had in 1948. Reflecting the impact of world events, international issues took on a party relevance which was much less apparent during the days of the "bipartisan" foreign policy.

The relative importance of domestic and foreign issues in future elections cannot be predicted without knowledge of future events. It is clear, however, that the prevailing public images of the two parties render them both vulnerable to public disapproval which might be activated by new developments on the national or international scene.

Of the three factors we have considered, candidate appeal would appear to be the most susceptible to the vagaries of public sentiment. Although there are many examples of office holders who have maintained their popularity in one election after another, there are at least as many others whose hour of public acclaim was fleeting. It seems likely that the success of a public figure in maintaining his popular appeal will be determined not only by the personal attributes of the man, but also by the extent to which he is associated favorably or unfavorably with the partisan issues which become salient in the public mind during his term of office.

[7] Hayes, S. P., Jr., "The interrelations of political attitudes: I. Attitudes toward candidates and specific policies," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1937, 8, 459–82.

Part Three

SUMMARY

XIII

Summary

The study of political behavior encompasses a much broader range of phenomena than we have dealt with in the research described in this report. We have been concerned exclusively with voting in a national election and the perceptions, attitudes, and activities related thereto.

Voting behavior has obvious attractions as an object of research. The vote has the great advantage of being a discrete act which can be isolated and measured with a high degree of validity. It is, moreover, an act of considerable intrinsic significance. Other things being equal, most researchers would prefer to analyze data which hold some promise of more than trivial consequence. Finally, it is possible to use the vote as a vehicle for the investigation of a rich array of closely associated facts, as the present study has attempted to do.

This research was intended as a study of voters rather than of votes. This meant that we gathered our data from individual citizens rather than from election statistics or other aggregative data. Our objectives specified that our data have national and regional significance, and this required the use of a national cross-sectional sample. We wanted to measure both intentions to vote and actual voting behavior, and this meant that we interviewed our sample respondents both before and after the election.

Part One of this report has presented a detailed description of the 1952 election. It is possible to describe an election in a variety of different terms. We can assess the amount of interest and involvement people felt in the election and show the ways in which they expressed their interest. We can follow the course of the voting decision, tracing the gradual resolution of conflict into the final vote. We can compare the present vote with previous voting experience in order to reveal changes in voting behavior. We can describe the images of the parties and candidates as they existed in the minds of the public. We can compare the demographic characteristics of the voters and nonvoters, Republicans and Democrats. All of these kinds of data were anticipated in the planning of this study, and all have been presented in this report.

Descriptive information of this kind has both immediate and more lasting value. Simply as documentation of an important political

event, it has undoubted interest. The study of political behavior is not so advanced that descriptive facts are no longer useful. The general significance of such data is greatly enhanced, however, if they can be integrated with comparable data from preceding and succeeding elections. The study of political change holds much greater promise for the effective testing of theory regarding political behavior than does the analysis of any particular event. Repeated measurements of the kind reported here are necessary for a fully developed program of research in this area.

Part Two has undertaken a dynamic analysis of voting behavior. It has not concerned itself primarily with attempting either to relate specific campaign events to the vote or to classify the votes of the major demographic classes, although data of both these kinds have been presented. Our approach has been at a different level, that of the intervening variables of attitudes, perceptions, and group loyalties. The basic assumption of the study has been that a major portion of the total motivation of the individual citizen in the election situation can be reduced to a manageable number of variables, and that these variables can be adequately measured. Three concepts of personal orientation toward political behavior have been developed, emphasizing parties, issues, and candidates, respectively. These orientations have been treated as motivational factors, and measurements of each have been devised.

The analysis has been organized around two related hypotheses: first, that the motivation of political behavior is effective in direct relation to the number of congruent forces that motivate a person, and second, that the effectiveness of these motivating forces is reduced if there is conflict among them. We have applied these two hypotheses both to extent of participation and choice of candidate.

Participation in the 1952 presidential election has been found to relate with various degrees of significance to each of the three variables which have been the main concern of this study. Those people who were motivated by all three of these factors, with no partisan conflict among them, nearly all participated in the election, at least to the extent of voting. The fewer of these factors present for an individual, the less likely he was to vote or to engage otherwise in the election process. In other words, we have shown a direct relationship between the number of political factors motivating a person and the likelihood of his taking political action.

Similarly, we expected that a combination of congruent forces favoring a candidate would be more likely to result in preference for that candidate than would a smaller number of such forces. We have found that those people who felt themselves strongly identified with one of the major parties, held strongly partisan views on issues which

were consistent with those of their party, and were strongly attracted by the personal attributes of their party's candidate expressed preference in nearly every case for the candidate their party put forward. In contrast, among those people for whom none of these factors was active, equal numbers preferred each of the two candidates.

Our hypotheses have proposed that voting behavior depends not only on the cumulative effects of self-consistent factors but also on the inhibiting effect of conflicting factors. In contrast to the highly predictable behavior we observed among people with consistent motivational patterns, we found that when the three motivating factors were not congruent people were less clear in their choice of candidate, they were not so likely to vote, and those who did vote showed the conflict in their motivations by a greater incidence of vacillation, postponement, and divided votes.

These findings regarding the influence of conflict on voting behavior may be recognized as basically similar to the earlier data published by Lazarsfeld, and developed by him under the concept of "cross-pressures." For the most part the "pressures" measured by Lazarsfeld were not the same as those considered in this study. However, the results of both studies may be said to conform to the basic psychological principle that when strong and opposing forces act on an individual the resultant behavior will demonstrate the characteristics of conflict. In the present case, this took the form of, (*a*) negative reaction to the total situation, as expressed through failure to vote or postponement of the decision to vote, (*b*) alternate reaction to one force and then the other, as shown in vacillation between the two candidates, and (*c*) an attempt to satisfy both conflicting forces by reacting positively to both, expressed by dividing the ballot between the two parties.

The three motivational forces with which we have dealt do not, of course, represent the full range of motivations which may influence an individual in his voting decision. Although taken together they do account for a substantial part of the total variance of the vote, there are undoubtedly other factors of both a psychological and nonpsychological character which play a part. Subsequent analysis of data not presented in this report should make possible a more complete accounting of the variations we have seen in voting behavior.

No attempt has been made in this presentation to compare the relative influence exerted on the vote by each of the three variables studied. It seems probable that the respective weights each of these factors has would vary from election to election. The importance of party identification appears to have bulked large in both 1948 and 1952 and, given a continuation of the present party division, this factor may be expected to contribute a substantial portion of the total motivation in any presidential election in this country. In any particular year,

the more variable factors of issues and candidates may have unusual importance; 1952 appears to have been such a year. In contrast, 1948 appears to have been largely a party year.

It is apparent that our three basic concepts can be employed as analytical tools in the investigation of types of research problems other than those that have been the concern of this volume. The study of factors related to the three different orientations, the application of these variables to a motivational analysis of the political inclinations of demographic groupings, and other such investigations should add to our understanding of political phenomena above and beyond the limits of any given election.

The present volume has not presumed to interpret the political implications of the data which have been discussed. We have analyzed the characteristics of the major groups which make up the electorate, and we have found that the Republican victory in 1952 was made possible by the successful activation of their party regulars and the recruiting of substantial support from previous nonvoters and former Democrats. Neither of these latter groups had a strongly Republican motivational pattern, however, and it is problematic how long and under what conditions the Republican party can depend on their support. The Republicans profited in 1952 both from the attractiveness of their candidate and from the public temper regarding partisan issues. This profit was sufficient to overcome their persistent deficit in the number of people who identify themselves with their party. While party identification seems to change slowly, both issues and candidates are more variable factors. Whether the balance of forces which we have observed in 1952 will endure or not depends in large part on the extent to which domestic and foreign events force a reëvaluation of these factors in the minds of the voters.

Appendices

A. Sense of Political Efficacy

The preceding chapters have been concerned, in large part, with a discussion of the relationship of political participation and direction of vote to three variables, which have been identified as party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation. This section will be devoted to a discussion of one of two other variables, which it was hypothesized in the planning of this study would also be related to political activity, namely, *sense of political efficacy*. The other variable, discussed in Appendix B, is called *sense of citizen duty*. These variables were explored on an experimental basis in the present study, and the data presented in these appendices are intended primarily to stimulate interest in the concepts they represent.

Although the level of citizen interest and participation in any one election may be explained largely in terms of such factors as the attractiveness of one or both candidates and the perceived importance of the campaign issues, an understanding of long-range trends in level of electoral participation requires, in addition, the consideration of broader and more enduring political values and attitudes. For that matter, individual differences in involvement in any particular election are also better understood if we have some notion as to the basic attitudes held by these individuals with regard to political activity. Sense of political efficacy, as defined and used in this study, represents an attempt to investigate one of these broader political attitudes.

Sense of political efficacy may be defined as the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worth while to perform one's civic duties. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change. To the extent that this feeling of political efficacy is measurable, we would predict that it would be positively related to political participation.

In an attempt to measure some of the components of political efficacy, five items (calling for a simple "agree" or "disagree" response) were included in the pre-election questionnaire. These items were:

1. I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.
2. The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country.
3. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.

4. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
5. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

"Disagree" responses to items 1, 3, 4, and 5, and an "agree" response to item 2 were coded as "efficacious." To respond in contrary fashion (i.e., to think that public officials are not responsive to the will of the electorate, to feel that most major policy decisions are the work of "wire-pullers" and pressure groups and the product of "backroom deals," to be unaware that means of expressing one's political wishes other than voting are available to the average citizen, and to be of the opinion that the modern complexities of government have made citizen participation either impossible or unavailing) indicates a high degree of political futility.

There are a number of different ways to combine a set of items into a single measure. Because it represents one of the more psychologically meaningful methods, it was decided, if possible, to construct a Guttman-type scale from the political efficacy items.[1] Several procedures have been developed for applying the scale analysis technique. The one that seemed best suited to our purposes was Ford's method for scoring six (or fewer) attitude questions with an IBM counter-sorter.[2] It is the procedure used in the following analysis.

One of the main problems in constructing a scale involves the establishment of criteria for judging the adequacy of the scale and of the individual items in it. Several different (and, it must be admitted, largely arbitrary) criteria have been used. Guttman demands 90 per

[1] A scale, psychologically speaking, is an instrument for placing the members of a given population in their proper positions relative to one another with regard to a particular characteristic, attitude, or behavior. One of the criteria of a good attitude scale is that it be unidimensional, by which is meant that it must measure but one attitude or set of closely interrelated attitudes or, in other words, that it must measure just one continuum, or dimension. The Guttman scale analysis methods were perfected to eliminate from scales items that proved to be unreliable or off the continuum being measured. Behind the technique is the notion that a perfect scale would be one by which it would be possible to reproduce the exact pattern of the respondent's answers to each item in the scale from the score he obtained. This scale would have 100 per cent reproducibility. Actual scales cannot be expected to produce these perfect results, but something approaching this should be demanded of every usable scale. Guttman settled on 90 per cent as the minimum "coefficient of reproducibility" necessary for an acceptable scale. For a full discussion of this particular concept of "scalability" and the techniques involved see S. A. Stouffer, *et al.*, *Measurement and Prediction*, Vol. IV of *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950).

[2] For a detailed description of this method see Robert N. Ford, "A Rapid Scoring Procedure for Scaling Attitude Questions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Fall, 1950, **14**, 507–32.

cent reproducibility for the total scale, i.e., a total error of greater than 10 per cent means that the scale is unsatisfactory. Jackson, on the other hand, has devised what he calls a "plus percentage ratio" (PPR) for measuring scalability. By this criterion, a PPR of .70 is required for the data to be considered scalable.[3] For individual items, different researchers have established criteria of not more than either 10 or 15 per cent error for acceptability. An item with greater than 15 per cent error in it should be dropped from the scale.

When a scale analysis was carried out using the aforementioned five political efficacy items, an over-all coefficient of reproducibility of 92.3 resulted; or, stated another way, there was 7.7 per cent error for the five-item scale. The range of error was 6 to 8 per cent for four of the individual items, but for the second item ("the way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country") it was 10.8 per cent. Since this was a somewhat ambiguous question with a relatively large per cent error, it was dropped from the scale, and the percentages of error were recomputed on the remaining four questions. The coefficient of reproducibility for the four-item scale is 93.5, and none of the individual items yields more than 7.3 per cent error. This scale also meets Jackson's criterion for scalability with a PPR of .75.

The next task was to convert the response patterns into scale types. For those patterns that were not perfect scale types two methods were used: (*a*) "Minimum error assignment," wherever possible, and (*b*) Henry's "distribution of perfect types" for the "ambiguous" response patterns.[4] The end product was a five-point scale, the frequencies for which are to be found in Table A.1.[5]

[3] The formula for a plus percentage ratio is

$$\text{PPR} = \frac{\text{C.R.} - \text{minimum C.R.}}{1 - \text{minimum C.R.}}$$

where C.R. is Guttman's "coefficient of reproducibility," and the minimum C.R. for each item equals the frequency of responses to the category with the greatest frequency, divided by the total number of responses to that item. This PPR is computed for each item in the scale, and the PPR for the whole scale is simply the arithmetic mean of the item PPRs. See Jay M. Jackson, "A Simple and More Rigorous Technique for Scale Analysis," Part II of *A Manual of Scale Analysis* (unpublished manual, McGill University, Montreal, Canada).

[4] See Andrew F. Henry, "A Method of Classifying Non-Scale Response Patterns in a Guttman Scale," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring, 1952, **16**, 94–106.

[5] For approximately 3 per cent of the cases in the total sample there were one or more "Not ascertained" responses. Half of these had two or more such responses and were therefore coded "Not ascertained" for the entire scale. The remaining cases, however, each had only one such response, and it was possible to assign them to one of the five scale types. In addition a few cases, in which the two "easiest" items (items 1 and 4) had been negatively responded to and the two "hardest" items (items 3 and 5) had been positively responded to, were considered to be nonscalar and were also classified as "Not ascertained."

To test the hypothesis that political participation is positively related to the sense of political efficacy, the political efficacy scale was related to the index of political participation. The relationship between these two variables is presented in Table A.1. This table clearly indicates that the higher one's sense of political efficacy, the higher the level of his participation in the 1952 election. The index scores range from +29 for the highest political efficacy category to −35 for the lowest, and the relationship is consistent throughout.

TABLE A.1

Relation of Political Efficacy Scale Scores to Political Participation

Political Participation	Political Efficacy Scale Scores				
	(High) 4	3	2	1	(Low) 0
High	42%	43%	27%	20%	12%
Medium	45	42	50	54	41
Low	13	15	23	26	47
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of participation	+29	+28	+4	−6	−35
Number of cases	106	326	629	202	331

Although Table A.1 dramatically demonstrates the size and consistency of the positive relationship between political efficacy and political participation, there are some obvious considerations which suggest that the relationship might be largely derivative. One would predict, for example, that political efficacy (as well as political participation) is also positively related to education—the higher one's education, the more likely he is to rate high on political efficacy. Perhaps, then, the political efficacy differences shown in Table A.1 are merely a reflection of educational differences. Or, in similar fashion, one might suspect that the demonstrated differences are merely artifacts of race, or region, or sex, or age differentials in political activity. We would predict, however, that they are not, and that the positive relationship between political efficacy and political participation will not disappear even when the crucial demographic variables are held constant.

Table A.2 presents some of the demographic correlates of political efficacy. As was expected, education is highly related to the efficacy scale; one-half of those respondents who attended college rank high on

this scale, as compared with only 15 per cent of those who have completed no more than grade school. The other two socio-economic status variables, income and occupation, are also highly related to political efficacy. In addition, men are somewhat more inclined than women to feel that the average citizen can make his influence felt upon governmental policy, Negroes feel more politically impotent than the

TABLE A.2

SOME DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES OF SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

Demographic Variables	Degree of Political Efficacy†					Number of Cases
	High	Medium	Low	Not Ascertained	Total	
Sex						
Male	35%	47	17	1	100%	738
Female	20%	55	23	2	100%	876
Race						
White	28%	53	18	1	100%	1,453
Negro	14%	36	48	2	100%	157
Age						
21–34 years	27%	55	17	1	100%	485
35–44 years	31%	52	17	*	100%	381
45–54 years	30%	52	17	1	100%	284
55 years and over	22%	48	28	2	100%	442
Education						
Grade school	15%	49	34	2	100%	660
High school	30%	56	13	1	100%	712
College	50%	44	6	*	100%	238
Income						
Under $2,000	11%	49	38	2	100%	315
$2,000–2,999	19%	54	25	2	100%	255
$3,000–3,999	25%	57	17	1	100%	364
$4,000–4,999	33%	51	16	*	100%	233
$5,000 and over	43%	46	10	1	100%	415
Occupation of head						
Professional and managerial	41%	50	8	1	100%	333
Other white collar	39%	46	14	1	100%	155
Skilled and semi-skilled	25%	57	17	1	100%	462
Unskilled	15%	47	37	1	100%	174
Farm operators	13%	55	31	1	100%	178

TABLE A.2 (*continued*)

Demographic Variables	Degree of Political Efficacy†					Number of Cases
	High	Medium	Low	Not Ascertained	Total	
Region						
Northeast	30%	53	15	2	100%	390
Midwest	30%	50	19	1	100%	580
South	18%	49	32	1	100%	440
Far West	30%	56	12	2	100%	204
Type of community						
Metropolitan areas	33%	50	15	2	100%	438
Cities and towns	27%	51	21	1	100%	928
Open country	16%	55	28	1	100%	248

† For the purposes of this table and of Table A.3, political efficacy scale scores 1 and 2 were combined to form a "medium" political efficacy category, and scale scores 3 and 4 were grouped together to produce a "high" political efficacy category; scale score 0 thereby became the "low" political efficacy category. Some such combination was necessary in order to avoid ending up with cells with too few cases. The relationship of these five scale scores to political participation (Table A.1) dictated the particular grouping effected.

rest of the population, the South ranks significantly lower than the other three regions of the country in political efficacy, and sense of political potency increases directly with population density.

Having demonstrated the relationship of these demographic variables to political efficacy, and having previously demonstrated their relationship to level of political participation (Chapter V), we are now in a position to discover what happens to the political efficacy–political participation relationship when these demographic factors are held constant. This is done in Table A.3.

Inspection of Table A.3 reveals that the relationship between political efficacy and political participation holds for every one of the categories of the eight demographic variables used as controls. High participation index scores are obtained by the college-educated, middle-aged and high-income respondents who also score high on political efficacy. The lowest participation index score (−82) is obtained by Negroes who are "lows" on political efficacy. People of low efficacy scores in the South and in the "under $2,000" income bracket are not far behind, with participation index scores of −66 and −62.

As has already been suggested, education is a particularly crucial control variable; but even among the college educated the strength of the respondent's sense of political efficacy seems to make some difference in the extent of his political activity. The same also holds true in the "highest" categories of the other two socio-economic status variables, income and occupation. It should be noted, however, that there is

TABLE A.3

RELATION OF SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, WITH RELEVANT DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES HELD CONSTANT

DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES	DEGREE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY		
	High	Medium	Low
Sex			
Male	+34†	+11	−27
Female	+22	− 6	−39
Race			
White	+32	+ 6	−21
Negro	(−50)‡	−41	−82
Age			
21–34 years	+12	− 6	−38
35–44 years	+31	+ 1	−44
45–54 years	+41	+ 8	−27
55 years and over	+35	+ 6	−29
Education			
Grade school	+17	−16	−48
High school	+26	+ 8	− 8
College	+43	+31	§
Income			
Under $2,000	+ 8	−15	−62
$2,000–2,999	+14	−15	−33
$3,000–3,999	+16	+ 1	−18
$4,000–4,999	+30	+19	−13
$5,000 and over	+43	+19	+ 2
Occupation of head			
Professional and managerial	+40	+26	(+10)‡
Other white collar	+37	+ 5	(−33)‡
Skilled and semi-skilled	+20	− 4	−19
Unskilled	(− 8)‡	−17	−50
Farm operators	(+22)‡	+ 1	−51
Region			
Northeast	+47	+ 8	−12
Midwest	+26	+12	−11
South	+ 6	−26	−66
Far West	+28	+14	(−12)‡
Type of community			
Metropolitan areas	+35	0	− 9
Cities and towns	+25	+ 4	−39
Open country	+25	− 8	−43

† Cell entries are indices of participation.
‡ Indices based on between 20 and 30 cases.
§ Too few cases to permit computation of a reliable index.

less spread between the political efficacy "highs" and "lows" among those respondents with a college education, with incomes of $5,000 or over, and in families where the head of the household pursues a professional or managerial occupation, than there is among those of poorer education and lower income. These data suggest that factors other than sense of political efficacy may have somewhat greater relevance for the political participation of people of upper socio-economic status than they do for those of lower status.

In summary, it is reasonable to conclude that citizens who feel that public officials are responsive and responsible to the electorate, who think that individual political activity is worth while and capable of influencing public policy, and who see that the private citizen's channels of access to governmental decision-makers are not confined to the ballot box, are much more likely to be politically active than those citizens who feel largely overwhelmed by the political process. It is also possible to state that this relationship is not merely a function of education or any other likely demographic factor. It does appear, however, that the effect of differing levels of political efficacy is not as great for the more socially advantaged citizenry as it is for the less socially advantaged.

B. Sense of Citizen Duty

The second general political attitude included in this study is what has been termed *sense of citizen duty.* Alternative labels for this concept might be "sense of political responsibility" or "sense of civic obligation." It is the feeling that oneself and others ought to participate in the political process, regardless of whether such political activity is seen as worth while or efficacious. It was predicted that the strength of this sense of citizen duty would be positively related to the level of political participation.

Citizen duty, like political efficacy, was to be measured by a scale composed of several different items, which were intended to tap the more important components of this political value. The following four statements (requiring a simple "Agree" or "Disagree" response) were included in the pre-election interview:

1. It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have a chance to win.
2. A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with.
3. So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not.
4. If a person doesn't care how an election comes out he shouldn't vote in it.

Obviously, the respondent must disagree with these statements if he is to express feelings of political obligation. He must feel that all elections (national, state, and local) deserve his participation, that neither overwhelming electoral odds nor the apparent insignificance of the single vote should stand as barriers to voting, and indifference to the outcome of a particular election should be no deterrent.

The first fact to be noted concerning these four items is the high degree of disagreement that they evoked. Nearly seven out of every eight respondents took exception to the first and third statements, and four out of five expressed disagreement with the second item. A little less than half, however, could not accept the fourth statement. The obvious discrepancy between the average citizen's professed sense of citizen duty and his political performance should occasion no great surprise when two facts are borne in mind: First, in an area involving socially valued attitudes or activities, there is bound to be a certain amount of deliberate distortion on the part of respondents who wish to cast themselves in a more favorable light; and, second, there is both much honest inconsistency between people's thoughts and actions and also much honest failure to live up to perfectly good intentions.

The same type of scale analysis as was applied to the political efficacy items was also used with the citizen duty statements. The coefficient of reproducibility for the four-item scale was 96.0, with the amount of error ranging from 3 to 5 per cent for the individual items.[1] The "plus percentage ratio" for this scale is a satisfactory .77. The response patterns were then assigned to scale types in accordance with the methods described in the preceding section.[2]

Table B.1, constructed in the same fashion as Table A.1, shows the nature of the relationship between citizen duty and political participation. Again, we have a five-point scale related to three categories of political participation. The citizen duty scale is, as would be expected, highly skewed, with approximately four out of every five respondents falling in the highest two scale types. The data, however, give considerable support for our hypothesis that political participation is positively related to citizen duty. The range of participation index

[1] It must be admitted, of course, that with three of the items yielding 80 to 90 per cent disagreement, the opportunity for error was relatively small, as the amount of error in a dichotomous item cannot exceed the percentage given by the response with the smaller frequency. Jackson's PPR, however, takes this fact into account and attempts to correct for it.

[2] The cases for which there were one or more "Not ascertained" responses were also handled as were the similar cases in the political efficacy scale. The cases having two or more such responses were coded "Not ascertained" for the citizen duty scale, the remaining being assigned to one of the scale types. Two response patterns were considered to be nonscalar and were also classified as "Not ascertained."

scores is from +17 for those respondents possessing the greatest sense of political responsibility to −69 for those possessing the least, and there are no reversals among the intervening scale types; and looking at the "high" and "low" political participation rows, we discover an orderly and predicted progression throughout.

TABLE B.1

RELATION OF CITIZEN DUTY SCALE SCORES TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political Participation	Citizen Duty Scale Scores				
	(High) 4	3	2	1	(Low) 0
High	32%	29%	24%	6%	4%
Medium	53	46	46	23	23
Low	15	25	30	71	73
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Index of participation	+17	+4	−6	−65	−69
Number of cases	698	631	106	52	103

It will be noted that the five citizen duty scale types divide themselves into three rather distinct groups so far as extent of political activity is concerned: Scale types 0 and 1 seem to go together to form a category of respondents (approximately 10 per cent of the sample) who rank very low in political participation. Scale types 2 and 3 may be combined to make a grouping whose index of participation conforms very closely to that of the total sample (+2 as compared with +1). And scale type 4 stands by itself as a category which rates fairly high (+17) on the index, although, it should be noted, not nearly as high as the top political efficacy category. The combinations just described are the ones that will be used in the remaining analysis of citizen duty.

As in the case of political efficacy, the question arises as to whether the relationship between citizen duty and political participation is primarily the reflection of the influence of education or some other demographic variable. This is a problem, because of the relationship between citizen duty and a number of demographic factors. A summary of some of these demographic correlates of citizen duty is presented in Table B.2. Generally speaking, this table shows the same types of relationships as were found with respect to political efficacy. Education, income, occupation, and race are highly related to sense of civic obligation; the regional and type of community relationships are

TABLE B.2

SOME DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES OF SENSE OF CITIZEN DUTY

DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES	DEGREE OF CITIZEN DUTY†					NUMBER OF CASES
	High	Medium	Low	Not Ascertained	Total	
Sex						
Male	44%	48	7	1	100%	738
Female	42%	44	12	2	100%	876
Race						
White	45%	46	7	2	100%	1,453
Negro	24%	39	36	1	100%	157
Age						
21–34 years	42%	50	7	1	100%	485
35–44 years	43%	48	8	1	100%	381
45–54 years	44%	45	10	1	100%	284
55 years and over	46%	39	13	2	100%	442
Education						
Grade school	32%	46	19	3	100%	660
High school	49%	46	4	1	100%	712
College	57%	43	*	—	100%	238
Income						
Under $2,000	31%	41	25	3	100%	315
$2,000–2,999	41%	47	11	1	100%	255
$3,000–3,999	39%	53	7	1	100%	364
$4,000–4,999	43%	52	3	2	100%	233
$5,000 and over	58%	40	1	1	100%	415
Occupation of head						
Professional and managerial	54%	43	2	1	100%	333
Other white collar	55%	41	2	2	100%	155
Skilled and semi-skilled	39%	52	8	1	100%	462
Unskilled	32%	48	20	—	100%	174
Farm operators	34%	47	17	2	100%	178
Region						
Northeast	50%	41	7	2	100%	390
Midwest	49%	43	6	2	100%	580
South	28%	51	20	1	100%	440
Far West	45%	51	2	2	100%	204
Type of community						
Metropolitan areas	52%	41	5	2	100%	438
Cities and towns	42%	47	10	1	100%	928
Open country	35%	48	16	1	100%	248

† The combination of sense of citizen duty scale scores into high, medium, and low categories is described on page 196.

TABLE B.3

RELATION OF SENSE OF CITIZEN DUTY TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION WITH RELEVANT DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES HELD CONSTANT

DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES	DEGREE OF CITIZEN DUTY		
	High	Medium	Low
Sex			
Male	+24†	+13	−58
Female	+11	− 8	−72
Race			
White	+20	+ 6	−53
Negro	−30	−52	−93
Age			
21–34 years	+ 6	− 7	−73
35–44 years	+25	− 5	−66
45–54 years	+29	+16	(−77)‡
55 years and over	+17	+ 8	−61
Education			
Grade school	− 5	−11	−73
High school	+23	+ 6	(−44)‡
College	+39	+32	§
Income			
Under $2,000	− 9	−17	−77
$2,000–2,999	+ 1	−16	(−57)‡
$3,000–3,999	+10	+ 1	(−48)‡
$4,000–4,999	+31	+12	§
$5,000 and over	+34	+25	§
Occupation of head			
Professional and managerial	+32	+35	§
Other white collar	+23	+ 3	§
Skilled and semi-skilled	+13	+ 1	−70
Unskilled	− 1	−25	−82
Farm operators	+15	−11	(−72)‡
Region			
Northeast	+28	+14	(−41)‡
Midwest	+19	+13	−32
South	−12	−22	−91
Far West	+28	+ 9	§
Type of community			
Metropolitan	+23	+ 3	(−43)‡
Cities and towns	+15	+ 4	−73
Open country	+11	− 7	−70

† Cell entries are indices of participation.
‡ Index number based on between 20 and 30 cases.
§ Too few cases to permit computation of a reliable index.

substantially the same as those for political efficacy. Only in the case of the sex and age variables do differences largely disappear.

In spite of these demographic relationships, the relationship between citizen duty and political participation holds up very well, even when each of these eight demographic factors is held constant. This is clearly demonstrated in Table B.3. Unfortunately, in several categories (and several of the more crucial ones) there were too few cases to permit the computation of a reliable participation index. These consist of the "low" citizen duty respondents in the highest education, income, and occupational groupings and in the Far West category. It might be noted, however, that the indices constructed from each of these groupings do yield the expected *negative* scores. This being the case, there is only one minor reversal in Table B.3—between the "high" and "medium" citizen duty categories for the professional and managerial class. There are no reversals between the "high" and "low" citizen duty groups.

We are able to state with a fair degree of certainty, therefore, that the more strongly a person feels a sense of obligation to discharge his civic duties, the more likely he is to be politically active. And this relationship is not peculiar to any particular demographic status. At all levels of age, education, income, and occupational status, in different sections of the country, and regardless of race or sex, a higher sense of citizen duty accompanies a greater likelihood of active political participation.

C. Primary Group Influences and Political Behavior

Students of political behavior have long been aware of the vital role that interpersonal forces play in shaping an individual's political attitudes. Studies on populations varying from the national electorate to college sophomores have demonstrated the striking congruence between an individual's political attitudes and voting choice and those of his primary group associates—his family, his work group, his circle of friends, and neighbors. This has led many investigators to single out these primary group influences as the major determinants of political attitudes and behavior.

In an attempt to determine the extent of primary group homogeneity in the 1952 election, the postelection interviews included a series of questions about the voting behavior of three significant primary groups. All respondents were asked how their "friends" had voted. Married people were asked how their spouses voted, and unmarried people were asked about their families. Finally, all people who worked in a situation involving other people were asked about the voting behavior

of "the people where you work."[1] The questions about spouses and families were phrased in terms of whether they voted Democratic or Republican. In the questions about friends and work associates, the respondents were also offered a neutral alternative ("Did they vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or were they pretty evenly split?") in order not to force a Democratic or Republican choice in those cases where the group was divided.

On the basis of the data obtained from the responses to these questions, we can conclude that the 1952 election again demonstrated the political homogeneity of the face-to-face group.[2] This is clearly illustrated in Table C.1, which presents the relationships between the respondents' presidential preferences and their primary group members' votes. In those cases where the primary group was seen as voting in predominantly one direction, there was a strong tendency for the respondent's presidential preference to agree with the group choice. This agreement was greater for husbands and wives than it was among friends and work associates, but in all cases it was very clear. Even in the case of lowest agreement, three-quarters of the respondents who perceived their work associates as going predominantly for one of the parties also took the dominant group position.[3]

[1] Respondents were also asked, in the pre-election interviews, about the vote *intentions* of their "five best friends" and (in the case of married people) of their husbands or wives. Relationships between respondents' voting behavior and the pre-election perceptions of the voting intentions of friends and spouses were very similar to the relationships between respondents' voting behavior and the postelection perceptions presented in Table C.1.

[2] In making this statement, we are assuming that the respondents' perceptions of their primary group associates' voting choices represents an accurate reflection of reality. We have no reason to suspect that conscious, purposeful misrepresentation of their associates' votes would be any greater than the respondents' misrepresentation of their own votes, which, as we noted in Chapter I, we have reason to believe was small. However, in cases where the group referent was somewhat vague and political discussion among group members minimal, so that accurate information about the group was not readily available, we might expect some tendency for respondents to "project" their own preferences on to the group. This would occur more often in the perception of the voting behavior of friends and "people where you work" than it would in the case of husbands and wives. In general, however, we would expect that there would be more information available on which to base a realistic perception of how one's primary group associates voted (and hence less "projection") than there would be in the case of the broad demographic groupings discussed in Appendix D.

[3] It should be noted that this statement does not mean that three-quarters of the respondents who expressed a presidential preference saw themselves in agreement with their work associates. Since well over one-quarter of the respondents did not see their work associates as taking a predominant position, it would not be possible for three-quarters of them to see themselves in agreement with these work associates.

Also of interest in Table C.1 are the presidential preferences of the respondents in those cases where the primary group was not seen as taking a clear party position. Those people whose primary group associates did not vote indicated a decided preference for Stevenson, which is consistent with the frequently documented finding that people of Democratic inclination tend to predominate among the nonvoting groups. On the other hand, those people who did not know how their

TABLE C.1

RELATION OF PRIMARY GROUP MEMBERS' VOTES TO RESPONDENTS' PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCES

Primary Group Vote	Respondents' Presidential Preferences				Index of Presidential Preference	Number of Cases	Proportion of Subsample†
	Eisenhower	Stevenson	Other	Total			
Spouse's vote							
Democrat	11%	88	1	100%	−77	337	(27%)
Republican	93%	7	*	100%	+86	496	(40%)
Don't know	52%	39	9	100%	+13	77	(6%)
Didn't vote	40%	54	6	100%	−14	311	(25%)
Family's votes‡							
Democrat	20%	79	1	100%	−59	75	(22%)
Republican	91%	8	1	100%	+83	108	(32%)
Split	41%	54	5	100%	−13	22	(6%)
Don't know	45%	43	12	100%	+ 2	51	(15%)
Didn't vote	39%	50	11	100%	−11	38	(11%)
Friends' votes							
Democrat	17%	83	*	100%	−66	355	(22%)
Republican	84%	15	1	100%	+69	574	(36%)
Evenly split	47%	50	3	100%	− 3	373	(23%)
Don't know	49%	39	12	100%	+10	236	(15%)
Didn't vote	34%	54	12	100%	−20	41	(3%)
Work associates' votes§							
Democrat	20%	78	2	100%	−58	271	(30%)
Republican	76%	24	*	100%	+52	290	(32%)
Evenly split	55%	43	2	100%	+12	195	(21%)
Don't know	47%	43	10	100%	+ 4	114	(13%)
Didn't vote	‖	‖	‖		‖	8	(1%)

† Proportions were computed on the basis of the subsamples asked about each primary group; for example, the subsample for "Family's vote" includes only unmarried respondents. These figures do not total to 100 per cent because they do not include people whose primary group associates voted for a third party candidate or whose vote was not ascertained.
‡ Asked only of unmarried people.
§ Asked only of people who work with other people.
‖ Number of cases too small for computation of percentages.

primary groups voted took neither an unusually Democratic nor Republican position, but showed an Eisenhower preference similar to that evidenced by the total sample population. The findings with reference to those cases in which the primary groups were seen as split in their allegiance are not too clear, but there does appear to be some tendency for people whose friends or family were politically divided to indicate a higher preference for Stevenson than that obtaining in the total sample population. This may be due to the fact that, in a year of marked shift to the Republican party, a number of the evenly split groups were probably groups of normally Democratic allegiance.

In studying the relationship between an individual's political behavior and that of his primary groups, the focus is usually on the *direction* that political activity takes. There is also a relationship between the *extent* of an individual's political activity and that of the other people in his primary group. The relationships between primary group voting behavior and amount of individual political participation in the 1952 election are presented in Table C.2. It is apparent from this table that nonvoting, as well as direction of voting, tends to be a shared behavior. Over half of the married people whose spouses did not vote, 74 per cent of the unmarried people whose families did not vote, and 90 per cent of the people whose friends did not vote were themselves nonvoters.

A number of other items may be noted in Table C.2. As would be expected, individuals in Republican groups tend to participate more than individuals in groups of Democratic inclination, a reflection of the fact that Republicans generally tend to participate more than Democrats. Also of interest is the difference between those individuals whose primary groups were seen as split and those who said they did not know how their groups voted. Not knowing how one's primary group associates voted seems to be a reflection of lack of interest and involvement. Except in the case of one's husband or wife (where a "don't know" response may have special meaning), people who don't know how their primary groups voted tend to be low participators.[4] Those who saw their groups as divided in allegiance behaved quite differently. Their participation tended to fall between the participation of those from the Democratic and Republican groups, being lower than that of people whose group members were predominantly Republican, but higher than that of the respondents who associated with

[4] A "don't know" response may not only indicate low interest and participation on the respondent's part, but may also reflect low participation of his primary group associates. It will be noted in Table C.2 that relatively few people indicated that their families, friends, or work associates did not vote. It is possible that many people who gave a "don't know" response when asked about their groups' voting behavior were members of groups where most of the members actually did not vote.

people of Democratic persuasion. Being in a group of divided political loyalty does not appear to produce any inhibitory effect on the individual's political participation. If being in such a situation creates conflict in the individual, this conflict does not evidence itself in reduced participation.

TABLE C.2

RELATION OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION TO PRIMARY GROUP MEMBERS' VOTES

Primary Group Vote	Political Participation				Index of Participation	Number of Cases†
	High	Medium	Low	Total		
Spouse's vote						
Democrat	31%	53	16	100%	+15	337
Republican	39%	54	7	100%	+32	496
Don't know	30%	56	14	100%	+16	77
Didn't vote	10%	31	59	100%	−49	311
Family's votes‡						
Democrat	27%	42	31	100%	− 4	75
Republican	31%	56	13	100%	+18	108
Split	32%	41	27	100%	+ 5	22
Don't know	20%	37	43	100%	−23	51
Didn't vote	5%	21	74	100%	−69	38
Friends' votes						
Democrat	22%	49	29	100%	− 7	355
Republican	39%	46	15	100%	+24	574
Evenly split	29%	49	22	100%	+ 7	373
Don't know	11%	49	40	100%	−29	236
Didn't vote	2%	8	90	100%	−88	41
Work associates' votes§						
Democrat	32%	43	25	100%	+ 7	271
Republican	41%	41	18	100%	+23	290
Evenly split	31%	48	21	100%	+10	195
Don't know	9%	54	37	100%	−28	114
Didn't vote	‖	‖	‖		‖	8

† Does not include people whose primary group associates voted for a third party candidate, or whose vote was not ascertained.
‡ Asked only of unmarried people.
§ Asked only of people who work with other people.
‖ Number of cases too small for computation of percentages.

As we have already noted at the beginning of this discussion, the tendency for the political behavior of the individual to conform to the patterns set by his primary group associations has long been part of our basic knowledge in this area. However, the explanations and interpretations of these groups' political homogeneity are by no means

obvious. The mechanisms by which the group influences the individual are exceedingly complex. They vary from the subtle, unconscious mechanisms by which a group structures the political perceptions of its members, even when political events are of little concern to the group, to the extreme cases where political attitudes are tied to the basic values of the group members, and any attempt at individual deviation leads to interpersonal conflict and guilt reactions. Moreover, although it is customary to explain the homogeneity of the group's political attitudes in terms of the influence of the group on the individual, this is by no means the only factor operating. To mention only two other factors, group homogeneity is probably to some extent a function of the similarity of the socio-economic conditions and politically relevant life experiences of the primary group members, and also to some extent a function of the selective factor by which people tend to seek out individuals of like attitudes in forming their close relationships.

Intensive investigation of the nature of the mechanisms underlying the relationships between individual and group political behavior lies beyond the scope of this study. A national sample survey is not the method of choice for a study of group influence processes. However, an attempt was made to obtain some information in this area. In the coding of the reasons people gave for their voting choices, and in the codes which summarized the respondents' positive and negative perceptions of the parties and candidates, separate note was made of all responses which indicated that attitudes or behavior had been influenced by family, friends, work associates, etc. However, only a handful of people made such references—too few to permit any systematic analysis.

In addition to this coding of the responses to open-ended questions, a direct attempt was made to get information on primary group influence. All respondents who voted were asked the following question about the four primary groups whose vote had previously been ascertained: "Do you think any of [his] [her] [their] opinions about the election had anything to do with the way you decided to vote?"

This question has obvious limitations. Depending as it does on the respondent's perception of whether or not he was influenced, it does not measure the multitude of interactive processes affecting the individual that he does not recognize as influence. Moreover, admitting that one's voting decision has been affected by the opinions of others runs counter to an important American value and stereotype which stresses the independent thinker, the man who examines the relevant political facts and makes up his own mind.

Because of these and other limitations, responses to the question on perceived primary group influence cannot be interpreted as an accurate measure of the actual political influence exerted by these groups. As

one would expect, very few people admitted being influenced. Despite these limitations, however, an investigation of some of the correlates of the responses to this question may be of some interest. Although we cannot pursue this analysis here, we may cite one example for illustrative purposes. It is a common observation that concern with

TABLE C.3

RELATION OF SEX TO PERCEPTION OF PRIMARY GROUP INFLUENCE

PRIMARY GROUP INFLUENCE†	SEX	
	Male	Female
Spouse		
Influenced	6%	27%
Not influenced	87	70
Not ascertained	7	3
Total	100%	100%
Number of cases	502	449
Family‡		
Influenced	7%	10%
Not influenced	82	73
Not ascertained	11	17
Total	100%	100%
Number of cases	75	134
Friends		
Influenced	5%	6%
Not influenced	91	88
Not ascertained	4	6
Total	100%	100%
Number of cases	585	603
Work associates§		
Influenced	4%	5%
Not influenced	90	88
Not ascertained	6	7
Total	100%	100%
Number of cases	454	195

† Asked only of people who voted.
‡ Asked only of unmarried people.
§ Asked only of people who work with other people.

politics, in American life, is much more relevant to the man's role than it is to the woman's, and that women are less involved and informed in political events. We would expect, therefore, that there would be a relationship between sex and the importance of interpersonal influences on one's vote, with women both depending more on the opinions of others in arriving at their own decision, and being more willing than men to admit this dependence. The comparative perceptions of primary group influence for men and women are presented in Table C.3.

Two interesting findings appear in the table. First of all, political influence in the marriage relationship seems to go predominantly in one direction. Of the married women who voted, 27 per cent said that their husbands' opinions helped them decide on their voting choices, as contrasted with only 6 per cent of the married men voters admitting influence by their wives. This tends to support the widely held assumption that political agreement between husband and wife is more a function of wives voting the way their husbands vote than it is a function of husbands voting as their wives vote. (However, this difference is probably also partly a function of the fact that it is more socially acceptable for women to admit being influenced by their husbands than for men to admit influence by their wives.)

Perhaps of even greater interest than this difference between husbands and wives is the lack of any significant differences between men and women in the perception of political influence of family, friends, and work associates. Several interpretations for this finding are possible. It may indicate that, except in the marriage relationship, women are no more subject to interpersonal influence in forming their political attitudes than are men. Or, since we would expect that women's friendship and work groups would consist largely of other women, the fact that they did not feel they were influenced by these groups might indicate that women, though looking to men for help in making their election decisions, do not put other women in such a role. A third possible explanation must also be considered: in terms of the limitations discussed above, the lack of consistent differences noted in Table C.3 may be a function of the inadequacy of our measure of influence. Judgment on this point may better be made after the use of this measure in further analyses.

D. The Perceived Political Relevance of Demographic Groups

Chapter V presented a detailed discussion of the relationships between demographic characteristics and voting behavior in the 1952 election. To a considerable extent, these relationships conformed to patterns that have long been observed by students of American

elections. However, the fact that these relationships are well known does not necessarily mean that they can be explained in simple terms.

In certain ways, the analysis of the effects of demographic group membership on political attitudes and behavior involves complexities even greater than those encountered in the study of primary group influences (see Appendix C). This is particularly true when one examines these relationships in terms of their meaningfulness as psychological group phenomena. The main focus in the study of primary group influences is on the mechanisms and processes by which the group influences the individual. There is no need to argue the fact that primary groups do influence their members' attitudes and behavior. In the case of attitudinal homogeneity within demographic categories, however, one is first faced with the problem of attempting to determine whether in fact this is a psychologically meaningful group phenomenon. The first question one must answer is the extent to which the members in the demographic category are behaving as members of a psychological group. To what extent is a Catholic's vote an expression of identification with the Catholic group? To what extent are farmers psychologically voting as farmers? Or, can the relationship between demographic characteristics and political behavior be explained in terms of the similar life experiences of people of similar demographic background, or in terms of other factors which do not require the conceptualization of these broader social categories as psychological groups?[1]

We were interested, therefore, in measuring the extent to which people in different demographic classifications saw their membership in these classifications as relevant for their voting decision. For this purpose, two questions were included in the pre-election interview. Since the respondents could obviously not be asked about all relevant demographic classifications, the two questions referred only to the following nine categories: farmers, working-class people, Negroes, middle-class people, big-businessmen, labor union members, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews.

[1] It is interesting to observe in this connection that even Lazarsfeld's Erie County study, which placed such a primary emphasis on the influence of demographic characteristics, did not conceptualize this influence in terms of the individual's psychological relationship to the demographic grouping as such. Although the concept of social group conformity pressures plays an important role in Lazarsfeld's explanation of the influence of the demographic characteristics, these are primary group influences rather than forces induced by identification with the broader social grouping. The influences of the broad social categories are reduced to primary group influences; they are seen as important primarily because they define a person's primary group relationships. In such an explanation, Catholics vote alike because a Catholic's primary group relationships are mostly with other Catholics; psychologically they are voting as their "friends" and "family" vote, not as "Catholics" vote.

The respondents were first asked how they thought people in the nine different demographic categories would vote—whether they would be "mostly Republican," "mostly Democratic," or "evenly split."[2] This type of question has become fairly standard in group studies. It is based on the assumption that when an individual's group membership is psychologically relevant in influencing his attitude in a given area, he will tend to see the group as taking a particular position on that issue. For example, we would assume that a person whose sense of community with other Catholics was a significant determinant of his voting behavior would tend to be aware of Catholics' voting position, i.e., he would not say that he didn't know how Catholics would vote, and would also tend to see them as taking a predominant position rather than as politically divided, i.e., he would tend to see them acting as a group with a common set of political attitudes.

In those cases where the respondents saw a demographic grouping as voting either Democratic or Republican, they were asked the additional question of why they thought that the group would vote that way. Examination of these reasons gives further information on the extent to which the group is seen as relevant politically. We would assume that a reason which singles out the particular group's interest, and ties this interest to the fortunes of one of the parties, indicates a greater sense of the political relevance of this group than a general reason which has applicability to the total population. For example, we would assume that being a farmer was a more important influence on the vote of a man who saw farmers voting for a given party because that party "has always tried to help the farmer" than it was on the vote of a farmer who saw other farmers as voting for a given party because there would be a "better chance for peace" if that party won. The former reason ties the farmer's interest specifically to one of the parties; the latter reason could have been used equally well for any other grouping.

The reasons were coded with this distinction in mind. Reasons such as "party of the working man," "a lot of candidates in the party are Catholics," and "Negroes will vote Democratic because of FEPC" were all coded as "group-relevant" reasons. Reasons such as "better for peace," "time for a change," and "corruption," which clearly have no special group relevance, were coded as "other" reasons. In addition, a third major category was used so as to single out those responses

[2] The question was worded as follows: "Now, I'd like to ask you some questions about how you think *other* people will vote in this election. For instance, take *farmers*—do you think farmers around the country will vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or do you think they will be about evenly split?" This question was then repeated for the eight other demographic groupings.

which were not clear as to their group relevance. These were mainly responses which referred to good economic conditions, prosperity, etc., where, particularly in the case of the economic groupings, it was not clear whether the respondent was referring to conditions that affected the whole country or conditions that had special relevance for the particular group. These responses were categorized as "general economic interest reasons."

The question on the perception of how a group would vote can be combined with the question on the perception of the reasons why the group would vote that way to form a measure of "political group relevance." A group is then most relevant politically when it is seen as voting a given way for "group-relevant" reasons, next most relevant when seen as voting a given way for "general economic interest reasons," next when seen as voting a given way for "other" reasons, next when seen as "split" in vote intention, and least relevant politically when the respondent doesn't know how the group will vote.

Other data in the pre-election interviews enabled us to obtain some check on the adequacy of this measure of group relevance. In the coding of the pre-election interviews, all responses which referred favorably or unfavorably to one of the parties because of its helping or hurting a particular group were recorded and tabulated in a summary code (see Chapter IV). Since a respondent's spontaneous reference to a particular group, when commenting on the two parties, is in all probability a more valid indication that the group is psychologically relevant for him than his responses to a question which presents him with the group stimulus, these spontaneous references, when they occur to any great extent, may be used as an internal validity check of the group-relevance measure. This could not be done in the case of five of the demographic groupings—Negroes, middle-class people, and the three religious groupings—because only a very few respondents made spontaneous references to them. However, the internal validity analysis was made with reference to working-class people, farmers, and big-businessmen,[3] where considerable numbers of respondents had made spontaneous references. Of the total sample, 33 per cent spoke favorably of the Democratic party as having helped the working people, common people, poor people, etc.; 14 per cent spoke negatively of the Republican party as being the party of big business, rich people, etc.; 8 per cent spoke favorably of the Democrats in connection with farmers.

Table D.1 presents the relationship between the respondents' spontaneous statements that the Democratic party was good for working

[3] The analysis was not made with reference to labor union members, since it was felt that it would have duplicated the findings with reference to working-class people.

people, and their responses to the specific questions on how they thought working-class people would vote and the reasons for their perception. A very clear relationship is evident. Two-thirds of the respondents who felt that working-class people would vote Democratic, and gave group-relevant reasons for this belief, had previously spontaneously associated working people's welfare with the Democratic party. This figure decreases regularly down to 12 per cent for those who felt that working-class people would vote Republican and 9 per cent for those

TABLE D.1

RELATION OF PERCEPTION OF WORKING-CLASS PEOPLE'S PARTY PREFERENCES TO SPONTANEOUS ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY WITH WELFARE OF WORKING PEOPLE

	Perception of Working-Class People's Party Preferences					
	Democratic for Group Relevant Reasons	Democratic for General Economic Interest Reasons	Democratic for Other Reasons or Reasons Not Given	Split	Republican†	Don't Know
Spontaneous association of Democratic party with working people's welfare	66%	48%	34%	24%	12%	9%
No spontaneous association of Democratic party with working people's welfare	34	52	66	76	88	91
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	259	328	226	392	129	278

† The perception of working-class people as voting Republican is not divided according to reasons, because very few respondents who had this perception gave group-relevant reasons.

who didn't know how working-class people would vote. Thus, the spontaneous identification of working people's interest with the Democratic party was related both to the perception that working-class people would vote Democratic and to the group-relevant nature of the reasons for this perception. Similar relationships were obtained in relating the perception of the vote and reasons for the vote of "farmers" and "big-businessmen" to the spontaneous references to those groups (although these relationships were much less sharp than that presented in Table D.1).[4] There is some evidence, then, supporting the validity of the group relevance measure.

[4] Since many fewer people made spontaneous references to big-businessmen and farmers than to working people, we would not expect the relationships to be as large.

In examining the perceived political relevance of different demographic groupings, we are mainly interested in the members' perceptions of their own demographic groupings. However, the attitudes and behavior of one's nonmembership groups can also be psychologically relevant, as findings from many group studies have demonstrated. Tables D.2 and D.3, therefore, present the total sample's perceptions of the voting behavior of the nine demographic groupings. The perceptions of the members of each group are presented in Table D.4.

Table D.2 presents the respondents' pre-election perceptions of how the nine demographic groupings would vote. Although there are a number of interesting items in this table, two generalizations might be

TABLE D.2

PERCEPTION OF PARTY PREFERENCES OF DIFFERENT DEMOGRAPHIC CLASSES

Demographic Classes	Perception of Party Preferences						No. of Cases
	Democratic	Republican	Split	Don't Know	Not Ascertained	Total	
Farmers	35%	14	27	24	*	100%	1,614
Labor union members	61%	5	12	22	*	100%	1,614
Working-class people	51%	7	25	17	*	100%	1,614
Middle-class people	19%	24	31	26	*	100%	1,614
Big-businessmen	12%	55	9	24	*	100%	1,614
Negroes	34%	10	15	41	*	100%	1,614
Protestants	4%	11	40	44	1	100%	1,614
Catholics	17%	8	25	49	1	100%	1,614
Jews	11%	8	19	61	1	100%	1,614

noted. First, taking a "split" or "don't know" response as an indication that the group is seen as less politically relevant, a sharp difference appears between the economic and the religious groupings, with the economic groupings being seen as much more relevant. This is particularly true with respect to big-businessmen, who were seen as taking a predominant party position by 67 per cent of the respondents, and labor union members, whom 66 per cent of the respondents saw as going Democratic or Republican. In contrast to this, all the religious groupings were seen as of low political relevance by at least three-quarters of the population. Although this was to be expected in the case of Protestants and Jews, it is interesting that it was also true for Catholics—at least in the 1952 election.

It is also interesting to observe, in Table D.2, that the perception of

group voting tends strongly to favor the Democrats. "Big-businessmen" is the only group which is seen as heavily favoring the Republicans. Labor union members (and working-class people), Negroes, and farmers are put solidly in the Democratic camp. Although the perception of the first three groups as Democratic was anticipated, the

TABLE D.3

RELATION OF PERCEPTION OF PARTY PREFERENCES OF DIFFERENT DEMOGRAPHIC CLASSES TO PERCEPTION OF REASONS FOR PREFERENCES

Perception of Party Preferences of Demographic Classes	Perception of Reasons for Party Preferences					No. of Cases
	Group Relevant Reasons	General Economic Interest Reasons	Other Reasons	Reasons Not Ascertained	Total	
Farmers						
Democratic	46%	35	10	9	100%	549
Republican	18%	14	57	11	100%	228
Labor union members						
Democratic	41%	19	29	11	100%	982
Republican	13%	16	52	19	100%	69
Working-class people						
Democratic	32%	40	19	9	100%	813
Republican	3%	29	53	15	100%	129
Middle-class people						
Democratic	12%	47	29	12	100%	308
Republican	20%	13	52	15	100%	378
Big-businessmen						
Democratic	21%	47	17	15	100%	193
Republican	44%	4	41	11	100%	893
Negroes						
Democratic	53%	15	21	11	100%	546
Republican	26%	5	53	16	100%	151
Protestants						
Democratic	8%	14	58	20	100%	71
Republican	9%	2	72	17	100%	176
Catholics						
Democratic	16%	13	58	13	100%	269
Republican†	42%	11	38	9	100%	126
Jews						
Democratic	44%	20	27	9	100%	182
Republican	55%	6	25	14	100%	126

† The high proportion of group-relevant reasons among people who saw the Catholics as going Republican is almost completely a function of the Stevenson divorce issue.

perception of farmers is somewhat surprising. Although it conforms to the farmers' 1948 vote, it diverges sharply from their 1952 vote and runs counter to the stereotype, held in some quarters, of the farmer as an individualistic, conservative Republican.

This tendency to identify the Democratic party with the interests of the broad population groupings is even more clearly demonstrated

when the reasons for the perceptions of group voting are examined. This is done in Table D.3. Farmers, working-class people, labor union members, and Negroes are not only more often seen as voting Democratic than Republican, but are also much more often seen as voting that way for group-relevant reasons. For example, 46 per cent of the people who felt that farmers would vote Democratic gave group-relevant reasons for their perceptions, whereas only 18 per cent of the respondents who thought that the farmers would vote Republican gave group-relevant reasons for that perception. When these groups were seen as voting Republican, the group vote was much more often cast in a general context and not given a specific group meaning.[5]

Turning now to a consideration of the way that membership in a demographic grouping influences one's perception of its political relevance, Table D.4 compares group members and nonmembers in their perceptions of the vote of the nine demographic categories.[6] A number of differences appear. We would expect a grouping to be more relevant for members of the grouping than it is for the general population. This is supported by the data presented in Table D.4, if we consider only the "don't know" response category. For example, 61 per cent of the non-Jews said that they didn't know how Jews would vote, whereas only 32 per cent of the Jews in the sample didn't know how their group would vote; 53 per cent of the non-Catholics in the sample said they didn't know how Catholics would vote as compared to only 32 per cent of the Catholics. However, much of this difference between members and nonmembers disappears if "split" voting as well as a "don't know" response is taken to represent minimal psychological relevance of the group. Only one-third of the Catholics and Jews in the sample saw their groups as making a predominant party choice. Even among their members, there was not very much perception of religious groupings as politically relevant.[7]

[5] This tendency to identify the Democratic party with group interest, particularly with economic group interest, is consistent with other data from the study. As was noted in Chapter IV, some of the major arguments offered by respondents in favor of the Democratic party were that it was the party of the common people, the working man, and that it meant good times and prosperity. The Republican party was rarely spoken of favorably as a party that would bring better economic conditions, or as a party that would help particular groups.

[6] Group members and nonmembers differed in their perceptions of how their groups would vote, but did not differ systematically in their perceptions of the reasons for their groups' votes. Contrary to expectations, there was no relation between membership in a group and the tendency to see that group as voting a given way for group-relevant reasons. For this reason, we have not included the table showing the relation between group membership and the perception of the reasons for the group's vote.

[7] This may be partly a function of a reluctance of people to identify religion with politics, at least publicly.

TABLE D.4

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP AND NONMEMBERSHIP IN DIFFERENT DEMOGRAPHIC CLASSES AND PERCEPTION OF PARTY PREFERENCES OF THESE CLASSES

Membership in Demographic Classes†	Perception of Party Preference						No. of Cases
	Democratic	Republican	Split	Don't Know	Not Ascertained	Total	
Farmers							
Members‡	26%	18	37	18	1	100%	183
Nonmembers	34%	14	27	25	—	100%	1,431
Labor union members							
Members§	72%	3	14	11	—	100%	440
Nonmembers	57%	5	11	27	*	100%	1,174
Working-class people							
Members‖	54%	8	22	16	*	100%	504
Nonmembers	48%	8	26	18	*	100%	1,110
Middle-class people							
Members#	15%	47	29	9	—	100%	200
Nonmembers	19%	21	32	28	*	100%	1,414
Negroes							
Members	45%	6	13	35	1	100%	157
Nonmembers	32%	11	15	42	—	100%	1,457
Protestants							
Members	5%	11	39	44	1	100%	1,156
Nonmembers	2%	12	42	42	2	100%	458
Catholics							
Members	22%	6	38	32	2	100%	343
Nonmembers	15%	9	22	53	1	100%	1,271
Jews							
Members	31%	2	31	32	4	100%	52
Nonmembers	11%	8	19	61	1	100%	1,562

† Does not include "big-businessmen" because very few respondents could be objectively placed in that class.

‡ Includes people who were themselves farmers or whose family heads were farmers.

§ Includes people who were themselves union members or whose family heads were union members.

‖ Working-class members consist of people who subjectively identified themselves as "working-class" and whose occupational status or that of the family head was that of a skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled worker.

Middle-class members consist of people who subjectively identified themselves as "middle class" and whose occupational status or that of the family head was professional, managerial, or self-employed businessmen.

We would also expect that group members would have a truer perception of how their groups' votes actually would go. This tends to be supported by the data. It is interesting to learn, however, that even among farmers the perception of the farmers' vote, though slightly more Republican than the perception among the general population, was still more Democratic than Republican.

We would expect the perceived political relevance of a group to be related to a number of other factors, in addition to membership in the group. Following some of the findings derived from recent social-psychological experiments on factors influencing perception, we would expect the perception of the political relevance of a group to be related to such dimensions as the ambiguity of the group's political position, the strength of the individual's identification with the group, and the positive or negative attitude toward the group. We would also expect such factors to affect the relation between the perceived group vote and the individual's own vote. Investigation of these hypotheses and relationships lies beyond the scope of the present discussion.

E. The Questionnaires

Pre-Election Questionnaire

I'm mainly interested in talking to you about the election this fall and how you feel about it.

1. Who do you think will be elected president in November?
   1*a*. [If R makes choice] Do you think it will be a close race or will [answer to 1] win by quite a bit?
2. How about here in [your state]? Will the vote for president be pretty evenly split or not?
   2*a*. [If necessary] Who do you think will win for president here in [your state]?
3. Do you think there are any important differences between what the Democratic and Republican parties stand for, or do you think they are about the same?
4. I'd like to ask you what you think are the good and bad points about the two parties. Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic party? (What is that?)
5. Is there anything in particular that you don't like about the Democratic party? (What is that?)
6. Is there anything in particular that you like about the Republican party? (What is that?)
7. Is there anything in particular that you don't like about the Republican party? (What is that?)
8. Do you think it will make a good deal of difference to the country

whether the Democrats or the Republicans win the elections this November, or that it won't make much difference which side wins?

8*a*. [If yes] Why is that?

8*b*. [If no] Why do you feel it won't make much difference?

9. Do you think it will make any difference in how you and your family get along financially whether the Democrats or Republicans win? (How is that?)

   9*a*. [If makes a difference and not answered in 9] Well, do you think you'll be better off or worse off financially if the Republicans win the election?

10. Now I'd like to ask you about the good and bad points of the two candidates for president. Is there anything in particular about Stevenson that might make you want to vote for him? (What is it?)

11. Is there anything in particular about Stevenson that might make you want to vote against him? (What is it?)

12. Is there anything in particular about Eisenhower that might make you want to vote for him? (What is it?)

13. Is there anything in particular about Eisenhower that might make you want to vote against him? (What is it?)

14. Now, adding up the good points and the bad points about the two candidates, and forgetting for a minute the parties they belong to, which one do you think would make the best president?

15. Some people say that Eisenhower is not a real Republican. What do you think about this? Is he the kind of man that *you* think of as being a real Republican? (Why do you say that?)

16. [If not answered in 15] What about Eisenhower's ideas and the things he stands for? Do you think that he is pretty much the same as most other Republicans, or is he different from them? (Why do you say that?)

17. How about the candidates for vice-president? Aside from their parties, do you have any strong opinions about either of them? (How is that?)

18. Generally speaking, would you say that you personally care a good deal which party wins the presidential election this fall, or that you don't care very much which party wins?

19. How about state and local elections? When you have state and local elections around here would you say that you care a good deal who wins, or that you don't care very much who wins those elections?

20. Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns. How about you? Would you say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political campaigns so far this year?

Now, I want to ask you how you feel about some of the issues that people are talking about these days. For example—

21. Some people think the national government should do more in trying to deal with such problems as unemployment, education, housing, and so on. Others think that the government is already doing too much. On the whole, would you say that what the government has done has been about right, too much, or not enough?

21*a*. Now, how do you think the two parties feel about this question—Do you think there are any differences between the Democratic and Republican parties on this issue, or would you say they feel the same? (How is that?)

22. There is a lot of talk these days about discrimination, that is, people having trouble getting jobs because of their race. Do you think the government ought to take an interest in whether Negroes have trouble getting jobs or should it stay out of this problem?

22*a*. [If government should take an interest] Do you think we need laws to deal with this problem or are there other ways that will handle it better?

22*a*(1) [If "other ways" to 22*a*] What do you have in mind?

22*a*(2) [If "laws" to 22*a*] Do you think the national government should handle this or do you think it should be left for each state to handle in its own way?

22*b*. [If government should stay out] Do you think the state governments should do something about this problem, or should they stay out of it also?

23. Have you heard anything about the Taft-Hartley Law?

23*a*. [If has heard] How do you feel about it? Do you think it's all right as it is, do you think it should be changed in any way, or don't you have any feelings about it?

23*a*(1) [If should be changed] Do you think the law should be changed just a little, changed quite a bit, or do you think it should be *completely* repealed? (How is that?)

24. Some people think that since the end of the last world war this country has gone too far in concerning itself with problems in other parts of the world. How do you feel about this?

24*a*. Now, how do you think the two parties feel about this question—Do you think there are any differences between the Democratic and Republican parties on this issue, or would you say they feel the same? (How is that?)

25. Some people feel that it was our government's fault that China went Communist, others say there was nothing that we could do to stop it. How do you feel about this?

26. Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Korea two years ago, or should we have stayed out?

27. Which of the following things do you think it would be best for us to do *now* in Korea? Should we—

☐ (*a*) Pull out of Korea entirely?
☐ (*b*) Keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement?
☐ (*c*) Take a stronger stand and bomb Manchuria and China?
[Qualifying comments]_____

Now I would like to ask you a little more about the political parties.

28. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?

If Republican or Democrat to Question 28*: (if independent or other skip to Question* 28*d.)*

28*a*. Would you call yourself a strong (R) (D) or a not very strong (R) (D)?

28*b*. Was there ever a time when you thought of yourself as a (R) (D) rather than a (D) (R)?

28*b*(1). [If yes to 28*b*] When did you change?

28*c*. Suppose there was an election where your party was running a candidate that you didn't like or you didn't agree with. Which of the following things comes closest to what you think you would do?

☐ (1) I probably would vote for him anyway because a person should be loyal to his party.

☐ (2) I probably would not vote for either candidate in that election.

☐ (3) I probably would vote for the other party's candidate.

28*c*(1). [If 3 is chosen to 28*c*] How would you feel about voting for the other party—would it bother you in any way?

If independent or other to Question 28*:*

28*d*. Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?

28*e*. Was there ever a time when you thought of yourself as a Democrat or a Republican?

28*e*(1). [If yes to 28*e*] Which party was that?

28*e*(2). [If yes to 28*e*] When did you change?

Ask of everyone

29. Do you remember when you were growing up whether your parents thought of themselves mostly as Democrats or Republicans, or did they shift around from one party to another?

30. In the elections for president since you have been old enough to vote, would you say that you have voted in all of them, most of them, some of them, or none of them?

If R has *ever voted for president to Question* 30, *ask Questions* 31–33*; if R has* never *voted for president, skip to Question* 34.

31. Have you always voted for the same party, or have you voted for different parties for president?

31*a*. [If same] Which party was that?

32. Do you remember who you voted for the first time you voted for president?

32*a*. [If yes] Who was it? What party was it?

32*b*. [If yes] Do you remember what year that was? [If yes] When?

33. In 1948, you remember that Truman ran against Dewey. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?

33*a*. [If yes, does remember voting] Which one did you vote for?

Ask of everyone

34. Now how about the election this November? Do you know if you are (registered) (eligible to vote) so that you could vote in the November election if you wanted to?
    34*a*. [If necessary] Are you (registered) (eligible to vote)?
35. So far as you know now, do you expect to vote in November or not?

If yes *to Question* 35, *ask Questions* 36–39; *if* no *to Question* 35, *skip to Question* 40.

36. How do you think you will vote for president in this election?
    36*a*. [If mentions candidate or party] What would you say is the *most important reason* why you are going to vote for [answer to 36]?
37. Who do you plan to vote for as United States senator?
38. How about congressman? Who do you plan to vote for there?
39. Who do you think you will vote for as governor here in [your state]?

If no *to Question* 35:

40. If you *were* going to vote, how do you think you would vote for president in this election?
    40*a*. [If mentions candidate or party] What would you say is the most important reason why you would vote for [answer to 40]?

Ask of everyone

41. Some people think that if a voter votes for one party for president he should vote for the same party for senator and congressman. Do you agree or disagree with that idea?
    41*a*. Why do you feel that way?
42. Was there some other candidate whom you would rather have seen nominated at Chicago last July? [If necessary] Who?
    42*a*. [If yes to 42] Why would you like to have seen him nominated?
43. Do you think the party conventions like they had in Chicago are a good way to nominate candidates for president, or do you think there is a better way?
    43*a*. [If a better way] What would you suggest?
44. Now I'd like to ask you some questions about how you think *other* people will vote in this election.
    For instance, take *farmers*—do you think farmers around the country will vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or do you think they will be about evenly split?
    ☐ D ☐ R ☐ Split ☐ DK
    Now, how about *working-class people*—do you think they will vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or do you think they will be about evenly split?
    ☐ D ☐ R ☐ Split ☐ DK
    Now, how about:

Negroes	☐ D	☐ R	☐ Split	☐ DK
Middle-class people	☐ D	☐ R	☐ Split	☐ DK
Big-businessmen	☐ D	☐ R	☐ Split	☐ DK
Labor union members	☐ D	☐ R	☐ Split	☐ DK

Now, how about people in different religious groups, like Protestants, Catholics, and Jews? For instance, how about Protestants —do you think Protestants around the country will vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or do you think they will be about evenly split?

	☐ D	☐ R	☐ Split	☐ DK
Now, how about Catholics?	☐ D	☐ R	☐ Split	☐ DK
How about Jews?	☐ D	☐ R	☐ Split	☐ DK

44*a*. [Ask only for groups seen as mostly supporting one or the other party to question 44.] Now let me check back and ask you why you feel that _____ are more likely to vote (R) (D), etc.

45. Are you married?

45*a*. [If yes] How do you think your husband (wife) will vote?

46. Now how about your five best friends? How do you think they're most likely to vote?

47. Now I'd like to read some of the kinds of things people tell me when I interview them and ask you whether you agree or disagree with them. I'll read them one at a time and you just tell me whether you agree or disagree.

47*a*. It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have a chance to win.	☐ Agree	☐ Disagree
47*b*. I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.	☐ Agree	☐ Disagree
47*c*. The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country.	☐ Agree	☐ Disagree
47*d*. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.	☐ Agree	☐ Disagree
47*e*. A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with.	☐ Agree	☐ Disagree
47*f*. So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not.	☐ Agree	☐ Disagree
47*g*. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.	☐ Agree	☐ Disagree
47*h*. If a person doesn't care how an election comes out he shouldn't vote in it.	☐ Agree	☐ Disagree
47*i*. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.	☐ Agree	☐ Disagree

And now I'd like to ask you just two more questions.

48. There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. If you were asked to use one of these four names for *your* social class, which would you say you belonged in—the middle class, lower class, working class or upper class?

49. Some people say there's not much opportunity in America today—that the average man doesn't have much chance to really get ahead. Others say there's plenty of opportunity, and anyone who works hard can go as far as he wants. How do you feel about this?

Postelection Questionnaire

We're calling on all the people we interviewed before the election and asking them how they feel about the way the election came out.

1. Do you think it will make a good deal of difference to the country that Eisenhower won instead of Stevenson, or don't you think it will make much difference?
   1*a*. [If yes] Why is that?
2. We're mainly interested in this interview in finding out whether people paid much attention to the election campaign this year.
   Take newspapers for instance—did you read about the campaign in any newspaper?
   2*a*. [If yes] Would you say you read quite a lot ☐ or not very much ☐?
3. How about radio—did you listen to any speeches or discussions about the campaign on the radio?
   3*a*. [If yes] Would you say you listened quite a lot ☐ or not very much ☐?
4. How about television—did you watch any programs about the campaign on television?
   4*a*. [If yes] Would you say you watched quite a lot ☐ or not very much ☐?
5. How about magazines—did you read about the campaign in any magazines?
   5*a*. [If yes] Would you say you read quite a lot ☐ or not very much ☐?
6. [If yes to two or more] Of all these ways of following the campaign which one would you say you got the most information from—newspapers, radio, television, or magazines?
7. In talking to people about the election, we find that a lot of people weren't able to vote because they weren't registered, or they were sick, or they just didn't have time. How about you, did you vote this time?

If R voted: (*If R did not vote, skip to Question* 23)

8. Who did you vote for for president?
9. What would you say is the most important reason you voted for him?
10. How long before the election did you decide that you were going to vote the way you did?
11. Did you ever think during the campaign that you might vote for [opposite candidate]?
    11*a*. [If yes] What made you decide not to vote for him?
12. How about the election for United States senator? Did you vote for a candidate for senator?
    12*a*. [If yes] Who did you vote for?

13. How about the vote for congressman? Did you vote for a candidate for Congress?
    13*a*. [If yes] Who did you vote for?
14. How about the vote for governor here in [your state]? Did you vote for one of the candidates for governor?
    14*a*. [If yes] Who did you vote for?
15. How about the elections for other state and local offices—did you vote a straight ticket or did you vote for candidates from different parties?
    15*a*. [If voted a straight ticket] Which party did you vote for?
16. You know that the parties try to talk to as many people as they can to get them to vote for their candidate. Did anybody from either one of the parties call you up or come around and talk to you during the campaign?
    [If yes]
    16*a*. Which party were they from?
    ☐ D ☐ R ☐ Both D and R ☐ Don't know ☐ Other
    16*b*. Do you remember what they talked to you about?
    [If Democrat] ———
    [If Republican] ———
    16*c*. Do you think that anything they said had anything to do with the way you decided to vote?

Now I'd like to ask you some questions about how you think some people you know voted in the election.

17. Could you tell me how your friends voted in the election? Did they vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or were they pretty evenly split?
    17*a*. Do you think any of their opinions about the election had anything to do with the way you decided to vote?
18. How about the people where you work? Did they vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or were they pretty evenly split?
    18*a*. Do you think any of their opinions about the election had anything to do with the way you decided to vote?
19. [If married] How about your (husband) (wife)? Did (he) (she) vote Democratic or Republican?
    19*a*. Do you think any of (his) (her) opinions about the election had anything to do with the way you decided to vote?
20. [If not married] How about your family? Did they vote Democratic or Republican?
    20*a*. Do you think any of their opinions about the election had anything to do with the way you decided to vote?
21. Is there anything in particular that happened during the campaign, something you saw, read, or heard about, that helped you decide how you were going to vote?
22. I have a list of some of the things that people do that help a party or a candidate win an election. I wonder if you could tell me whether you did any of these things during the last election campaign.

22*a*. Did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates? ☐ Yes ☐ No

22*b*. Did you give any money or buy tickets or anything to help the campaign for one of the parties or candidates? ☐ Yes ☐ No

22*c*. Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, dinners, or things like that? ☐ Yes ☐ No

22*d*. Did you do any other work for one of the parties or candidates? ☐ Yes ☐ No

22*e*. Do you belong to any political club or organizations? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Skip to Question 32 *if R voted*

If R did not vote:

23. Who would you have voted for if you had voted?
24. What was the main reason you didn't vote?
25. Were you registered to vote?
26. You know the parties try to talk to as many people as they can to get them to vote for their candidate. Did anybody from either one of the parties call you up or come around and talk to you during the campaign?

    26*a*. [If yes] Which party were they from?

    ☐ D ☐ R ☐ Both D and R ☐ Don't know ☐ Other

Now I'd like to ask you some questions about how you think some people you know voted in the election.

27. Could you tell me how your friends voted in the election? Did they vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or were they pretty evenly split?
28. How about the people where you work? Did they vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or were they pretty evenly split?
29. [If married] How about your (husband) (wife)? Did (he) (she) vote Democratic or Republican?
30. [If not married] How about your family? Did they vote Democratic or Republican?
31. I have a list of some of the things that people do that help a party or a candidate win an election. I wonder if you could tell me whether you did any of these things during the last election campaign.

    31*a*. Did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates? ☐ Yes ☐ No

    31*b*. Did you give any money or buy tickets or anything to help the campaign for one of the parties or candidates? ☐ Yes ☐ No

    31*c*. Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, dinners, or things like that? ☐ Yes ☐ No

    31*d*. Did you do any other work for one of the parties or candidates? ☐ Yes ☐ No

    31*e*. Do you belong to any political club or organizations? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Ask of everyone: [Questions 32–40 were asked only of 585 people selected at random from the postelection sample.]

32. I have a list here of different kinds of clubs and organizations that people can belong to. I would like you to go over this list with me and tell me if you belong to any organizations like a labor union, a lodge, a veterans' organization and so on.
[List names of all organizations to which R belongs at bottom of page.]

LABOR UNIONS: A local of some union.

CHURCH CONNECTED GROUPS: Like a club connected with a church, such as men's clubs, ladies' aid societies, Holy Name societies, Missionary societies.

FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS OR LODGES: Like the Masons, Knights of Columbus, Elks, Eastern Star.

VETERANS ORGANIZATIONS: Like the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Am. Vets.

BUSINESS OR CIVIC GROUPS: Like Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions.

PARENT-TEACHER ASSOCIATION.

NEIGHBORHOOD CLUBS OR COMMUNITY CENTERS.

ORGANIZATIONS OF PEOPLE OF THE SAME NATIONALITY BACKGROUND: Like the Polish National Alliance, the Italian American Society, etc.

SPORT TEAMS: Like bowling or baseball teams.

PROFESSIONAL GROUPS: Like the American Medical Association, or a builders' association.

NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATIONS.

WOMEN'S CLUBS.

CHARITABLE AND WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS.

INFORMAL CLUBS OR GROUPS: Like sewing circles, bridge clubs, poker clubs.

33. We want to be sure we have all of the organizations you belong to. Are there any others that are not on the list? [Add any mentioned to list below].

34. [For each group mentioned which is not a well-known national organization] Just what does this organization do? I mean what is its main activity? [Write in answers below]

35. [For all groups] Now I would like to ask you how active you are in this (these) organization(s).
First, let's take the _____ group. Would you say you are an active member of this group or not very active?
Active ☐ Not very active ☐ [repeat for each group]

36. Now I'd like to read some of the kinds of things people tell me when I interview them, and ask you whether you agree or disagree with them. I'll read them one at a time, and you just tell me whether you agree or disagree with them, and whether you agree or disagree a little or quite a bit.

36*a*. Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.
Agree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐
Disagree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐

36*b*. What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents.
Agree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐
Disagree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐

36*c*. A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk.
Agree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐
Disagree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐

36*d*. Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.
Agree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐
Disagree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐

36*e*. Women should stay out of politics.
Agree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐
Disagree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐

36*f*. People sometimes say that an insult to your honor should not be forgotten. Do you agree or disagree with that?
Agree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐
Disagree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐

36*g*. People can be trusted.
Agree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐
Disagree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐

36*h*. One main trouble today is that people talk too much and work too little.
Agree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐
Disagree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐

36*i*. Sex criminals deserve more than prison; they should be whipped publicly or worse.
Agree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐
Disagree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐

36*j*. It is only natural and right that women should have less freedom than men.
Agree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐
Disagree: A little ☐ Quite a bit ☐

37. What was your occupation four years ago? I mean, what kind of work were you doing around the time of the 1948 election?

37*a*. [If R was employed] Were you working for yourself then, or were you working for someone else?

38. [Ask only if R is not head of the household] What kind of work was the head of your household doing four years ago, around the time of the 1948 election?

38*a*. [If head was employed] Was he working for himself then, or was he working for someone else?

39. When you were going to grade school or high school, did you go to a parochial school, a private school, or a regular public school?

40. Were you or the head of your household ever in the armed services of the United States?

[If yes]

40*a*. Which one of you was that?

40*b*. What years did that cover?

Personal Data

1. Sex: ☐ Male ☐ Female.
2. Race: ☐ White ☐ Negro ☐ Other _____
3. What year were you born?
4. How many grades of school did you finish? 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.

   4*a*. [If high school] Have you had any schooling other than high school?
   ☐ Yes ☐ No

   4*a*(1). [If yes to 4*a*] What other schooling have you had?

   4*b*. [If attended college] Do you have a college degree? ☐ Yes ☐ No.
5. What is your occupation? I mean, what kind of work do you do?

   5*a*. [If R is employed] Do you work for yourself or for someone else?

   5*b*. [If R is unemployed] What kind of work do you usually do?

   5*c*. [If R is retired] What kind of work did you do before you retired?
6. [Ask only if R is not head of the household] What kind of work does the head of your household do?

   6*a*. [If head is employed] Does he work for himself or for someone else?

   6*b*. [If head is unemployed] What kind of work does he usually do?

   6*c*. [If head is retired] What kind of work did he do before he retired?

   6*d*. Age of head: [21–24] [25–34] [35–44] [45–54] [55–64] [65 and over]
7. Do either you or the head of your household belong to a labor union?

   7*a*. [If necessary] Who is it that belongs?
8. What kind of work did your father do for a living while you were growing up?
9. Where were you born? [If United States, which state?]
10. What part of the United States did you grow up in? (Which state or states?)
11. Were you brought up mostly on a farm, in a small town, or in a large city?
12. Were both your parents born in this country? ☐ Yes ☐ No.

    [If yes to Question 12:]

    12*a*. Which country did your father's parents come from?

    12*b*. Which country did your mother's parents come from?

    [If no to Question 12:]

    12*c*. Which country was your father born in?

    12*d*. Which country was your mother born in?
13. How long have you lived in this county [Note: *county*, not country.]
14. How long have you lived in (state)?

15. Do you feel that you have settled down to stay here in [face sheet designation] or do you feel that you may not stay here very long?
16. Do you folks own your home here, or rent, or what?
    ☐ Own ☐ Rent ☐ Other _____
17. Do you have any children in school here in _____?
    ☐ Yes ☐ No.
18. Is your church preference Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish?
    ☐ Protestant ☐ Catholic ☐ Jewish ☐ Other ☐ None.
19. Would you say you go to church ☐ regularly ☐ often ☐ seldom or ☐ never?
20. About what do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family?

☐ Under $1,000	☐ $3,000–3,999	☐ $7,500–9,999
☐ $1,000–1,999	☐ $4,000–4,999	☐ $10,000 and over
☐ $2,000–2,999	☐ $5,000–7,499	

F. Sample Design

General Method for Selection of Sample

The individuals interviewed in this survey are a representative cross-section of citizens of voting age living in private households in the United States. Since the survey was restricted to private households, those people residing in military establishments, hospitals, religious and educational institutions, logging and lumber camps, penal institutions, hotels, and larger rooming houses were excluded from the sample. These excluded groups, which comprise very roughly about five per cent of the adult population of the United States, were omitted from the defined population because the usual sampling procedures would cause serious practical difficulties when applied to these groups, and because a large proportion of these people are legally or otherwise disfranchised.

The sample was selected by a probability method with procedures known as area sampling. By this method every member of the population sampled had a known chance of being selected. The basic procedure is first to select randomly a sample of primary sampling areas (each of which contains one or more counties). This was done by dividing the entire country into 66 strata, and selecting one primary sampling area from each stratum. Each of the twelve largest metropolitan areas in the country formed a stratum by itself and was selected with certainty, so as to represent itself. In each of the remaining 54 strata, one primary sampling area was selected to represent the entire stratum.

Within each sample point (selected primary sampling area), a sample

of places (cities, towns, rural congested areas) was selected. Open country areas were selected in 40 of the sample points.

Within each sample city or town, or rural congested area, scattered blocks were selected at random. For cities with populations of 50,000 or more, census statistics showing average rental value and number of dwelling units are available for each block, and this information was used as a basis for stratification of the blocks and for measures of size used in the selection procedure.

A sampling rate was applied such as to yield an average of two expected dwellings in each block, on the basis of census figures. In the larger cities each block was chosen with a probability directly proportional to its expected number of dwelling units, and the dwellings within the blocks were selected with probability inversely proportional to the same number; therefore, all dwellings had the same chance of being included in the sample (except when they were deliberately oversampled). It should be noted that if there were any major changes in population since the census figures were obtained, these changes would be reflected by area sampling in an increased or decreased yield of interviews from the affected areas. Census figures were not used to establish a quota of interviews, but only a sampling rate. This procedure of sampling, with probability proportionate to measure of size, was used similarly at each stage of the sample selection.

In smaller cities, towns, and rural congested areas, the map was divided into blocks and numbered in such a way as to yield a rough geographical stratification when sampled systematically. The dwelling units found on the selected blocks were listed and subsampled systematically.

Open country areas were divided into small segments containing one to six dwelling units, and a random selection was made from these segments. All the dwellings in the selected segments were included in the sample.

Each sample block or segment was marked on a detailed map or aerial photograph of the area. These materials and detailed instructions guided the interviewers in carrying through the sampling procedure.

Within each dwelling unit which fell into the sample, only one adult was interviewed. The respondent was designated by an objective procedure of selection,[1] and no substitutions were allowed. If an individual to be interviewed was not at home on the first call, from three to ten call-backs were made in an attempt to reach him. However, even after repeated calls a small proportion of the designated individuals were not found at home, and some refused to be interviewed.

[1] Kish, Leslie, "A Procedure for Objective Respondent Selection within the Household," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1949, **44**, 380–87.

The selection of only one adult within each sample dwelling unit means, of course, that if each dwelling unit had an equal chance of being included in the sample, then people who live in households where there are a large number of adults have a smaller chance of being interviewed than people in households where only one or two adults live. This can be adjusted for through a system of weights. The data presented in this report have not been adjusted in this way. However, from the analysis of data from this survey and many previous surveys, it was found that the weighting produces only minute changes in the data.[2]

The Sample for the Pre-Election Survey

In order to obtain a large enough sample to permit regional estimates and comparisons, the West was sampled with a probability twice as large as was used for the rest of the country. The double sampling in the West was handled as follows: For three sample places (each of which were large cities) three extra large cities were selected, and the interviews were taken from them. In the remaining sample places the number of interviews was doubled. This made it possible to make more precise estimates for the West. Altogether 2,021 interviews were taken on the pre-election survey.

The Sample for the Postelection Survey

For this survey, the West was "unloaded," i.e., only half of the dwellings in the West which had been selected for the pre-election survey were retained for the postelection survey. This subselection was made randomly, stratifying on sex, income, and party preference of the respondent. All selected dwellings in the other three geographic areas (Northeast, Midwest, and South) were retained.

This left a sample of dwellings in the United States, all of which had been selected with equal probability. This sample was randomly divided into two parts, one consisting of one-third of the sample, the other consisting of the other two-thirds of the sample. This was done because two different forms of questionnaires were used. All respondents were asked certain basic political questions. The additional

[2] By comparing properly weighted data with unweighted data on a selection of items, it was found that for most items the differences ranged around 0.3 per cent. The largest differences were found on age, sex of respondent, and income. The unweighted results underestimate the proportion of people under forty years old by 1.3 per cent, underestimate the proportion of males by 0.9 per cent, and overestimate the proportion with incomes under $2,000 per year by 2.8 per cent. The unweighted results for 1952 voting behavior underestimated the Democratic vote by 0.1 per cent.

questions were political in nature for the one-third sample, and economic in nature for the two-thirds sample.

The same respondents that were interviewed on the pre-election survey were reinterviewed on the postelection survey. If the family occupying the selected dwelling had moved, the interviewers were instructed to go to the new address and interview the designated respondent there. No substitutions were allowed.

TABLE F.1

THE DISPOSITION OF INTERVIEWS ON THE PRE-ELECTION AND POSTELECTION SURVEYS

Number of respondents who gave:		
Both pre-election and postelection interviews		1,614
Pre-election interviews only		407
Postelection interviews not obtained because:		
(*a*) West overload	222	
(*b*) Other reasons	185	
Postelection interviews only		100
Total		2,121

No reinterview was attempted with those respondents who had refused to be interviewed in the pre-election survey. It was assumed that they would refuse a postelection interview, so they were merely counted as refusals on the reinterview, and incorporated into the "nonresponses."

Altogether 1,714 postelection interviews were taken, and of these 1,614 respondents had also given pre-election interviews. The 100 respondents giving only postelection interviews were not interviewed in the pre-election survey for reasons such as: not at home, respondent absent, house vacant during the time of the pre-election survey, etc.

Sampling Errors

Survey results are subject to two major kinds of error. First, there are whatever inaccuracies occur in the respondents' answers and in the way they are recorded by the interviewers—the so-called "reporting" errors. In most cases the magnitude of these errors can only be surmised. Another type of error is called sampling error. It results from the fact that the survey is based upon a sample rather than upon interviews with the entire population. There is always the possibility that by chance the sample will contain too many or too few Republicans,

too many or too few people who believe foreign involvement is undesirable, etc. The extent to which sample findings may overestimate or underestimate the true figures is largely dependent on the number of interviews, but there are other factors involved as well. With a sample of a given size, the smallest sampling error would be achieved if the cases in the sample were widely scattered through the area sampled, with no two interviews taken in the same place. This kind of sample is prohibitive from the standpoint of time and expense, however, and in practice the interviews are "clustered" within sample points and within blocks or segments. Clustering increases the sampling error. To some extent, however, certain reductions in sampling error are achieved through the use of stratification.

The sampling error measures the limits on either side of the obtained figures within which the true population value has a given probability of falling. It is customary to give, as "the sampling error," a figure representing two standard errors; this represents the limits within which the true value will lie 95 out of 100 times.

The sampling error varies somewhat for the different findings of the survey. Despite these differences, tables representing the approximate magnitudes of the sampling errors of various estimated percentages will give a general picture of the degree of variability that should be attached to the estimates. Tables F.2, F.3, F.4, and F.5 represent a generalized compromise result. However, the sampling error for any particular item may in fact be one percentage point lower or higher than that given in the tables.

Table F.2 may be used to determine the sampling error for the difference of two proportions when comparing two subgroups, both of which are based on all sample points. The *n*s of the two subgroups and the average size of the two proportions being compared are necessary for entering the table.[3] If, for example, the two groups being compared were based on *n*s of 200 and 500 respectively, the proper "box" in the table is found in the row marked $n=200$ and the column marked $n=500$. Where the proportions being compared are about 50 per cent, the sampling error is about 9 per cent; where the proportions being compared are about 20 per cent, the sampling error is about 7 per cent; etc. Thus, the proper "box" is determined by the *n*s of the two subgroups, and the line within the "box" is determined by the size of the proportions being compared.

[3] The average of the two proportions being compared would be obtained by the following formula:

$$\frac{n_1p_1 + n_2p_2}{n_1 + n_2} = \text{average proportion,}$$

where n_1 and n_2 refer to the sizes of the two groups being compared, and p_1 and p_2 refer to the two proportions being compared.

TABLE F.2

DIFFERENCES REQUIRED FOR STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE (Probability = 95%) IN COMPARING TWO SUBGROUPS, BOTH OF WHICH ARE BASED ON ALL SAMPLE POINTS

n \ n	40	70	100	200	300	500	1,000	1,500	p
40	23	20	19	18	17	17	17	17	50%
	18	16	15	14	14	14	13	13	20%
	18	16	15	14	14	14	13	13	10%
	18	16	15	14	14	14	13	13	5%
70		17	16	14	14	13	13	13	50%
		14	13	12	11	11	10	10	20%
		14	13	12	11	11	10	10	10%
		14	13	12	11	11	10	10	5%
100			15	13	12	12	11	11	50%
			12	10	10	9	9	9	20%
			9	8	7	7	7	7	10%
			9	8	7	7	7	7	5%
200				11	10	9	9	8	50%
				9	8	7	7	7	20%
				7	6	6	5	5	10%
				5	5	4	4	4	5%
300					9	8	8	7	50%
					7	7	6	6	20%
					6	5	5	5	10%
					4	4	4	3	5%
500						7	7	7	50%
						6	5	5	20%
						5	4	4	10%
						3	3	3	5%
1,000							6	6	50%
							5	5	20%
							4	4	10%
							3	3	5%

Table F.3 may be used to determine the sampling error for estimated proportions of groups based on all sample points. The size of the group and the size of the proportion being estimated are needed for entering the table. If, for example, the size of the group is 300, then the proper "box" is found in the row marked $n = 300$. Proportions around 50 per cent have a sampling error of about 6 per cent;

TABLE F.3

SAMPLING ERRORS (Probability = 95%) FOR ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS FOR GROUPS BASED ON ALL SAMPLE POINTS

n		p
40	16	50%
	13	20%
	13	10%
	13	5%
70	12	50%
	10	20%
	10	10%
	10	5%
100	10	50%
	8	20%
	6	10%
	5	5%
200	8	50%
	6	20%
	5	10%
	4	5%
300	6	50%
	5	20%
	4	10%
	3	5%
500	5	50%
	4	20%
	3	10%
	3	5%
1,000	4	50%
	3	20%
	3	10%
	2	5%
1,500	3.6	50%
	2.9	20%
	2.2	10%
	1.6	5%
1,800	3.4	50%
	2.7	20%
	2.0	10%
	1.4	5%

proportions around 20 per cent have a sampling error of about 5 per cent; etc. Thus, if a proportion based on an $n=300$ were estimated to be 45 per cent, then the true population value has a 95 per cent probability of falling within the range 45−6 per cent and 45+6 per cent —thus, between 39 and 51 per cent.

TABLE F.4

DIFFERENCES REQUIRED FOR STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE (Probability=95%) IN COMPARING TWO SUBGROUPS FORMED ALONG REGIONAL LINES

n \ n	40	70	100	200	300	500	1,000	1,500	p
40	25	22	21	20	19	19	19	19	50%
	20	18	17	16	16	16	15	15	20%
	20	18	17	16	16	16	15	15	10%
	20	18	17	16	16	16	15	15	5%
70		19	18	16	16	15	15	15	50%
		16	15	14	13	13	12	12	20%
		16	15	14	13	13	12	12	10%
		16	15	14	13	13	12	12	5%
100			17	15	14	14	13	13	50%
			14	12	12	11	11	11	20%
			11	10	8	8	8	8	10%
			11	10	8	8	8	8	5%
200				13	12	11	11	10	50%
				11	10	8	8	8	20%
				8	7	7	6	6	10%
				6	6	5	5	5	5%
300					11	10	10	8	50%
					8	8	7	7	20%
					7	6	6	6	10%
					5	5	5	4	5%
500						8	8	8	50%
						7	6	6	20%
						6	5	5	10%
						4	4	4	5%
1,000							7	7	50%
							6	6	20%
							5	5	10%
							4	4	5%

Table F.4 and Table F.5 may be used when the groups are formed along regional lines, since in this case, only part of the sample points are involved. The procedures for using Tables F.4 and F.5 are the same as noted above, for Tables F.2 and F.3 respectively.

TABLE F.5

SAMPLING ERRORS (Probability=95%) FOR ESTIMATED PROPORTIONS FOR GROUPS FORMED ALONG REGIONAL LINES

n		p
40	17	50%
	14	20%
	14	10%
	14	5%
70	13	50%
	11	20%
	11	10%
	11	5%
100	11	50%
	9	20%
	7	10%
	6	5%
200	9	50%
	7	20%
	6	10%
	4	5%
300	7	50%
	6	20%
	4	10%
	3	5%
500	6	50%
	4	20%
	3	10%
	3	5%
1,000	4	50%
	3	20%
	3	10%
	2	5%

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